Where the Manchester derby was won and lost – tactical analysis

It was a Manchester derby to forget for Ruben Amorim’s Manchester United, with defeat at the Etihad meaning the Portuguese’s Premier League record now reads eight wins from 31 matches.

But was Sunday’s 3-0 loss a case of a faulty philosophy, individual mistakes, or an impressive performance from Manchester City?

City focused much of their play down the left-hand side in the first half.

Blues boss Pep Guardiola aimed to exploit weaknesses in United’s defensive approach, with an eye on their back five, two central midfielders and the aggressive manner in which the wider centre-backs are asked to step out to press.

The hosts’ left-back – Nico O’Reilly – took a wider position on the touchline, aiming to draw United right wing-back Noussair Mazraoui towards him.

Jeremy Doku – City’s left winger – would ordinarily have been marked by Mazraoui, but as O’Reilly took the wide position, Doku was more central.

That gave Mazraoui the difficult task of knowing who to pick up. His decision was to ignore Doku and instead defend the wide spaces – stepping up to press O’Reilly when the ball went to him.

Doku’s inside position ensured City had an overload around United’s midfield.

Rodri, Phil Foden (who had dropped deeper), Doku (who had moved inside) and Tijjani Reijnders formed a box around United’s midfield duo.

With Doku infield, it was Leny Yoro – United’s right centre-back – who was tasked with pushing up aggressively on him.

That is a difficult ask for a natural central defender, especially with Doku dropping as deep as his own half, and it was made more difficult as Foden also occupied those areas.

Yoro’s front-footed defending made the midfield battle a four against three – rather than four against two – at times, but he would often retreat when City’s players moved deeper as he did not want to end up too far from his backline.

By not committing entirely to backing up the press in a man-to-man fashion, United’s press was disjointed – meaning City had a free man somewhere.

United captain Bruno Fernandes touched on this after the match, admitting his team needed to be “more brave with full pressure” to prevent the opening goal.

“City take that risk against us – we need to do the same,” he said.

“I was trying to press Rodri because the aim of the midfielders was for one to jump on Rodri, with one of the defenders on Foden.

“In the first moment, I can cover both but Leny comes up so I go more on Rodri. And Leny was going backwards because of a miscommunication and we end up giving too much space on the pitch.”

A team-wide man-to-man press would ensure easy passing options aren’t available for the opposition.

As Fernandes mentions, it was the job of one of the defenders – namely Yoro – to jump on Foden. But the clever positioning of O’Reilly and movement of Doku meant he was left in two minds.

City’s use of pinning was particularly impressive.

Pinning is the act of positioning a player in a certain area with the result an opponent also has to stay there.

If a winger stands on the touchline next to the opposition full-back, for example, the defender is unlikely to leave that area as the attacker would be free. The winger has, therefore, ‘pinned’ the full-back.

City used pinning throughout Sunday’s game to make United’s aggressive defending tactics weaker, and to open up space for their attackers.

We’ve already spoken about how O’Reilly pinned Mazraoui to the touchline, leaving Doku free to move inside without being followed.

On the other flank, we saw clever movement from Reijnders on to Luke Shaw that prevented him from leaving the back five. As a result, Doku’s unorthodox positioning – having vacated his flank – allowed him to pick up the ball unopposed.

Amorim asks his wide centre-backs to step out and apply pressure to the extra opposition player if United are outnumbered in midfield, but with Shaw stuck with Reijnders, City had Doku free.

For City’s first goal, Fernandes and Manuel Ugarte were back in defensive positions, but the hosts were able to pick up the loose ball in the penalty area uncontested.

Late runs into the box had already resulted in goals against United this season, with Fulham’s Emile Smith Rowe scoring in that manner last month. For both that goal and Foden’s on Sunday, Fernandes failed to track the midfield run.

Fernandes plays in midfield for Amorim for his engine, industry, direct passing and ability to switch play. As a naturally attacking midfielder, his relative strengths don’t include defensive awareness and tracking late runs.

Should he do better here? Probably. But it raises a bigger question as to whether United have platformed their individuals according to their strengths, while minimising their weaknesses.

After the match, much of the debate was focused on whether United’s struggles are down to personnel or the system.

Better personnel always improves performance but United’s struggles this season have also been down to their structure and the roles players have been asked to perform.

With better individuals, perhaps United’s wide centre-backs would press man to man high up the pitch. But regardless of who plays, opponents would still be able to create midfield overloads by using the same rotations with which City and Fulham have found success.

If teams are finding specific ways to unpick a system, a manager failing to nullify that will concern fans.

Amorim, however, appears to be doubling down on his system.

Speaking after Sunday’s game, he said: “When I want to change my philosophy, I will change. If not, you have to change the man.”

But United’s squad will not change before the January transfer window, so nullifying the above issues may need an adaptation to the system or players’ roles.

Not for the first time, Guardiola showed on Sunday he has a willingness to adapt his system to maximise his players’ strengths and minimise their weaknesses.

His use of new goalkeeper Gianluigi Donnarumma appeared to indicate they may adopt a more direct approach when building from the back.