An unprecedented pan-Arab protest movement was born out of a desire for more democratic forms of government exactly 15 years ago when Mohammed Bouazizi was himself killed in Tunisia.
In extraordinary scenes, millions of protesters across several countries rallied against authoritarian leaders who had been in power for decades, challenging political systems defined by repression, corruption, and exclusion.
The centralized power structures that exacerbated corruption, injustice, and concentrated wealth in the hands of a select few were the subject of protester complaints. A historic call for respect, accountability, and democratic rule followed, not just a regional revolt.
Predictably, regimes responded with heavy-handed tactics – numerous demonstrators were killed, beaten, or arrested.
However, the pro-democracy movement had early significant successes.
Four long-standing dictators, including Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Tunisian Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, were all forced to resign in less than a month.
In a handful of countries – Bahrain, Algeria, and Iraq among them – regimes successfully quelled protests, ending them before they could gain serious momentum.
Protest movements in other nations led to sporadic reforms or, in the case of Syria, a protracted civil war without a full regime change.
Libya and Yemen ultimately suffocated in a bloody conflict similar to Syria.
Egypt and Tunisia were the only Arab Spring countries that could point to significant longer-term successes – both countries quickly toppled their dictators and almost immediately began democratic transitions.
Despite the mixed outcomes, observers generally praised the Arab Spring as a new form of democracy for a region that had been tyranny for a long time. However, 15 years later, it is clear that authoritarian regimes have learned how to prevent similar uprisings from ever occurring again despite the popular demands for democracy.
The cases of Egypt and Tunisia
Constituent assemblies were established, new political parties and media outlets were established, and new political leaders were elected in both Egypt and Tunisia at the beginning of the transition.
Importantly, both countries saw the formation of Muslim Brotherhood-style parties, which have traditionally been well-organized in the majority of the region.
Some observers viewed the political rise and influence of centrist Islamists as something benign, even positive, while others argued it posed a problem.
Aside from the arguments over whether political Islam might be beneficial or ineffective, Egypt and Tunisia were initially seen as hopeful models of democratic change for Arab countries because they made the case that authoritarianism was not inevitable in the Arab world.
Both nations demonstrated that modern Arab societies were capable of creating democratic systems, even if imperfect and fragile, despite their transitions being full of serious challenges and occasionally experiencing full-on crises.
More importantly, perhaps, the examples of Egypt and Tunisia showed that Arab citizenries were democratically eager – election turnout figures in both countries were comparable to those of some established Western democracies.
However, voter turnout and appearances were at least partially deceiving, particularly in Egypt, where the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters won elections and elections, including the presidency, but never actually held office.
Egypt’s “deep state” — which included the military, police, intelligence, judiciary, and media apparatus — never fully eluded the political landscape.
The old regime successfully sabotaged a pair of elected parliaments and then, in the summer of 2013, collaborated with anti-Islamist Egyptian liberals to overthrow Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi.
A complete reversal of democracy, a return to the pre-2011 status quo, and arguably something even more tyrannical was the result of the 2013 Egyptian coup.
Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had previously been Morsi’s defense minister, quickly gained control. He oversaw mass killings, mass arrests, political party bans, media closures, sham elections, and the eventual overhaul of Egypt’s legal and political frameworks.
Even more despotic than Mubarak’s, according to experts, is the authoritarian system created by el-Sisi.
Tunisia’s attempt at democracy was longer than Egypt’s, but it ultimately fell flat.
In 2014, Tunisia prepared a new constitution and elected its first democratic president, Beji Caid Essebsi.
However, Tunisia’s democratic experiment was about to end with the election of Kais Saied as president in 2019.
Saied overthrew Tunisia’s burgeoning democracy in July 2021, about two years after taking office, claiming emergency powers, removing the prime minister, and suspending parliament.
Since that time, Saied has further consolidated power.
Lessons learned
The pro-democracy protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrated unmistakably that their dictatorships were not sufficiently authoritarian.
In both nations, the political and legal frameworks have been carefully reengineered to prevent exactly the kind of civil disobedience witnessed 15 years ago.
No protest or opposition can be tolerated at all.
For instance, a 2013 protest law in Egypt forbids public demonstrations, and a 2015 terrorism law defines any act of “intimidation” that “hinterts national unity,” “disturbs the public order,” or “impedes public authorities from carrying out their work” as an act of “terrorism.”
The post-2013 Egyptian military regime has also demonstrated that it will not leave any elections to chance.
The government has rigged schem elections, passed a constitutional amendment that guarantees the parliament’s loyalty to the president, and revised the constitution to make it automatic until 2030.
El-Sisi has used his influence to force opposition figures into permanent exile, as well as cracks that have facilitated opposition candidates’ presidential campaigns.
Experts have noted how closely Tunisia’s Saied has followed in el-Sisi’s footsteps.
Saied has rewritten the constitution, expanded presidential powers, and eliminated checks and balances, just like his Egyptian counterpart, who hasn’t yet established el-Sisi-level repression in Tunisia.
According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Tunisia has fallen backwards in terms of various political and economic indicators in line with the Arab Spring.
Cracks in the system
The root causes of the Arab Spring, which were sparked by corruption, injustice, and economic hardship, are still present and perhaps more pressing than they were in the Arab Spring of that time.
On the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Arab nations consistently perform poorly, and many places are still at the bottom of the world’s rankings. States also continue to experience injustice.
For example, out of 21 Arab countries recently evaluated by Freedom House, none were rated “free”, and of the nine Arab nations assessed in 2025 as part of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, most placed near the bottom of global rankings.
Importantly, the Arab region is still enshrined in economic hardship as a whole, despite the Gulf nations not far away.
The United Nations claims that the region’s population continues to suffer from severe food shortages and hunger, and that per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is still exceedingly low in the majority of non-Gulf states.
Economic problems in Egypt and Tunisia are indicative of conditions in much of the rest of the region.
Since the uprising in 2011, both the military’s economic empire and the inequality gap have grown, while also rising inflation and poverty.
Tunisian’s economy is also experiencing decline.
According to a recent report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Saied’s economic approach has led to a huge increase in internal debt and a “collapse of]economic] growth”, in addition to “reduced real wages and increased unemployment”.
Democracy: The room’s thorny subject
The Arab regimes’ citizens continue to have a disproportionate desire for democratic government, which is perhaps the most alarming aspect.
According to the Arab Opinion Index, more than 70 percent of Arab respondents support democracy, compared with only 19 percent who do not.
Survey findings also point out that Arab citizens frequently associate democracy with freedom, equality, and justice, and hold favorable opinions of the Arab Spring.
Similar findings are suggested by more recent polls of the Arab Barometer.
The Arab Spring is not over
About 14 years after the uprising against him began, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was toppled and forced into exile.
Perhaps more importantly, this cataclysmic event demonstrated that analysts may have been premature in declaring the Arab Spring’s end.
Recent Gen Z protests in Morocco offer more evidence that many Arabs – especially young people – are able, willing, and ready to fight for change.
Thus, it may only be a matter of time before a final chapter of protests occurs.
Governments are aware of the possibility. Egypt’s el-Sisi regime again provides a useful case in point.
El-Sisi has been forced to repeatedly warn Egyptians against protesting in recent years.
He claimed in a number of years that an uprising like the one from 2011 would “never occur again” in Egypt.
The paranoia is real – Egypt’s deep state does not appear willing to take any chances by opening up the political arena.
The regime is reportedly seeking to extend el-Sisi’s rule indefinitely, despite the fact that it has recently launched a massive election-rigging campaign.
The Egyptian government has also attempted to stop opposition abroad, but it is content to do so.
The regime has tried to shut down opposition media outlets based outside Egypt and has sought to have popular opposition figures extradited to the country.
Anas Habib, a young Egyptian, staged a peaceful protest at the Egyptian Embassy in The Hague earlier this year.
Egypt’s foreign minister reacted by urging Egyptian embassy staff to detain protesters and have them detained. In an act of apparent revenge, Egyptian authorities arrested Habib’s elderly uncle in Egypt.
Arab states have recently begun boosting their cooperation in internal security, with governments aggressively pursuing international individuals who are wanted for extradition.
These extreme deeds demonstrate the paranoia that the Arab Spring’s events are intermissions rather than the culmination.
History suggests that when the movement continues, it will not be announced in advance.
The last word is almost always in the hands of the people. Simply put, we are unsure of their decision to use it.
Source: Aljazeera
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