A nine-point political roadmap was signed by Sudanese political parties, armed groups, civil society organizations, and prominent political figures in Nairobi on December 16 and presented as a civilian-led initiative aimed at ending Sudan’s war and restoring a democratic transition.
It attempts to use civilians as a “third pole” in Sudan’s conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are both framed as antiwar, pro-peace, and pro-peace.
Even though the declaration doesn’t provide any specific steps toward military reform, its authors claim that it represents an attempt to reclaim political power from civilians after months of being marginalized by armed actors and foreign mediators.
The roadmap sparked new political and civic circles in Sudan about legitimacy, representation, and the persistent dominance of elite-driven civilian politics.
The roadmap
The Quad’s announcement in September, which included Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States, led to the release of the Nairobi declaration.
A three-month truce, according to the Quad statement, should result in a permanent ceasefire, humanitarian assistance for civilians, and the establishment of a political transition process.
The Nairobi declaration also emphasized the importance of reforming Sudan’s security forces under civilian oversight and excluding remnants of the regime of former president Omar al-Bashir.
The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM-AW), led by Abdelwahid al-Nur, as well as the National Umma Party, the Sudanese Congress Party, civil society organizations, and the Sudanese Congress Party (SUN).
Abdalla Hamdok, the former prime minister, signed the declaration, which coordinated with the SAF and the RSF, from al-Bashir’s overthrow in 2019 until the military coup in October 2021.
Al-Nur, the long-time leader of the SLM-AW armed group that controls Jebel Marra in Darfur and who has historically rejected what he sees as “elite-driven” political settlements, also endorsed it.
Having a bad day
Hamid Khalafallah, a researcher from Sudan, claimed that the declaration does not adequately reflect the country’s wider civic movement despite its intention to present a civilian leadership.
He claimed that the Nairobi coalition is an example of earlier civilian organizations that failed to reach Sudanese citizens, particularly those who were most impacted by the conflict.
He claimed that it is a reproduction of former groups that have struggled to represent the Sudanese people. It still represents a highly regarded elite group that practices politics the same way it has always done.
No committees formally supported or signed the declaration, despite reference to neighbourhood groups that emerged from Sudan’s protest movement and helped toppled al-Bashir in 2019.
Drafts were reportedly shared with some grassroots organizations, but the process proceeded without a single vote, bolstering concerns that local people remain politically instrumental rather than empowered.
Khalafallah argued that his inclusion was intended to counterbalance rival military-aligned forces rather than change civilian politics, despite al-Nur’s participation being hailed by some as a breakthrough.
Prior to the Nairobi Declaration, Sudan’s three main civilian coalitions were either affiliated with or accused of acting in such a way.
The Democratic Bloc is a group of political parties and armed organizations affiliated with the SAF, while Tasis is a coalition of political parties and armed movements that was established in February of this year.
Finally, political parties and civil society organizations are joined by Hamdok’s Sumoud, which the SAF claims supports the RSF.
Europe’s one-track civilian strategy
Officials in Europe have taken a break from the initiative in Nairobi.
Under the condition of anonymity, a senior European Union diplomat told Al Jazeera that Brussels does not support the Nairobi roadmap as the foundation for a unified civil process.
The source stated that the African Union [AU] should have access to just one civil process. Like this Nairobi incident, “everything else is a distraction.”
The priority, according to the EU official, is not to multiply civilian platforms, but to consolidate them under a trustworthy umbrella that is widely accepted by Sudanese society.
The source stated that “our goal is to build a credible third pole in opposition to SAF and RSF.” “A welcoming one that most Sudanese citizens support.”
After the SAF and the RSF approve the Quad’s proposals for a humanitarian truce and ceasefire, including reforms putting security forces under civilian-led control, the EU plans to form a broad coalition that will take the lead.
The EU’s language asserts that abandoning Sudan’s divided civilian landscape would automatically legitimize military rule, while also reflecting growing international actors’ growing frustration with its fragmented civil landscape.
We are not naive that people will rule tomorrow, the source said. However, we must uphold our values.
The EU official rejected narratives that depicted either side as a governing body in her assessment of Sudan’s conflicting parties.
SAF is a bit better, but not much, according to the source, “than RSF does in Darfur.”
Look at the oil deal, the official continued. People are not important, but money is.
Following SAF’s pullout and the RSF’s capture of the site, they referred to the most recent agreement between the SAF and the RSF, which was reached under South Sudanese mediation. Both organizations would then withdraw from the Heglig oil facility.
Warring parties acting as spoilers
The Nairobi declaration effectively presents to the international community a roadmap that adheres to pre-existing goals in order to win support from the Quad, according to US-Africa policy expert Cameron Hudson, who told Al Jazeera.
According to Hudson, “I think the Nairobi declaration reverses what the Quad has said,” implying that the initiative is intended more to sway international support than to create genuine domestic consensus.
Hudson argued that this method “prematurely” links ceasefire efforts with army reforms or other political changes, and that it should continue to go along separate lines until the violence subsides. He also argued that this method mishandles the political transition in Sudan.
He argued that if the Quad wanted an unconditional ceasefire, it should pursue it rather than allowing for political guarantees during a transition.
It is premature to discuss reforming the army or engaging in other political reforms for this reason. For the time being, these should be kept separate.
The tension is intense. Both the SAF and the RSF should not have a political future, according to the Quad and the European Union, and they must be completely excluded from the Bashir regime.
Source: Aljazeera
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