Putin may well get what he wants in Ukraine

The conflict in Ukraine appears to be coming to an end after the protracted phone call between US President Donald Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin, which came after US-Ukrainian talks in Jeddah last week.

Moscow and Kiev appear to agree with Trump’s efforts to reach a peace agreement, but the specifics of their positions are still unclear.

A 30-day, unconditional ceasefire, followed by peace talks, is a proposal made by Washington, and Kyiv has accepted it. Ukraine didn’t want to end the conflict before beginning peace talks, but the prospect of losing more territory, infrastructure, lives, and, most likely, American support has helped.

Russia has for its part agreed to suspend missile attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for 30 days while pursuing negotiations for a full-fledged ceasefire. Moscow earlier expressed concern about what comes after, as well as the logistics of implementing the ceasefire and the guarantees to prevent violations.

Russia’s advantage on the battlefield, which it is not particularly interested in losing before the framework of a settlement is established, contributes to the caution. After the Trump-Putin call, Russian officials in any case sounded very optimistic about the possibility of a settlement.

If the ceasefire negotiations progress, is the question of whether Putin will likely receive everything he promised when he launched the brutal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022?

By now, it is clear to all sides what constitutes a realistically achievable peace agreement. Moscow has repeatedly stated that the peace agreement is intended to follow the Istanbul agreements, which were developed by the Russian and Ukrainian delegations in the spring of 2022 but which were ultimately abandoned by Ukraine due to pressure from the British and American pressure.

These agreements included measures to safeguard Russian-speaking citizens living in Ukraine, military neutrality, and a cap on the size of its army.

Moscow wants Kyiv to acknowledge the demise of four Ukrainian regions, Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhia, even though Russia has not yet officially declared its territory there. However, it is possible that the Kremlin will reject its maximalist demand that Ukraine leave these regions and start occupying them.

The fate of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Station, which is currently being occupied by Russia and is quite close to the front line, will also be discussed in territorial negotiations, according to US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. If Russia joins that discussion, it will mean that it will no longer occupy the unoccupied territory of the north of Zaporizhia and, consequently, the unoccupied territory of the other three regions.

The discussions surrounding the nuclear plant are a positive sign because they point to realistic concessions that the West and Ukraine could make as opposed to the completely unrealistic demands of NATO troops operating on the ground under the guise of “peacekeepers,” which the United Kingdom and France are pushing for.

Accepting that Putin is not fighting for territory is the key to understanding his logic. He views the comprehensive invasion, which has now led to the occupation of a fifth of Ukrainian territory, as a blow to the 2015-2016 Minsk agreements, which had envisaged the two breakaway regions Donetsk and Luhansk remaining under legitimate Ukrainian control. For Ukraine’s decision to withdraw from the Istanbul agreements, Russia’s annexation of these two regions, along with Kherson and Zaporizhia, was punishment.

Putin is unconcerned about NATO countries maintaining any security infrastructure or influence over Ukrainian security organizations, even though the nuclear power plant could be conceivably swapped for another territory or, more likely, political concessions regarding the rights of Russian speakers and the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

This conflict is really about drawing a thick red line that the American-led West won’t extend beyond until the conversation about Russia’s westward integration is once more rooted in the West’s decision in the 1990s to confront rather than integrate the newly formed democratic Russia.

Putin will, however, insist on the removal of what he calls “NATO infrastructure,” which includes CIA listening stations and logistical facilities as well as military training and logistical facilities along the Russian border.

He will also likely demand the de-Westernization of Ukrainian security organizations like the Main Intelligence Directorate (HUR) and some Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), which are closely linked to the CIA and MI6.

He will be absolutely insistent that NATO and Kyiv reject the NATO promise that Ukraine would join the alliance at the summit in Bucharest in 2008. George W. Bush, the president of the United States, imposed that commitment on European allies, which shook Russian foreign policy and caused a conflict with Georgia and then Ukraine.

All of these objectives are achievable with the lifting of sanctions against Russia, at least by the US itself, according to the signals coming from Trump’s administration. The Kremlin has indicated that it will use the $300 billion in Westeros for post-war reconstruction in Ukraine. It believes that this money has already been lost, and it might think that a kind deed like that would help to rekindle relations with the now obnoxious neighbor.

Putin will see his decision to launch the brutal aggression against Russia’s closest neighbor as justified if he can get all of that.

Putin appears to have achieved another objective, namely restoring Russia’s superpower status in the eyes of the entire world, by ensuring Ukraine’s neutrality and advancing NATO further from Russian borders.

A regrettable realization will result from Russian leaders’ failure to control them militarily: that a significant nuclear power with the capacity to annihilate humanity cannot be defeated militarily. Then they might take into account the fact that Moscow could be very effectively influenced by soft power, which the West used much more successfully during the Cold War.

Russia will continue to be dependent on Europe, both culturally and economically. No matter what other countries’ opinions of Russia are, it will continue to consider itself a member of the European community. That opens up more strategic opportunities for the West to counteract Moscow’s threats rather than engaging in what Western officials are currently calling a “proxy war” in Ukraine.

Source: Aljazeera