There was hope that it would be Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy meeting in Turkiye this week, for the first time since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
That wasn’t to be, after Russia confirmed that Putin would not be travelling to Turkiye. But both countries still sent delegations – agreeing to a prisoner swap – and the meeting in Istanbul on Friday was the first direct talks since shortly after the war began in February 2022.
Some of those talks in 2022 were also hosted by Turkiye, highlighting the central role the country has played in the search for a resolution to one of the world’s most significant geopolitical conflicts.
Turkiye is also poised to expand its influence in Syria, where the US has lifted sanctions on the Turkish-allied government, and has a significant win on the domestic front, after the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) announced this week that it was disbanding, ending a 40-year war against the Turkish state.
A direct meeting between Putin and Zelenskyy on Turkish soil would have capped off a strong week for Turkiye, but analysts say that its central role to the process is a victory nonetheless.
“Turkiye stands to win diplomatically whichever way the talks go,” Ziya Meral of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) said, even if the analyst ultimately was sceptical of any peace framework emerging from the talks. “It fulfils Ankara’s desire to be a negotiator and key player in regional developments. The fact that Ankara is in a position to engage both with the United States and Russia, as well as Ukraine is indeed a diplomatic success.”
Over the last 15 years or so, Turkiye has established itself as a significant diplomatic player, extending its influence across Africa and playing a pivotal role in the overthrow of long-term Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, all while maintaining an intensely delicate balancing act between belligerents in the Russia-Ukraine war.
“There are many reasons why Turkiye is hosting the talks,” Omer Ozkizilcik, a non-resident fellow at The Atlantic Council, told Al Jazeera.
“Turkiye started a peace process independent of the US shortly after the invasion, leading to the Istanbul protocols of 2022. This is also a new model of negotiation, pioneered by Turkiye,” he said, referring to the draft peace agreement brokered between the two states that Russia has since accused Ukraine and the West of walking away from.
“Before, neutral states such as Switzerland with no stake in the conflict would mediate. Now, under a new model, Turkiye is successfully negotiating in conflicts where it does have diplomatic, economic and geopolitical stakes,” Ozkizilcik added, listing a number of disputes where Turkiye had played a mediating role, such as that between Ethiopia and Somalia, where Turkiye was able to negotiate in December a “historic reconciliation” in President Recep Tayyip Erodgan’s words.
Turkiye has its own interests across these countries, including its supply of drones to Ukraine and a significant military presence in Somalia. However, it is still able to present itself as a reliable arbitrator in peace talks involving these countries.
“It’s a new Turkish model that is seeing the country emerge as a regional diplomatic power,” Ozkizilcik said.
Hot and cold relations with Russia
The balancing act Turkiye has followed in negotiating between Russia and Ukraine hasn’t been easy – particularly when Ankara has had to take into account its opposition to Russian expansionism in the Black Sea region and Moscow’s support for parties opposed to Ankara in the Middle East and North Africa.
Turkiye labelled Russia’s invasion of Ukraine a “war” early in the conflict, allowing it to implement the 1936 Montreux Convention – effectively confining Russia’s military vessels to the Black Sea.
Ankara and Moscow have also found themselves on opposing sides in Libya and Syria. In Libya, Turkiye backs the United Nations-recognised government, in contrast to Russia’s support for armed forces in the insurgent east, while in Syria, Turkiye supported the ultimately victorious opposition forces against the Russian-backed al-Assad regime.
Syria was the source of the biggest tension between the two when, in 2015, Turkiye shot down a Russian fighter jet near the Turkiye-Syria border. The incident triggered a severe deterioration in diplomatic and economic ties, but a Turkish statement of regret led to a rapprochement the next year, and relations have remained strong.
Those strong ties have also survived Turkiye’s supply of drones and other military equipment to Ukraine throughout the course of the war.
Russia has seemingly turned a blind eye to that, and maintains “economic, diplomatic and energy relations” with Turkiye, Ozkizilcik said.
The benefits of good relations with Turkiye seem to outweigh Russia’s unhappiness with some aspects of Turkish policy, and Turkiye’s position as a member of NATO that Russia can still deal with is in itself useful.
In 2022, Turkiye was prominent in opposing Western sanctions on Russia; describing them as a “provocation“. And Turkiye has rarely been content to toe the NATO line, for a time opposing Sweden and Finland’s entry into the alliance, and also agreeing on a deal to buy Russia’s S-400 missile system in 2017.
Turkiye’s purchase of the missile system led to US sanctions, exclusion from the F-35 defence programme and accusations in some quarters that Ankara was “turning its back” on the West as part of a pivot towards Russia.
“Both sides have learned to compartmentalise differences,” Ozkizilcik said. He referred to an attack in 2020 that killed more than 33 Turkish soldiers in Syria by regime forces acting in coordination with Russia. “There were talks, both sides met and addressed the issue and they moved on. More recently, when Turkish-backed forces overthrew the Assad regime, Erdogan still called Putin on his birthday and congratulated him.”
Friendship with Ukraine
But Turkiye has been able to strengthen its relationship with the West in the years since, demonstrating its usefulness, particularly when it came to Ukraine.
Turkiye was instrumental in brokering a deal in 2022 to allow Ukraine to export its grain by sea, and has also been firm in its stance that Russian-occupied Crimea – the homeland of the Turkic Muslim Crimean Tatars – be returned to Ukraine.
Steven Horrell, a senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis, believes that Ukraine “appreciates Turkiye’s past support to them”, even if it has some qualms about its ties with Russia.
Zelenskyy has repeatedly thanked Erdogan for his role in facilitating talks and in supporting Ukraine. On Thursday, the Ukrainian leader highlighted Turkiye’s support for Ukraine, and even said that his country’s participation in direct talks – despite Putin’s absence – was “out of respect” for Erdogan and US President Donald Trump.
Earlier in the week, Zelenskyy had thanked Erdogan for his support “and readiness to facilitate diplomacy at the highest level”.
I spoke with the President of Türkiye @RTErdogan to discuss key details of the meeting in Türkiye, which could help bring an end to the war. I am grateful for his support and readiness to facilitate diplomacy at the highest level. We share a common view on the need for a… pic.twitter.com/BX1pw28f3x
The emphasis on mutual respect and friendship highlights that for Ukraine, Turkiye is not an ally it can afford to lose.
And that gives Turkiye some leeway in its ability to maintain close ties to Russia without any negative backlash from the West, and a chance to fulfil some of its own goals.
