In the general election, Moldova’s pro-European Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) won the election on September 28. It also established a new geopolitical trend and defeated the Patriotic Electoral Bloc (PEB), which is favored by Russia.
Russia is losing ground in post-Soviet Eurasia as a result of Russian aggression against Ukraine. In paradoxical circumstances, Moscow launched a massive invasion of its neighbor in 2022 to assert its authority over what it refers to as its “near abroad.” More than three years later, the failure of the strategy is painfully obvious.
Russia is being relegated by various nations and leaders, whether they are old-school autocrats or Democrats.
The impressive PAS performance in Moldova defied all expectations for a close race. Pro-Russian organizations under the leadership of PEB appeared to be gaining steam in the weeks leading up to the elections. Moldova’s society was evenly divided, and the country was burdened by uncertainty regarding the economy. However, with renewed tensions between the parties within the PEB, things turned around in the late summer.
The coordinated Russian efforts to influence the elections through information ops on social media, which used PAS as a Western puppet to sway the nation’s conflict with Russia and profit from Romania’s fears of an economic downturn and annexation, backfired.
Two blatantly pro-Russian parties were forced to withdraw from the Central Electoral Commission because of allegations of illegal funding. Additionally, the government obtained the extradition of fugitive oligarch Vladimir Plahotniuc, who is accused of being a key player in the $1 billion bank theft from Greece.
The West, a strong supporter of the European Union, found renewed by the drama to the Moldovan diaspora. In consequence, only the Gagauz region of northern Moldova and Transnistria, where the opposition parties are concentrated, did well. Despite receiving nearly 3 percent of its votes in comparison to 2021, PAS still won with 50.2 percent, compared to PEB, who received 24.4%.
Moscow-friendly forces likely had had a better chance of challenging PAS if Russia had stopped ingratiating. The opposition squandered a chance to influence how well-governed the elections are. PAS had a competitive advantage when it came to the EU versus Russia debate.
The party could take credit for bringing Moldova closer to membership, which led to the start of the 2024 accession talks, which had become a favored choice. Given its prominence as the country’s main export exporting destination and top trading partner, almost two-thirds of Moldovans are in favor of joining the EU, which is surprising. The populace’s pro-EU attitude is irreversible, and even if PEB gains control, it’s unlikely to significantly alter its course.
The South Caucasus can be seen too. Armenia, which was historically heavily reliant on Russian strategic and economic aid, has turned its head west. As Azerbaijan regained complete control of the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region in 2022, Moscow abysmally failed to support its allies.
Nikol Pashinyan, the president of Armenia, had a chance to talk to both Azerbaijan and Turkiye in person. A peace agreement between Baku and Yerevan is currently being considered because Donald Trump, the president of the United States, wants to see it through the finish line to claim credit.
Armenia’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which was dominated by Russia, was suspended in February 2024. Additionally, France’s cooperation in security and defense increased.
Azerbaijan has also experienced increased tensions with Russia twice in recent years, once in 2024 over a crashed passenger jet over the Caspian Sea and once this summer over the arrests of Azerbaijanis in Yekaterinburg, which led to a major crisis.
Russia served as Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s arbitrator in the past and has regional influence. While Turkiye and the US have stepped in to fill the void, it has now managed to alienate both nations.
Only Georgia appears to lean toward Moscow in the South Caucasus. The governing Georgian Dream party and its informal leader, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, have argued with the EU over their propensity for authoritarianism, largely due to this. Georgia has just rejected its democratic demands, which have, in any case, declined under Trump’s control. Tbilisi is attempting to balance between Europe, the US, and, of course, China rather than firmly ties itself to Russia.
In Central Asia, “multivectoring” has long been a common practice. Governments there have also been made aware of Russian ingrainement and given them an additional motivator to turn to China as a counterweight as a result of the conflict in Ukraine.
Beijing has been expanding its economic footprint in the area. It is the largest investor in Central Asia, and it is now the fifth-largest country in the group, accounting for 34% of the total trade of the five Central Asian nations, up from 17.7% in 2020 to 24.1 percent in 2024. Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are ahead of the rest.
China’s diplomatic efforts have also increased: In May 2023, China held its first China-Central Asia summit in Xi’an. A treaty on “permanent good-neighbourliness, friendship, and cooperation” was signed in Astana in June of this year.
Beijing also emphasized the importance of playing a greater part in transnational crime, border security, and antiterrorism, which are traditionally reserved for Russia. This partnership may be beneficial in overcoming domestic difficulties from the perspective of the regional states. The adage that China must provide the cash and Russia must be accurate no longer.
Given that Russia is reliant on China, which has grown exponentially as a result of the war in Ukraine and the Western sanctions that came with it, it is undoubtedly unhappy. Putin’s participation in the military parade in Beijing on September 3 to honor the victory of World War II and bolster China’s involvement in the conflict is yet another illustration of how erratic the relationship has become. The leaders of Belarus and the five Central Asian nations were also present.
That doesn’t mean China is currently entirely in charge of Central Asians. There is a lot of local agency involved, as regional political researchers have pointed out when criticizing the new “Great Game”‘s perceived impact. Local players are playing against the big boys to assert their independence and profit from these arrangements.
Europe also plays a role in this tale. About 23 percent of Central Asia’s total trade comes from the EU. Some of the turnover is clearly explained by the imports of European-made goods, but not all of it. The pace of EU diplomacy is also increasing. In order to discuss cooperation on civilian nuclear power, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to Kazakhstan in 2024 for a widely publicized visit. Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, and Antonio Costa, head of the EU-Central Asia summit, took place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, in April.
Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine has long-lasting effects on both Europe and China, as well as Russia itself. The strong Russian influence over its “near abroad” might be overthrown. There is no denying that Russia’s influence is severely declining in Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia.
Source: Aljazeera
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