President Donald Trump reiterated his commitment to “many more,” reaffirming his position that the US “will not allow radical Islamic terrorism to prosper,” after launching what he termed “a powerful and deadly strike against ISIS]ISIL terrorist scum” in northwest Nigeria on December 25. In a coordinated effort to combat terrorist groups in its member states, the newly formed Alliance of Sahel States (AES) established a joint military force with a 5, 000-strong contingent, presented as a sign of collective self-reliance and security autonomy. A 260, 000-strong joint counterterrorism force, supported by a proposed $ 2.5 billion annual budget for logistics and front-line support, was established in response to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)’s announcement to establish an ambitious plan announced in August 2025.
There is little evidence that a militarized escalation alone can defeat armed groups in the Sahel, despite the fact that their supporters may refer to these developments as decisive steps against terrorism. Instead, they signal a regional militarisation that is getting more and more aggressive. This not only causes West Africa’s growing geopolitical tensions, but it also, more importantly, causes the Sahel to become a center for interstate armed conflict, which poses far greater dangers for regional stability and stability.
A friendship ended badly.
A loosely coordinated, non-hierarchical security structure supported by regional and extra-regional actors up until 2021 oversaw counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in the Sahel. ECOWAS played a key coordinating role by bringing together the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, international powers like the US and France, as well as regional powers like Algeria and Nigeria.
The 2013 African-led International Support Mission to Mali, which was coordinated by ECOWAS with the AU, UN, and France to combat Tuareg rebels and allies armed groups in northern Mali, is a prime example. The G5 Sahel counterterrorism force, which was funded by the EU and ran between 2017 and 2023, was even more notable. Although these arrangements frequently featured tension, competition, and uneven outcomes, they still had a common security framework that forbade direct state-to-state conflict.
Following the coup in Niger in 2023, this balance was hampered. In the eyes of the Nigerien junta, ECOWAS threatened the use of force to restore constitutional order by breaking a political snag. That threat, which was widely accepted as an act of aggression, turned out to be catalytic. In response, Niger’s military rulers decided to form the Alliance of Sahel States in conjunction with counterparts in Mali and Burkinabe in an effort to reclaim security autonomy, end relations with ECOWAS, the EU, the US, and France.
Notably, the AES institutionalizes a mutual defense pact, which explicitly presents ECOWAS and its Western partners as threats to the country’s sovereignty and national security as codifying this conflict with the previous multilateral security order. This attitude furthers the rift between former allies, signaling a risky shift toward neighboring states’ securitization, which raises the threat of interstate conflict in West Africa, a symptom that hasn’t been present since the 1990s.
emerging political unrest
The AES has cut off security ties with the West by choosing Russia as its primary security partner to counterbalance decades of US and European influence in West Africa, indicating a growing but still evolving security partnership with Moscow. These strategic choices are also escalating regional geopolitical tensions, which are also reflected in the emerging self-help posture with new preferences for non-conventional allies.
Nigeria’s military intervention in neighboring Benin was praised as a significant success for ECOWAS. The AES recognized that the Nigerian Air Force C-130 made an emergency landing in Burkinabe two days later and that it had been authorized to neutralize any aircraft involved in further violations. Reports that France had provided intelligence and surveillance to Nigeria during the Benin intervention heightened tensions, which heightened concerns about France’s potential re-entry into the AES security landscape. The AES’s security cooperation has increased even more as a result of Nigeria’s willingness to extend it with the US following the Christmas Day attacks. The strikes, which are directed at militants in northwest Nigeria, appear to be intended to strengthen US strategic legitimacy as a regional counterterrorism force, opening the way for further operations in the country’s northeast, where ISWAP and Boko Haram are still active.
Given Nigeria’s standing within ECOWAS, the proposed 260, 000-person ECOWAS force’s potential operational capacity is likely to be affected by this emerging security partnership with the US. In the name of sovereignty, the AES is determined to protect its member states from Western security influence. Numerous combat engagements would take place in areas close to AES territory because ECOWAS forces would be stationed in member states at the heart of terrorist violence. Military clashes between the two sides increase as AES troops are stationed in these locations, especially given the region’s fluid combat environments and porous borders. The possibility that a US-backed ECOWAS may launch air strikes on AES territory cannot be dismissed because the Christmas Day strikes reportedly hit unintended targets. The AES may attempt to use Russia’s military support, which may invoke Cold War-era security brinkmanship.
implications for regional stability
Two significant risks exist for regional stability and peace if there is no AES/ECOWAS reconciliation. First, rising geopolitical tensions could lead to direct military clashes between AES and ECOWAS members, putting West Africa at risk of waging a regional conflict. No one’s counterterrorism goals would be served by a conflict like this. In addition to causing harm to the region, it would also give armed groups the opportunity to expand their operations in the face of stale and distracted security responses. Second, the standoff poses the threat of creating a new stage for international power rivalry between a US and French-backed ECOWAS on one side and a Russia-backed AES on the other. The UN Security Council’s use of veto power by these international actors could cause further complication in the wake of a new New Cold War, which would have profoundly destabilizing effects on the region.
AES and ECOWAS now have to choose between reviving Cold War-style bloc politics in West Africa and negotiating a security sub-coalition that places human security before national sovereignty. Regardless of how the AES views ECOWAS, the latter is responsible for managing the unintended consequences of rising tensions. While there are few indications that the AES will work with an ECOWAS that is supported by the West to combat terrorism, ECOWAS could engage diplomatically to negotiate a plan of operations that respects AES sovereignty. ECOWAS has the diplomatic capacity to do so because it is Africa’s most advanced regional security organization. Nigeria should act more subtly while the French ECOWAS member states should lead these efforts to advance, while Nigeria should do so in secret. Whether ECOWAS can reclaim control over its security strategy and establish the rules for international cooperation will determine both West Africa’s future and the continent’s as a whole.
Source: Aljazeera
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