Central and Eastern European (CEE) governments remain concerned about their security despite Russian aggression, stretching from the Baltic states to the Black Sea. Many officials in nations like Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Romania continue to voice concern about a potential US focus shifting to the Middle East, which could stifle American vigilance in Europe despite NATO’s unwavering commitment to Article 5. Given that Russia continues to rebuild its military and that hybrid threats are increasingly prevalent in the region, this concern has grown.
To be clear, President Trump has long criticized NATO members for failing to meet their defense-related spending goals and even suggested that the US might halt US protection from nations that do not meet the 2 percent GDP target. The Hague’s NATO Summit on June 2025 marked a turning point: all member states agreed to increase combined defense and related spending by 5 percent of GDP by 2035, with the exception of core military spending, which was viewed as an “ironclad” commitment to NATO Article 5 and a pledge of continued support for Ukraine.
The Eastern flank states are uneasy because of the agreement’s gradual timeline (2020, with a review in 2029), and flexible accounting, where spending on Ukraine aid, infrastructure upgrades, and cyber projects all count. This is because timely implementation will be crucial for credibly deterring Russia.
Additionally, tensions over US-EU burden sharing persist, as evidenced by Trump’s recent assertion that the US would send Patriot air defense systems to Europe “for Ukraine” at a meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte but insisted that European allies foot the bill by giving the interceptor missiles themselves.
The diplomatic friction between European partners has been present for a while, most notably during the March Signalgate incident when Trump’s defense secretary Pete Hegseth called Europe “pathetic” and suggested that the EU countries were “freeloading,” and also during the notorious February diplomatic debacle when Trump and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy were publicly humiliated during a joint White House press conference.
However, CEE capitals cannot afford to leave the second Trump administration in the face of uncertainty. Indeed, the volatility emphasizes the need for these states to continue to work toward better outcomes. There are several reasons for this.
First, the US military presence has long been a key factor in preventing Russian expansionism in other regions. Since the end of the Cold War, CEE’s security architecture has largely been anchored in US guarantees, despite Washington’s apparent uncertainty regarding its commitment to European security. A deep-rooted awareness is that diplomatic decoupling from Washington frequently correlates with increased vulnerability along NATO’s eastern flank as a result of the traumatic historical experience of Western abandonment at crucial 20th-century junctures, such as the 1938 Munich Agreement, when Western powers handed Czechoslovakia over to Nazi Germany. For years, Poland and the Baltic countries (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) have hosted NATO battlegroups and have hosted US troops and air defense systems. The eastern countries of NATO have consistently warned that “they are next” if Putin wins the Ukraine election.
Given that the Trump administration is actively trying to broker a flash ceasefire agreement between Russia and Ukraine, which is reportedly involving territorial concessions to Moscow, this concern is especially acute. In his second inaugural address, President Trump made it abundantly clear that he wants to be remembered as “a peacemaker and unifier.” His advisers have proposed resolutions that would prevent Ukraine from joining NATO and prevent Russia from regaining control of Crimea and parts of Donbass. But neither the Europeans nor the Ukrainians should be concerned about finding peace. Any agreement that cedes Ukrainian territory or is perceived as a sign of Russian aggression has the potential to stifle the Kremlin, erode NATO’s standing, and undermine Europe’s long-term security framework.
The Kremlin has repeatedly tested NATO’s Article 5 resolve since Russia launched a full-scale invasion in 2022 through provocations along the eastern flank, including missile incidents and airspace violations. For instance, in February of 2024, Russian-controlled electronic warfare hampered GPS signals across its eastern border regions, affecting both military communications systems and civilian infrastructure. A Russian cruise missile flew into Polish airspace for 39 seconds before returning to Ukrainian territory one month later. Additionally, Russian fighter jets intercepted NATO surveillance aircraft over the Baltic Sea in August 2023, moving dangerously close and performing maneuvers that posed the risk of mid-air collisions.
If Putin’s aggression allows Russia to seize control of Ukraine or forcefully withdraw from Eastern Europe, the status quo could quickly deteriorate under a Trump-brokered agreement. After the war is over, Russia may continue to build its military, allowing for more aggressive aggressions, which will make the CEE and Europe more difficult.
In light of the uncertainty of US foreign policy, CEE leaders would be wise to pursue a dual-track approach.
First, given the US’s disengagement and Europe’s increased defense pledges, especially in partnership with Germany, the region’s engineering workforce and industry may have an enormous role to play in rearming Europe. This trend is already firmly advancing in Germany, turning idle civilian manufacturing facilities into military production centers. In order to create Leopard tanks, Puma IFVs, and artillery systems, it has been working with its defense firms to convert underutilized or decommissioned automotive factories like those in Berlin and Neuss to hybrid military production hubs like those in Gorlitz. Germany’s domestic reforms, most notably Berlin’s approval of a comprehensive defense procurement law that lowers the threshold for tenders and expedites the construction of military infrastructure, contribute to this industrial push.
For allied production networks in CEE, such deliberate reallocation of resources from struggling civilian industries toward military industrial output is clear. Additionally, CEE nations have increased their own heavy manufacturing capacities, with Poland and Slovakia increasing their joint production of artillery and armored vehicles, and Czechia’s Czechoslovak Group taking the lead in Europe’s munitions supply chain with a 4.6% revenue increase and an 11.7% order book anchored in exports bound to Ukraine.
With Trump’s car tariffs and faltering competitiveness, the CEE region needs to capitalize on this opportunity to address both its security and economic imperatives. It can do so by utilizing the 800-billion ($921.8 billion) defence mobilization plan and its proposal for 150 billion euros ($172.8 billion) in loans, which were approved in Brussels on March 6.
Second, persistent efforts to achieve better outcomes through diplomatic channels with Washington must be complemented by hedging against US security disengagement through the combination of strategic industrial repositioning and European solidarity.
Transactional partnerships can still provide significant security advantages, so this is still necessary even as ideological alignment wanes. With a government that values transactional diplomacy, the region can make use of some of its unique strategic assets, including Poland’s significant arms purchases from US manufacturers, Romania’s crucial Black Sea security infrastructure, and the Baltic states’ advanced cybersecurity capabilities.
At a time when security guarantees should be earned rather than assumed, the way forward requires putting all illusions and grievances to rest. Eastern European countries can meaningfully participate in rearming Europe in this emerging reality while navigating the shifting fault lines of post-American Europe.
Source: Aljazeera
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