Category World News

Following drone strikes at a significant power plant in the east of Sudan, major cities like Khartoum and Port Sudan, including the capital and the coastal city, have been rendered gloomy.

In the ongoing civil war that has torn the country apart, a facility in Atbara, River Nile state, was attacked by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are controlled by the government-aligned Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). On Thursday, flames and smoke erupted from the facility.

Al Jazeera has verified the footage that is circulated on social media showing the power plant ablaze.

Power plant officials reported that two civil defense personnel were killed while attempting to extinguish the fire that broke out after the first strike. They also claimed that rescue workers were hurt when a second drone struck as they battled the flames.

Residents of Port Sudan, according to Al Jazeera correspondent Mohamed Vall, discovered a routine power cut that had been caused by incidents in Atbara, which is located about 320 kilometers (roughly 230 miles) north of Khartoum.

He added that Sudan’s war has gotten worse of these strikes.

“This has been repeated throughout the entire year and the last year. Because they believe it is necessary to weaken the government and demonstrate to the population that they cannot be protected by this military government, Vall said, the RSF drones are flying thousands of kilometers across Sudan.

At least 104 civilians have been killed in Sudan’s Kordofan region since early December as a result of the latest escalation in a devastating drone campaign. In Kalogi, South Kordofan, the most deadly strike killed 89 people, including eight women and 43 children.

When drones struck their base in Kadugli on December 13 and sent shockwaves to six Bangladeshis, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres warned that killing peacekeepers “could constitute war crimes under international law.”

At least six people were killed and 12 were hurt when the Dilling Military Hospital was attacked a day later, many of whom were medical staff members.

In recent months, the SAF and RSF have both used drones extensively.

In 2024, 484 drone strikes were carried out across 13 African nations, with Sudan accounting for 264, more than half of the total, according to the US-based think tank Africa Center for Strategic Studies. The SAF claimed to have shot down more than 100 drones in just ten days, adding to the intensity by March 2025.

Sexual violence is “escalating alarmingly”

In April 2023, a power conflict between the SAF and RSF sprang into open combat. More than 100, 000 people have died in the war, according to some estimates, but the exact number is still undetermined.

More than 14 million people have been displaced and at least 30 million people need urgent assistance, according to the UN, making this the largest humanitarian crisis ever. More than 40, 000 people have fled North Kordofan alone, while unrest continues among the population in besieged cities.

Sudan topped the International Rescue Committee’s Emergency Watchlist for the third year in a row, thanks to a 50% drop in global humanitarian funding. Sudan was deemed the most neglected crisis in the world by a Thomson Reuters Foundation survey of 22 aid organizations in 2025.

More than 1, 600 people have died in 65 attacks on medical facilities in Sudan this year, according to WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who made the revelations on Wednesday. He claimed that “each attack strips more people of their medicines and health services.”

Additionally, Seif Magango, a UN Human Rights office spokesperson, stated on Wednesday that women were the ones who were most affected by the conflict. He said women are “attempting to flee from killing and bombs” while also being “gang raped in El-Fasher, which he described as particularly horrifying.

Darfur’s central regions, where the country is sandwiched between the RSF and SAF, are now where the heaviest fighting is now occurring.

M23 fighters are voluntarily kicking off in the strategic town of Uvira in the Democratic Republic of Congo. At the request of international mediators, they are leaving. As troops and military convoys left Uvira, Al Jazeera’s Alain Uaykani was there.

Eman Abu al-Khair, a mother-in-law, clutches a small bag of her infant’s clothes inside her tent while Khan Younis, a Gaza Strip resident, is pale and weary. Her child had already died from hypothermia.

The 34-year-old mother is still grieving after losing her son Mohammed, who has been missing for just 14 days. She simply couldn’t keep him warm enough despite the destruction caused by Israel’s genocidal war against Gaza.

Eman tells Al Jazeera, “I can still hear his tiny cries in my ears,” pointing out the pain on her face. I go to sleep and leave, unable to accept that his crying and awakening me at night will never occur again.

After being displaced from their home in the east of Khan Younis, the family’s tragedy started late on December 13 in al-Mawasi, west of Khan Younis, in the southern Gaza Strip.

Eman put her baby to sleep, but when she woke up later, she discovered him in a worrying condition.

Without adequate shelter&nbsp or clothing for a newborn, there was no protection for Mohammed because the temperature had dropped.

His body was ice-cold, he claimed. He was barely breathing, his hands and feet were frozen, and his face was stiff and yellow, she says.

“My husband immediately woke up so that we could take him to the hospital,” he said. “But he couldn’t find any way to get us there.”

The father couldn’t even travel to the hospital because it was late at night and the rain was still pouring.

The family waited until morning because there was no other choice.

We rushed toward the hospital as soon as the sun set, according to Eman. “We arrived too late, sadly,” he said. His condition was already critical.

The infant’s deterioration at the Red Crescent Hospital in Khan Younis shocked the doctors there. His convulsive symptoms caused doctors to rush him into the paediatric intensive care unit because his face had completely turned blue.

Before he passed away on December 15 after two days in intensive care.

“My baby didn’t have any medical issues. His tests revealed no illness. His tiny body “couldn’t stand the extreme cold inside the tents,” Eman says, wiping her tears in her eyes.

An infant died on Tuesday as a result of a severe body temperature drop brought on by the recent extreme cold in Gaza as a result of the ministry of health’s announcement to address the death of the child.

Mohammed Khalil Abu al-Khair, who was two weeks old, had died from acute hypothermia, according to the ministry’s press release.

Abu al-Khair, who arrived at the hospital two days ago and was taken to the intensive care unit, passed away yesterday, according to the statement.

After the ministry announced three similar deaths in Gaza the week before Mohammed’s death, there are now four more children who have died as a result of the cold weather.

Celebration turned into destruction

After a grueling pregnancy that, according to Eman, was filled with hardship and the war was still raging, the Abu al-Khair family welcomed Mohammed on December 1 in a state of joy and celebration.

“My pregnancy was a lot of work,” she said. I was exhausted and we had to endure extremely harsh conditions and famine,” she claims.

“But Mohammed’s well-being and birth gave me all my suffering.” I had no idea that after just two weeks, we would lose him.

Eman makes desperate attempts to secure the tent and seal every opening to protect the baby from the cold while Khalil, the baby’s father, tried to secure the tent and keep the baby warm with every piece of clothing and the blankets she had.

But they made no end in themselves.

As you can see, we are residing in tents on the street. What exactly can a piece of cloth or nylon do? She yells while circling the tent.

The cold is unfathomable, he says. When we wake up in the morning, water reaches our bedding from below.

After their two-year-old daughter Mona, who had grown up during the conflict that started in October 2023, Eman and Khalil gave birth to Mohammed, Eman and Khalil’s second child.

Little Mona emailed me after we left the burial and inquired, “Where is the baby?” As she holds her daughter and sobs, Eman says, “Every time she asks where her little brother went, she kills me.”

Eman wonders what crime her baby and other young people his age committed, and why they deserve what she calls the “cruel” fate of a life lived in tents.

“Our children have perished one after another through bombing, snipers, hunger, and cold. My child is not the first, and neither will he.

Not a life, really.

The director general of the Gazan government’s health agency, Munir al-Bursh, has warned of more premature deaths among children, the elderly, and the sick as a result of the soaring temperatures inside displacement tents that have been soaked in rain.

According to Al-Bursh, tents are a breeding ground for the spread of respiratory illnesses among those who are displaced, and patients are unable to receive any medical care due to moisture and standing water inside.

In Gaza, little reconstruction has occurred despite the ceasefire’s onset in October, where Israeli bombing and systematic demolition have destroyed the majority of residential structures.

Israel has also continued to attack Gaza frequently, and there are no indications that it will allow real reconstruction to begin, at least temporarily.

That implies that Mohammed’s circumstances are likely to persist.

And Eman is terrified of losing her 2-year-old daughter because of the tragic loss of her baby.

I cover her with everything I have, cover her, and never go to sleep. I keep an eye on her constantly. She claims that her heart is burning.

Eman is caught between trying to comfort herself and clinging to patience as to how long the situation there will continue to be so dire.

This is not a life, they say. Unfortunately, she claims that the reality appears to be going on for ten more years.

The Arab Spring has been viewed as a failure for more than ten years, frequently depicted as a sporadic irrationalization that turned into repression, war, and authoritarian restoration. The uprising in Tunisia, which started on December 17, 2010, with the self-immolation of street vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Sidi Bouzid, is frequently referred to as a tragic prelude to failed hopes rather than a transformative political moment.

This interpretation is inaccurate and incomplete in many ways.

Although all three of these were real, Bouazizi’s act was not just a response to police brutality, corruption, or economic exclusion. The quiet normalization of humiliation was shattered by this moral rupture, which exposed the moral foundations of authoritarian rule. A collective awakening about dignity, belonging, and the restrictions of obedience was what occurred in Tunisia and soon throughout much of the Arab world.

Therefore, the Arab Spring should be understood more as a sustained shift in political consciousness than as a failed transition. The most significant effects of it were not institutional but rather experiential, changing how people perceived their own capacity for acting and citizenship. That shift did not disappear, even when regimes were still in place or under control. The terrain where power is still contested has been altered.

For this reason, uprisings cannot be viewed as isolated national uprisings. Different societies moved simultaneously from Tunis to Cairo, Sanaa to Benghazi, with their histories shaped by distinct but interconnected emotional and political philosophies. The protesters were rejecting the notion that power could indefinitely prevent them from having access to information, voice, and equal citizenship, demanding material change as well as asserting themselves as political subjects.

This shift was embodied in the uprisings. They redefined who could claim legitimacy and what it meant. People were rehearsing alternative ways of living together while occupying public space by not simply opposing regimes. A lived reimagining of political possibility was less of a program than a practice, being shaped by action as opposed to design.

The transformation of streets and squares into places for collective learning was one of its most significant aspects. Places that had long been dominated by the state’s coercive and symbolic power were reclaimed as places of mutual recognition and participation. Common citizens arranged security, cleaned streets, debated demands, and bargained differences in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, Tunisian Bourguiba Avenue, and Sanaa’s Change Square. Politics were swayed away from public spaces.

For a simple reason, these instances were significant: they demonstrated that democracy is a social practice that can be learned through action as well. Protesters imposed responsibility rather than just rights. The experience of inhabiting these spaces left a lasting impression even after they were later violently reclaimed or cleared. Democracies are remembered even after they have lived it briefly.

The Arab uprisings also demonstrated the importance of cities. Sidi Bouzid is an excellent illustration of a powerful example of a revolt being sparked in the periphery and marginal spaces, but they are also carried on or defeated in urban centers. This is a structure-related claim rather than virtue. Cities focus on historical memory, social networks, and institutions. They make authority tangible rather than abstract, putting people directly in direct opposition to the power-making machinery, including ministries, courts, and security services.

In markets, neighborhoods, mosques, and universities, there are a large repertoires of social bonds that are forged in urban life: trust, cohesion, debate, and solidarity. Collective action can continue after the initial moment of rupture thanks to these networks. Uprisings run the risk of being episodic without them. They become more resilient with them, even when they are oppressed.

Of course, repression erupted quickly and brutally. Counter-revolution, militarisation, and war followed the excitement of those early months. Regimes asserted control over bodies, spaces, and memory in many Arab cities as a response. What followed would be dishonestly romanticized.

The symbolic struggle that was sparked by repression did not, however, end. Protesters from across the country targeted both the imagery and rituals that supported authoritarian rule. Statues were ruined, slogans scrawled over dominance symbols, and portraits were torn down. These acts didn’t involve theatrical excess. They attempted to break up the emotional framework of resentment and fear.

Even when they are followed by defeat, such events leave traces. How we perceive and feel authority is altered by the collective transgression of once-inviolable lines. People are taught that power can be confronted, mocked, and undone, even for a short while. That understanding is retained even after being suppressed.

Despite repeated attempts to portray the Arab Spring as a historical error or cautionary tale, it is still alive and well. A pedagogy of liberty was what persisted, not a collection of institutions. This method of instruction changed how people perceived agency, responsibility, and resistance as they were learned through reflection and action in public space.

Today’s quieter, more dispersed battles are a reflection of its effects. Young people from all over the region are organizing to fight for social justice, environmental degradation, and public accountability. They may not invoke 2011 but they still exhibit an innate resistance to fatalism. This enduring skepticism is embodied in a graffiti on the street in Hay Ettadhamen, a marginalized Tunisian suburb, that reads, “Is Tunisia a republic, a monarchy, an animal farm, or a prison”?

Here, the Arab Spring’s most enduring contribution is found. It demonstrated that acts that take place in isolated spaces can reshape people’s imagination and broaden the scope of the possible. Bouazizi’s opposition to democracy did not lead to instant change. However, it sparked a critical awareness that permeates struggles against injustice and exclusion.

The uprisings continued. They no longer have any meaning, though.

An unprecedented pan-Arab protest movement was born out of a desire for more democratic forms of government exactly 15 years ago when Mohammed Bouazizi was himself killed in Tunisia.

In extraordinary scenes, millions of protesters across several countries rallied against authoritarian leaders who had been in power for decades, challenging political systems defined by repression, corruption, and exclusion.

The centralized power structures that exacerbated corruption, injustice, and concentrated wealth in the hands of a select few were the subject of protester complaints. A historic call for respect, accountability, and democratic rule followed, not just a regional revolt.

Predictably, regimes responded with heavy-handed tactics – numerous demonstrators were killed, beaten, or arrested.

However, the pro-democracy movement had early significant successes.

Four long-standing dictators, including Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh, Egypt’s Hosni Mubarak, Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, and Tunisian Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, were all forced to resign in less than a month.

In a handful of countries – Bahrain, Algeria, and Iraq among them – regimes successfully quelled protests, ending them before they could gain serious momentum.

Protest movements in other nations led to sporadic reforms or, in the case of Syria, a protracted civil war without a full regime change.

Libya and Yemen ultimately suffocated in a bloody conflict similar to Syria.

Egypt and Tunisia were the only Arab Spring countries that could point to significant longer-term successes – both countries quickly toppled their dictators and almost immediately began democratic transitions.

Despite the mixed outcomes, observers generally praised the Arab Spring as a new form of democracy for a region that had been tyranny for a long time. However, 15 years later, it is clear that authoritarian regimes have learned how to prevent similar uprisings from ever occurring again despite the popular demands for democracy.

The cases of Egypt and Tunisia

Constituent assemblies were established, new political parties and media outlets were established, and new political leaders were elected in both Egypt and Tunisia at the beginning of the transition.

Importantly, both countries saw the formation of Muslim Brotherhood-style parties, which have traditionally been well-organized in the majority of the region.

Some observers viewed the political rise and influence of centrist Islamists as something benign, even positive, while others argued it posed a problem.

Aside from the arguments over whether political Islam might be beneficial or ineffective, Egypt and Tunisia were initially seen as hopeful models of democratic change for Arab countries because they made the case that authoritarianism was not inevitable in the Arab world.

Both nations demonstrated that modern Arab societies were capable of creating democratic systems, even if imperfect and fragile, despite their transitions being full of serious challenges and occasionally experiencing full-on crises.

More importantly, perhaps, the examples of Egypt and Tunisia showed that Arab citizenries were democratically eager – election turnout figures in both countries were comparable to those of some established Western democracies.

However, voter turnout and appearances were at least partially deceiving, particularly in Egypt, where the Freedom and Justice Party of the Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters won elections and elections, including the presidency, but never actually held office.

Egypt’s “deep state” — which included the military, police, intelligence, judiciary, and media apparatus — never fully eluded the political landscape.

The old regime successfully sabotaged a pair of elected parliaments and then, in the summer of 2013, collaborated with anti-Islamist Egyptian liberals to overthrow Egypt’s first-ever democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi.

A complete reversal of democracy, a return to the pre-2011 status quo, and arguably something even more tyrannical was the result of the 2013 Egyptian coup.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who had previously been Morsi’s defense minister, quickly gained control. He oversaw mass killings, mass arrests, political party bans, media closures, sham elections, and the eventual overhaul of Egypt’s legal and political frameworks.

Even more despotic than Mubarak’s, according to experts, is the authoritarian system created by el-Sisi.

Tunisia’s attempt at democracy was longer than Egypt’s, but it ultimately fell flat.

In 2014, Tunisia prepared a new constitution and elected its first democratic president, Beji Caid Essebsi.

However, Tunisia’s democratic experiment was about to end with the election of Kais Saied as president in 2019.

Saied overthrew Tunisia’s burgeoning democracy in July 2021, about two years after taking office, claiming emergency powers, removing the prime minister, and suspending parliament.

Since that time, Saied has further consolidated power.

Lessons learned

The pro-democracy protest movements in Egypt and Tunisia demonstrated unmistakably that their dictatorships were not sufficiently authoritarian.

In both nations, the political and legal frameworks have been carefully reengineered to prevent exactly the kind of civil disobedience witnessed 15 years ago.

No protest or opposition can be tolerated at all.

For instance, a 2013 protest law in Egypt forbids public demonstrations, and a 2015 terrorism law defines any act of “intimidation” that “hinterts national unity,” “disturbs the public order,” or “impedes public authorities from carrying out their work” as an act of “terrorism.”

The post-2013 Egyptian military regime has also demonstrated that it will not leave any elections to chance.

The government has rigged schem elections, passed a constitutional amendment that guarantees the parliament’s loyalty to the president, and revised the constitution to make it automatic until 2030.

El-Sisi has used his influence to force opposition figures into permanent exile, as well as cracks that have facilitated opposition candidates’ presidential campaigns.

Experts have noted how closely Tunisia’s Saied has followed in el-Sisi’s footsteps.

Saied has rewritten the constitution, expanded presidential powers, and eliminated checks and balances, just like his Egyptian counterpart, who hasn’t yet established el-Sisi-level repression in Tunisia.

According to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index, Tunisia has fallen backwards in terms of various political and economic indicators in line with the Arab Spring.

Cracks in the system

The root causes of the Arab Spring, which were sparked by corruption, injustice, and economic hardship, are still present and perhaps more pressing than they were in the Arab Spring of that time.

On the annual Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), Arab nations consistently perform poorly, and many places are still at the bottom of the world’s rankings. States also continue to experience injustice.

For example, out of 21 Arab countries recently evaluated by Freedom House, none were rated “free”, and of the nine Arab nations assessed in 2025 as part of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index, most placed near the bottom of global rankings.

Importantly, the Arab region is still enshrined in economic hardship as a whole, despite the Gulf nations not far away.

The United Nations claims that the region’s population continues to suffer from severe food shortages and hunger, and that per capita gross domestic product (GDP) is still exceedingly low in the majority of non-Gulf states.

Economic problems in Egypt and Tunisia are indicative of conditions in much of the rest of the region.

Since the uprising in 2011, both the military’s economic empire and the inequality gap have grown, while also rising inflation and poverty.

Tunisian’s economy is also experiencing decline.

According to a recent report published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Saied’s economic approach has led to a huge increase in internal debt and a “collapse of]economic] growth”, in addition to “reduced real wages and increased unemployment”.

Democracy: The room’s thorny subject

The Arab regimes’ citizens continue to have a disproportionate desire for democratic government, which is perhaps the most alarming aspect.

According to the Arab Opinion Index, more than 70 percent of Arab respondents support democracy, compared with only 19 percent who do not.

Survey findings also point out that Arab citizens frequently associate democracy with freedom, equality, and justice, and hold favorable opinions of the Arab Spring.

Similar findings are suggested by more recent polls of the Arab Barometer.

The Arab Spring is not over

About 14 years after the uprising against him began, Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad was toppled and forced into exile.

Perhaps more importantly, this cataclysmic event demonstrated that analysts may have been premature in declaring the Arab Spring’s end.

Recent Gen Z protests in Morocco offer more evidence that many Arabs – especially young people – are able, willing, and ready to fight for change.

Thus, it may only be a matter of time before a final chapter of protests occurs.

Governments are aware of the possibility. Egypt’s el-Sisi regime again provides a useful case in point.

El-Sisi has been forced to repeatedly warn Egyptians against protesting in recent years.

He claimed in a number of years that an uprising like the one from 2011 would “never occur again” in Egypt.

The paranoia is real – Egypt’s deep state does not appear willing to take any chances by opening up the political arena.

The regime is reportedly seeking to extend el-Sisi’s rule indefinitely, despite the fact that it has recently launched a massive election-rigging campaign.

The Egyptian government has also attempted to stop opposition abroad, but it is content to do so.

The regime has tried to shut down opposition media outlets based outside Egypt and has sought to have popular opposition figures extradited to the country.

Anas Habib, a young Egyptian, staged a peaceful protest at the Egyptian Embassy in The Hague earlier this year.

Egypt’s foreign minister reacted by urging Egyptian embassy staff to detain protesters and have them detained. In an act of apparent revenge, Egyptian authorities arrested Habib’s elderly uncle in Egypt.

Arab states have recently begun boosting their cooperation in internal security, with governments aggressively pursuing international individuals who are wanted for extradition.

These extreme deeds demonstrate the paranoia that the Arab Spring’s events are intermissions rather than the culmination.

History suggests that when the movement continues, it will not be announced in advance.

The last word is almost always in the hands of the people. Simply put, we are unsure of their decision to use it.