Category World News

In Yemen’s already complex theater, political and military signals have gotten stronger. In an unusually short period of time, three successive statements were issued within a single context, beginning with an official Yemeni request from President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, the governing body of the internationally recognised government. The Saudi-led coalition then issued a political message to the minister of defense, which sets out the steps being taken and the course of action they will take.

What transpired is neither a routine truce nor an isolated incident. The sequence suggests an arrangement that uses Yemeni legitimacy as the political framework for a Saudi move aimed at restraining the expansion of an ally advancing eastward, while at the same time reducing the Houthis ‘ chances of exploiting any rift within the opposing camp. The three statements’ weight exceeded the words of their respective statements, which moved the situation from an open tug-of-war to a clear path based on a field response, an official request, and finally a political message that establishes the limits of movement and sets its course.

The east and the west, why?

The names of Yemen’s governorates may seem like marginal details to a non-Arab reader, but Hadramout and al-Mahra are exceptions. With its oil and gas resources and related infrastructure, Hadramout contributes to Yemen’s economic development and is a key border crossing with Saudi Arabia, which contributes to both border security and trade. Al-Mahra controls ports, crossings, and movement routes that have an impact on regional security and the local economy because it borders Oman and Saudi Arabia. This location makes any tension in the east a quintessential border issue, not merely a local crisis, and any large-scale instability there will not remain confined within Yemen, as it impacts the country’s economy, raises border sensitivity within the region, and stirs concerns about the stability of trade routes.

Riyadh sees the east as a place where it strives to avoid chaos because of this. With the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is supported by the United Arab Emirates, and its forces in Hadramout and al-Mahra, the conflict has become a direct question of who has the authority to manage security and resources in areas that cannot support a protracted conflict.

The first step came through a statement attributed to a government source about a request by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council to take military measures to protect civilians in Hadramout and support the armed forces in imposing calm. The significance of this phrase is that it elevates the conflict from being one of conflict between forces within the same camp (the STC is a member of the Presidential Leadership Council), causing the supporting partner to take legal action.

In response to a request from the head of a recognized international governing body, the coalition has a clearer political justification for its intervention. Internally, the request sends a message no less important, as the presidency does not want to become a mere facade covering up imposed facts, and it seeks to affirm the idea that controlling the field happens through the state, even if it seeks regional support to achieve that.

The coalition issued a second statement, which urgently demanded that the STC step down from Hadramout and al-Mahra, hand over camps to the “Nation’s Shield,” and issue a warning against engaging directly in military operations that would otherwise be in conflict with de-escalation efforts. This text provides executive instructions, including those for escalation, handover, and reinstating the local authority.

The mention of the “Homeland Shield” forces in the statement is striking because the coalition is not merely calling for vacating positions, but is also proposing an alternative party to take them over. Riyadh can manage the eastern file without resorting to the logic of multiple forces, which lowers the likelihood of a security vacuum. The phrase “direct engagement” is the most explicit warning, because it raises the price of any attempt to forcefully impose a new reality on the coalition or test its limits.

The third statement by Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, addressed primarily to the Yemeni people, affirmed that the kingdom’s intervention came in response to a request from the legitimate government and in support of restoring the state and preserving Yemen’s security. The “Southern issue” was included in the political solution pipeline through the Riyadh Conference and Riyadh Agreement, ensuring southern participation in governance, and it was emphasized as a fair political cause that cannot be ignored. The STC should “heed to reason,” he instructed, and follow Saudi and Emirati mediation efforts to end the escalation and grant peaceful transfer of camps.

This framing works in two directions, it grants the STC political recognition of the Southern cause, while setting strict boundaries for its pursuit, as Riyadh – according to the statement – distinguishes between the justice of the cause and the use of force to change control maps in resource and border areas. It also provides the STC with a practical exit through peaceful handover as opposed to an open conflict.

What does the Southern Transitional Council’s interpretation of this mean?

This sequence puts the STC to a direct test. The coalition’s operational statement placed a cap on its movements, and the political framing from the Saudi defense minister gave a way out via peaceful handover. In this situation, a coordinated response would preserve the STC’s political discourse and influence in its traditional areas of influence while presenting any withdrawal as an engagement in de-escalation. Procrastination or direct defiance, however, raises risks, as it could lead to greater political and diplomatic pressure and portray it as the party obstructing the de-escalation process in a highly sensitive area. In addition, the three messages change the boundaries of expansion within the same camp because specific tactics for influencing specific areas or centers differ from forced attempts to reshape eastern Yemen.

Houthis are watching.

The Houthis, an armed group with their own government backed by Iran, which control Yemen’s capital Sanaa and northwestern Yemen, are monitoring any rift among their opponents and seek to exploit it. The Yemeni presidency and the coalition’s swift coordination shows to Sanaa rulers that the opposing camp is capable of handling their disputes in sensitive areas and that placing a bet on internal fighting as a route to the east may not be possible. Additionally, creating security arrangements close to resource areas makes it more difficult to politicize their chaos and stifles any attempt to advance there in the future.

The phrase “Saudi–Emirati mediation” in the coalition’s statements and those by the Saudi defence minister appears highly sensitive because Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the STC is not merely one of political communication, but one of sponsorship, funding, and support that grants it freedom of movement and a constant backer. When the UAE and Saudi Arabia sign a letter of agreement as mediators, sending the STC the impression that it is protected, while putting Abu Dhabi in a tight corner because mediation requires a concrete commitment to stop escalation rather than just a declaration of intent.

This directs Abu Dhabi’s willingness to follow Saudi Arabia’s strategy and approach to an issue that threatens its border security and strategic interests, and serves as a test of the alignment of calculations within the coalition itself. But the question remains: will Abu Dhabi succeed in pushing the STC towards de-escalation, or will the political cover remain in place while developments on the ground move in a different direction?

What direction are we taking?

A quick-term settlement that includes a planned handover of camps, a planned handover of camps, and security measures to stop any one party from imposing its dominance in Hadramout and al-Mahra is more likely to be the result of Saudi Arabia’s efforts. This path maintains a minimum level of stability and reduces the chances of clashes within the camp opposing the Houthis. If it fails, only a few deterrents will be developed to enforce the stated ceiling while allowing the mediation channel to remain open to prevent a full-scale explosion.

The cost of turning eastern Yemen into a contentious space has been increased by the three statements, but they have not caused a resolution.

In my view, what will determine the direction is not the statements alone, but the behaviour of the parties in the following days: will the STC choose a settlement that saves face, or will it bet on time? And will the “security alternative” arrangements help to lessen friction, or will they lead to new local sensitivity?

And one more thing about the Houthis: will they view this containment as a deterrent that lessens opportunities to invest in disputes, or will they use it as a chance to test the limits of movement?

As Israel continues to obstruct essential shelter and aid into the area, displaced Palestinians in Gaza are in further misery as a result of their ongoing bombardment, siege, and loss in the country’s genocidal war for more than two years.

After heavy winter rains slammed the area in recent days, flimsy tents were flooded and makeshift camps were covered in mud on Monday.

Since Israel’s war destroyed an estimated 80% of the buildings in Gaza, Palestinians in Gaza are now forced to take shelter in tents and other makeshift structures due to the harsh conditions.

Officials are advising people that prolonged weather also presents new risks for disease and illness, including the risk of floodwater contamination from overburdened and damaged sewage systems and the possibility of damaged buildings collapsing in the midst of heavy rain.

A partially destroyed wall collapsed onto a 30-year-old woman’s tent on Sunday in the Remal neighborhood of Gaza City in the middle of fierce winds, killing her, according to Al Jazeera Arabic.

Although officials have cautioned people against using tents to shelter in damaged buildings, they only offer moderate protection from the heavy rain and no real protection from flooding.

According to the authorities in Gaza, at least 15 people have died this month from hypothermia, including three babies, as a result of the rains and the soaring temperatures.

The infant’s death from the extreme cold was the latest one to come from Arkan Firas Musleh, two months old.

floodwater that has been contaminated

According to Al Jazeera’s Hind Khoudary, a reporter from the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City, where the majority of the buildings have been reduced to rubble by Israeli attacks, deep puddles and thick mud were created in some places by the heavy rains.

People are having trouble moving through those mud puddles, she said. These include sewage, trash, and water.

In response to reports of flooded tents being reported by residents, a team of municipal workers tried to pump sewage from the stale network.

She said that “family members are complaining that sewage water has been entering their tents.”

calls for aid delivery

Aid organizations have urged Israel to put pressure on it to lift restrictions on the country’s access to life-saving aid, which they claim are far below the amount required by the US-brokered ceasefire.

“More rain,” More human suffering, despair, and death are what commissioner-general of UNRWA, the top UN agency coordinating aid in Gaza, wrote on social media on Sunday.

More than two years of suffering are being made worse by the harsh winter weather. In ruins and flimsy, waterlogged tents, people in Gaza are surviving.

He continued, “This is unavoidable. There is nothing about this.” At the required scale, aid supplies are not permitted inside.

More attacks by Israel

Israeli attacks on Palestinians continue in Gaza despite the ceasefire that ended on October 10.

A medical source told Al Jazeera Arabic that three Palestinians were hurt on Monday when Israeli forces attacked the Jabalia camp in northern Gaza.

According to witnesses, the attack took place in a location where Israeli forces had withdrawn under the ceasefire agreement.

According to Al Jazeera Arabic, witnesses also reported an Israeli airstrike on the eastern regions of the Bureij camp in central Gaza, artillery shelling east of Rafah, and additional Israeli attacks east of Gaza City.

A preliminary truce, followed by steps toward a wider peace, was a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump in September. In the first phase, there have been both the exchange of prisoners detained in Gaza and in Israeli jails, as well as the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the enclave. It still occupies the majority of the land, though.

However, Israeli attacks continue despite the fact that humanitarian aid has not arrived where promised.

I arrive at al-Shifa Hospital’s emergency room at 7:30 am and spend the entire 24-hour period there. There are constantly more patients coming in from heart attacks, hypothermia, chronic diseases that have suddenlygotten worse as a result of the lack of medical attention for traumatic injuries brought on by Israeli attacks.

Up to three doctors and four to six nurses work a regular shift, which is roughly a third of the emergency room’s staff before the war. I don’t get paid for this work, like many other medical professionals. Although the hospital cannot afford to pay us, some coworkers occasionally receive symbolic pay from organizations that support our efforts. No one is paid in installments.

Only three of the 29 al-Shifa departments are still in full swing. The majority of the structures in the once-sprawling medical complex have been destroyed or burned. Three of them have undergone partial restoration, and we work in them.

When my shift is over, I return to my bombed-out home, which has been replaced with tarpaulins rather than walls. Because I don’t bring any money back, we have no heating, electricity, or running water, and we struggle to get enough food.

Medical professionals in Gaza are confronted with this reality. The Gazan hospitals still resemble battlefronts despite more than two months since the ceasefire was in effect. Only the volunteerism and moral decency of countless medical professionals have allowed the sector to survive. It is barely functioning.

Patients stand in long lines in Gaza as doctors are working under enormous pressure, nurses are performing tasks beyond their capacity, and equipment shortages cause them to have their appointments delayed.

Hospital occupancy rates are at records, and some departments’ capacity has been frequently exceeded.

In a setting where almost everything is lacking, including essential medicines, ventilators, operating rooms, and even beds, medical teams are operating. Even a minor malfunction can halt the treatment of dozens of patients, adding to this a severe shortage of spare parts for malfunctioning medical equipment.

350, 000 people experience chronic illnesses, the majority of whom are unable to receive regular medical care. 42, 000 people in Gaza need long-term rehabilitation and/or multiple surgeries, which are inaccessible. Nearly 1,100 patients have died while awaiting medical clearance to leave for treatment out of the over 16, 000 patients.

In the meantime, Israel continues to bomb civilians and prevent the delivery of crucial and life-saving medications, including those for dialysis, heart medications, antibiotics, insulin, and emergency care IV solutions.

Since the Israeli truce ended on October 10 and injured at least 411 people, there are at least 411. The number of people who have died as a result of Israel’s decision to omit drugs is up for guesswork.

Medical professionals who have already endured hell bear the burden of all these pressures, including the high patient count, the damaged medical infrastructure, and the lack of medicines.

According to Medical Aid for Palestinians, at least 1,722 of our colleagues perished in the genocide. Some people eluded Gaza when they had the chance. Dr. Hussam Abu Safia, the hospital’s director, is one of the at least 80 of our colleagues who are still imprisoned in Israel.

Those of us who are still working are exhausted. We are still haunted by images of the horrors of the genocide: infants and children who have lost multiple limbs, elderly people who have severe internal injuries that cannot be operated on, and young people who have spinal or head injuries who are now entirely dependent on a caregiver and have access to medical supplies or medications.

In my pocket, among the tools and bandages, is where I carry my grief. One of my coworkers at al-Shifa Hospital who lost a child recently remarked, “Sometimes I treat a child who looks like my own son and I have to hide my tears.”

We are fighting against time and death, according to another coworker, and we don’t work in hospitals.

We are not just caregivers or employees in Gaza, as medical professionals. We are soldiers in a different kind of war, heroes without armor, and witnesses to tragedy. Despite putting our own suffering aside, some of us have lost loved ones, while others have lost homes. We can’t afford to let our patients down, but rather because we are fearless. There is an unwavering will despite the exhaustion, fear, and sorrow, and hearts filled with duty and humanity.

We’ll keep going, but we can’t do it alone. We require urgent assistance in order to re-equip operating rooms, re-stock medical supplies, and restore Gaza’s healthcare sector.

Gaza needs medicine, personnel, medical supplies, and a guarantee of the fundamental right to treatment, not more statements.

Let this article serve as a call to action right away, not a call for help. To resurrect Gaza’s healthcare system, lives must be saved. Israelis are important.