Category World News

As the US-Israel war on Iran continues to escalate, questions have been raised about how much it is costing Washington.

Late last week, two congressional sources told US broadcaster MS NOW that the war is costing the United States an estimated $1bn a day. A day later, Politico reported that US Republicans on Capitol Hill privately fear the Pentagon is spending close to $2bn a day on the war.

Congress’s House Minority Leader Hakeem Jeffries told reporters at a Capitol Hill news conference last week that President Donald Trump is “plunging America into another endless conflict in the Middle East” and “spending billions of dollars to bomb Iran”.

“But they can’t find a dime to make it more affordable for the American people to go see a doctor when they need one,” he said. “Can’t find a dime to make it easier for Americans who are working hard to purchase their first home. And they can’t find a dime to lower the grocery bills of the American people.”

Trump, who won the 2024 presidential election largely on promises to reduce the cost of living, has seen his popularity plummet. A Reuters/Ipsos poll, conducted hours after the US and Israel launched strikes on Iran on February 28, sparking region-wide retaliation, now shows dismal approval for the war from the US public as well.

The Pentagon, the headquarters of the US Department of Defense, has not released an official estimate of the cost of the war yet, but the soaring costs are unlikely to go down well with voters, analysts say, months before the midterm elections.

To seek clarity on the actual cost of the war, Representative Brendan Boyle of Pennsylvania, the top Democrat on the House Budget Committee, has asked the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to analyse the exact cost of the war.

As the Trump administration prepares to ask Congress for more money to fund the war this week, here’s what we know about how much the war is costing the US each day.

What has Boyle asked the CBO to do?

In a formal letter sent on March 5, Boyle asked the CBO to analyse “the operational, logistical, and sustainment costs of the war in Iran, including any additional direct or indirect costs associated with the use of military forces for this purpose”.

He also asked the CBO to estimate “other types of additional costs” that might be involved in the war with Iran, like “diplomatic operations and foreign aid costs”. Additionally, he wants the CBO to analyse “opportunity costs” such as how the cost of a US response to potential Chinese aggression would be affected by “moving an aircraft carrier from near Taiwan to off the coast of Iran”.

In his letter, Boyle said “the effect on prices from the economic disruption caused by the war in Iran” should be analysed.

“Please conduct this analysis under several scenarios, including scenarios of the war lasting longer than 4 to 5 weeks and deploying US troops on the ground in Iran,” he wrote.

How much is the war costing the US each day?

While the CBO has yet to release an analysis of the cost of the war, the US media have begun reporting estimates of how much Washington’s military campaign against Iran has cost the country so far. There have been varying estimates.

On Saturday, according to The New York Times, Pentagon officials told Congress that the first week of the war cost the US $6bn.

Earlier, on Thursday, two US congressional sources told MS NOW that the war with Iran is costing the US nearly $1bn a day. The next day, Politico reported that US Republicans privately feared the Pentagon was spending close to $2bn a day on the war.

Some of the equipment the US is using is extremely expensive, reports suggest. In particular, the US interceptor missiles being used to bring down Iranian missiles can cost millions of dollars for each one fired, analysts say.

Kent Smetters, director of the Penn Wharton Budget Model (PWBM), told Al Jazeera the war could cost the US $2bn per day in the early stages, but is unlikely to remain that high over the longer term.

“After the first few days, we think it is closer to $800m per day. But $2bn per day on a sustained basis seems very hard to believe, even with modern equipment that generally costs a bit more. Of course, these numbers could change if we get significant personnel build-up; right now, at most, that’s at least a few months away,” he said.

John Phillips, a British safety, security and risk adviser and a former military chief instructor, agreed. “Bottom line, the war likely costs about $1bn per day, not $2bn, though spikes may reach that,” he said.

Why is the war costing the US so much?

A former British military official, who requested anonymity, told Al Jazeera that for the US, “having assets in the Middle East region besides permanent bases” has increased costs significantly.

Since early February, the US has amassed a vast array of military assets in the Middle East amid escalating tensions with Iran.

According to open-source intelligence analysts and military flight-tracking data, since early February, the US appears to have deployed more than 120 aircraft to the region – the largest surge in US airpower in the Middle East since the 2003 Iraq War.

The reported deployments include E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, F-35 stealth strike fighters and F-22 air superiority jets, alongside F-15s and F-16s. Flight-tracking data shows many departing bases in the US and Europe, supported by cargo aircraft and aerial refuelling tankers, a sign of sustained operational planning rather than routine rotations.

“Two carrier groups with information have said they [the US] will be sending more,” the military official said, adding that he is not certain if these additional military assets are being sent as a source of relief for the US or because Washington is increasing its presence for an overlapping time before the swap due to maintenance and resupply taking place.

What is the money being spent on?

In a report published on Thursday, an analysis by Washington-based think tank the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said Washington had spent $3.7bn in its first 100 hours of the war alone, or nearly $900m a day, driven largely by the huge expenditure of munitions.

The CSIS researchers said their analysis drew on CBO estimates of the operations and support costs for each unit, adjusting for inflation and unit size, and adding 10 percent for costs of “a higher operational tempo”.

Their analysis found the US had expended more than 2,000 munitions of various types in the first 100 hours of the war, and estimated it would cost $3.1bn to replenish the munitions inventory on a like-for-like basis, with the costs increasing by $758.1m a day.

The former UK military official told Al Jazeera that the cost of one missile, including production, transport and manpower, is at least $2m.

CSIS researchers Mark Cancian and Chris Park said only a small amount of the estimated overall $3.7bn cost of the war in the first 100 hours was already budgeted for, while most of the costs – $3.5bn – were not.

The budgeted costs include “operational costs [approximately $196m, with $178m budgeted],” they said.

They noted that “munitions replacement [approximately $3.1bn]” has not yet been budgeted, and “replacing combat losses and repairing infrastructure damage [approximately $350m] is also unbudgeted”.

That meant the Pentagon will most probably have to request more funding in the near future to cover the unbudgeted costs, they said. This could prove a major political challenge for the Trump administration and provide “a focal point for opposition to the war”, they added.

Phillips said, “The big constraint isn’t money, it’s interceptor stockpiles.”

“The US can sustain the financial cost for years, but munition depletion could become a serious constraint within months of high-intensity operations.”

How much will the war cost the US overall?

Even if the daily costs of the war level out, the overall cost of the war is likely to mount.

Smetters told Fortune magazine on March 2 that, ultimately, US taxpayers will bear the brunt of this war and estimated the overall cost at $65bn.

“PWBM assumes more upside risk in the Epic Fury scenario. So a $65bn direct hit to taxpayers is the likely cost for direct military operations as well as the replacement of equipment, munitions, and other supplies,” he said.

“If the war lasts more than two months, then this number goes up,” he added.

On March 6, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth warned that the US bombardment on Iran is “about to surge dramatically”, entailing “more fighter squadrons … more defensive capabilities” and “more bomber pulses more frequently”.

The former UK military official told Al Jazeera, “The US has ramped up production of a range of missiles, but the number is low compared to the weapons needed.”

He noted that NATO countries also have their own missile orders, but right now, priority is being given to the US for its own resupply.

“The Middle East countries have limited amounts [of missiles] because of the cost and storage and management of the systems, including training for a threat they didn’t think would happen,” he said.

“In short, they [the US] have to select which incoming attack will be met with which countermeasures to keep hold of the real-time interception missiles which will have to be used against the high-speed missiles,” he added.

There is a way to reduce costs, analysts say, by limiting the use of extremely expensive interceptors. One option being considered is sourcing cheaper, mass-produced missile interceptor systems from Ukraine.

Last Thursday, a congressional source told MS NOW that the “costs [of the war] will likely decrease as the US deploys fewer costly interceptor missiles”.

Phillips told Al Jazeera that US officials already acknowledge they cannot shoot down every drone with interceptors and are focusing on destroying launchers instead.

“The world is working at pace to find more cost-effective ways of mitigating the drone threat. Direct energy weapons are a feasible way, but they can only be used either on ships or bases. They require significant power supplies in order to operate, so [they] aren’t really feasible,” he said.

Meanwhile, the CSIS report’s authors said, while air campaigns typically settle to a less frenetic pace after an intense early period of a conflict, “nevertheless, the unbudgeted costs” will be “substantial”.

“That means that [the Department of Defense] will need additional funds at some point because the level of budget cuts needed to fund this conflict internally would likely be politically and operationally difficult,” said the report.

Will the Trump administration get the money it needs to fund this war?

The Trump administration will have to go cap in hand to Congress in the near future to fund the unbudgeted costs of the war, analysts say.

Reporting from Washington, DC, following the publication of the CSIS analysis last week, Al Jazeera’s Rosiland Jordan said the Pentagon had put together a $50bn supplemental budget request in order to replace Tomahawk and Patriot missiles and THAAD interceptors already used in the first week of the war, along with other equipment that had been damaged or worn out so far.

She said the high cost of the war was “probably coming as a shock to members of Congress and the general public”.

“The military burn rate has been rather high.”

Congress is already concerned about the budget deficit and the interest on the federal debt, she added.

“Another $50bn request might give some legislators pause.”

According to a March 6 Politico report, when journalists asked House Speaker Mike Johnson whether Congress would approve $50bn, he said he was not certain of the specific amount the Trump administration would ask for but said Congress would pass the bill “when it’s appropriate and get it right”.

Students in Bangladesh have been shut out of classes after the government decided to conserve energy by closing all universities as the effects of the US-Israeli war on Iran continue to take hold.

Kano, Nigeria – As the son of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei takes over as Iran’s supreme leader after the assassination of his father in a United States-Israeli attack, hundreds of mourners gathered in a mosque far away from the war in the Middle East to grieve the late leader.

The adherents in northern Nigeria’s Kano State solemnly chanted prayers. At one point during the recitations, the voice of the religious leader that carried over the microphone to all corners of the hall, cracked with grief. Among the crowd, one young man wiped his eyes.

On Sunday, Iran named Mojtaba Khamenei as his father’s replacement. In Kano, the community sees it as a move ensuring the “continuation of his father’s resistance”. The assassination of the elder Khamenei last week in an air strike has stirred deep emotions among Nigeria’s minority Muslim Shia, a group that sees its faith and identity intertwined with that of the larger Shia community in Iran.

For 60-year-old academic Dauda Nalado, the elder Khamenei’s killing was not merely another event in foreign politics; it was the silencing of a revered spiritual teacher.

“Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is not only a leader of the Shiite community or even Muslims alone. He is regarded as a leader of oppressed people across the world,” the university professor told Al Jazeera. “If you look at Iran’s involvement in issues concerning Gaza and Palestine, you will understand why many people admire his leadership.”

Khamenei, who was 86 when he was killed, became Iran’s supreme leader in 1989. He shaped the country’s military and political apparatus, which became critical to Iran’s influence in the region; fostered self-reliance in the face of Western sanctions; and responded forcefully to criticism.

However, in January, Khamenei faced one of the most significant domestic challenges to his rule over the years when severe economic hardship turned into nationwide protests. Thousands of people were killed in the crackdown. The US has used it as one of the justifications for its current war; however, before his death, Khamenei accused “terrorists” linked to the US and Israel of being behind the violence.

Since the US and Israel launched their war on Iran on February 28, at least 1,255 people in Iran have been killed, including 160 girls in an attack on their school in the southern city of Minab. Hundreds of others were injured. Hospitals, residential buildings and historic heritage sites have been severely impacted by the bombings.

Across northern Nigeria, which is predominantly Muslim, Shias have taken to the streets to protest against the war, Besides Kano, demonstrators have gathered in Kaduna, Kebbi, Gombe, Bauchi, Katsina, and even in the mixed-faith commercial city of Lagos, in the country’s south.

Their demand is for the attacks on Iran to end.

“The United States and Israel jointly imposed this war. … Iran has a legitimate right to self-defence,” Nalado said.

A small but significant minority

Muslims make up about half of Nigeria’s 200 million people. Most in the country follow Sunni Islam, and the Shia are a small minority, numbering one million to five million, according to varying estimates.

Sunni and Shia Muslims are separated in their beliefs about the teaching and interpretations of the Quran and which of the companions of the Prophet Muhammad was meant to succeed him.

Of the various Shia groups in Nigeria, the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN) is the largest and most powerful. Its leader, Ibrahim el-Zakzaky, is an influential religious scholar credited with expanding a Shia community in a country that was almost completely Sunni Muslim. The 72-year-old is also controversial for perceived “radicalism”.

As a Muslim student unionist born to Sunni scholars, Zakzaky was said to have been moved by the success of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1979. That movement toppled the pro-Western monarchy, and Zakzaky reportedly resolved to lead a similar one in secular Nigeria, which was then scuppered by military coups.

He travelled to Iran in the 1980s for further Islamic studies and reportedly met then-Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini in person, an encounter that proved pivotal. Upon his return in the mid-1980s, he set up his Khomeinist movement and began preaching a version of Shia Islam in his hometown of Zaria in Kaduna State, which critics saw as “radical”. His organisation set up social welfare schemes in the impoverished north and sponsored students abroad. By the 2000s, he had millions of followers.

Zakzaky voiced disdain for successive governments in his sermons. He was criticised for not recognising the Nigerian state, and IMN members enforced strict dress codes in Zaria although they had no authority to do so. 

Those activities and suspicions that Iran was backing the group put the IMN on the radar of Nigeria’s security forces even though the IMN has not operated as an armed group. Kabir Adamu, a security analyst based in Abuja, said that while Iran likely provides financial support, there’s no evidence Tehran has armed the IMN in the same way it has done with Hezbollah or Hamas, its proxies in the Middle East.

Still, altercations between members and the police became common, and Shia Muslims accused authorities of persecution.

Tensions escalated in 2015 when IMN members at a rally blocked road access in Zaria, preventing a convoy for Nigeria’s army chief from passing through. Authorities claimed the IMN tried to “assassinate” the army chief. Clashes erupted, and the military cracked down with brute force, killing at least 350 members, including three of Zakzaky’s sons, in what Amnesty International called a massacre.

Zakzaky and his wife were shot and wounded in a raid on his house, leading to the near-loss of sight for the IMN leader. The couple was placed under house arrest for several years despite a court order to free them.

In 2019, Nigeria proscribed the IMN as a “terror” group.

When he was finally freed in 2021, Zakzaky and his family travelled to Tehran for treatment. He met the late Khamenei, who hailed him as a “true” fighter for the cause of Islam.

Nigeria’s balancing act

Tensions between successive Nigerian security forces and Zakzaky’s movement have often forced Abuja into a balancing act of sorts as the country sought to keep friendly ties with Iran.

Ideological armed groups like Boko Haram, which emerged in 2009, have caused the state to be more suspicious of religious movements. Authorities in 2013 said they arrested three suspected Hezbollah members in Kano with the help of Israeli officials who claimed they’d embedded within the Shia community.

As the war broke out on February 28, the government in Abuja reacted cautiously, calling for dialogue and voicing “deep concern”. Nigeria also said it’s planning to evacuate about 1,000 of its citizens from Iran, many of them students.

Nigerian authorities have been silent but watchful as Shia demonstrators held candlelight processions in several cities. In Abuja, security forces flooded the streets last week, cordoning off major roads and preventing any gatherings there.

“Authorities are likely worried about possible riots that could be hijacked ahead of general elections in January,” Adamu said.

There’s also the fact, he added, that Nigeria has been working more closely with the US to combat armed groups at home with American soldiers arriving in the country last month.

Back in Kano, the Shia community, while angry about Khamenei’s killing, is pleased that his son is now taking his place.

An IMN member who gave his name as Mustapha KK told Al Jazeera that Mojtaba Khamenei’s succession is a “blessing” and “a shield against American arrogance and Israeli aggression”.

“Mojtaba embodies the spirit of defiance, ensuring the Islamic Republic of Iran remains strong in the face of enemies. For us in Nigeria’s Islamic Movement, his leadership is a source of pride and hope for the global struggle against tyranny,” he said.

Nalado, meanwhile, said the new supreme leader is “well suited and capable”.

“Khamenei has gone, and Khamenei has come,” he said. “Those who stand with Iran will feel relieved and put great hope while those who are against Iran will not feel comfortable. Certainly, the legacy of Khomeini and Khamenei lives on.”

At the Kano mosque, some mourners in the crowded hall held up photos of Khomeini, Ali Khamenei and the Iranian flag.

As their chanting voices rose, they hit their chests several times in tune with the rhythm, a symbolic ritual that conveys pain and solidarity.

Although most there were followers of Zakzaky, some were cautious to identify themselves as IMN members due to its current labelling and said they had gathered not for political reasons but for religious and moral ones.

But others were more vocal in sharing their anger over the US role in the Iran war and the fact that Nigeria’s government is now working with the US military.

Postgraduate student Salahuddeen Yahaya Alhasan, who also manages a farm in Kano, said the US-Israel strikes on schools and civilian locations in Iran were “reckless and barbaric” to him.

Supporters across Iran gathered to celebrate after Mojtaba Khamenei was named the country’s new supreme leader, succeeding his father Ali Khamenei a week after his death in a US-Israeli strike. Some Iranians voiced dismay, with chants against the new leader heard in parts of the capital.

Wars rarely begin as “forever wars”.

Leaders sell a short, controlled operation with a defined target. But mission creep turns that pitch into a pattern – retaliation cycles, credibility politics, alliance pressures and market shocks – that pull those governments deeper into a crisis and make stopping the assaults harder.

Governments start with narrow goals (“degrade”, “disrupt”), then drift towards open-ended aims (“restore deterrence”, “force compliance”) – objectives their airpower cannot conclusively deliver.

When the rationale for war becomes abstract, the endpoint becomes negotiable.

How wars become open-ended

The bombs falling on Iran follow a long history of interventions by the United States abroad. President Donald Trump, reportedly encouraged by a military operation in January that abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, boasted of helping to rebuild Venezuela.

However, Venezuela remains embroiled in a protracted political and economic crisis.

In the case of Iran, US allies in Europe were more sceptical as they invoked the lessons for the West from the 2003-2011 Iraq war.

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez warned that Western leaders were “playing Russian roulette” by threatening Iran while German Chancellor Friedrich Merz urged restraint and warned against destabilising the country.

Their message was that a “limited” military operation is often a pitch for the first few days of a conflict, not a description of what comes next.

But the US insisted it still controlled the narrative – and the events unfolding in the Middle East.

Trump said the US-Israel campaign in Iran could last “four to five weeks”, adding that the war has the “capability to go far longer than that”. That formulation – “short if it goes well, longer if it must” – is one of the oldest accelerants of mission creep.

Why mission creep happens and why it’s hard to contain

Mission creep is a chain reaction. It is accelerated by several factors:

Retaliation ladders: Each side’s “measured response” becomes the other side’s justification for the next strike, quickly shifting the war’s goals and timelines.

Domestic politics, allies and markets: These factors accelerate the slide into open-ended campaigns.

Leaders keep redefining success instead of pausing the attacks because admitting limits to their strategy could mean weakness. Allies add to the pressure as war coalitions fragment under stress, prompting states to take escalatory steps to prove reliability or avoid blame.

Finally, markets act as accelerants as energy prices, shipping insurance, trade disruptions and inflation become part of the ongoing war, forcing leaders to manage the economic effects of the war back home.

Credibility traps: These deepen the crisis as leaders shift focus from concrete tasks (hitting enemy sites, destroying military stockpiles) to abstract goals, such as “resolve” and “deterrence”. Analysts warned that states take risks to defend a war’s credibility even when underlying interests are limited.

Pivoting aims: When initial results disappoint, leaders pivot towards behavioral or political aims, like restoring deterrence or weakening a regime – objectives that airpower alone cannot deliver, turning the “operations” into “systems”.

The historical pattern

From Korea and Vietnam to Iraq, Syria, Gaza and now Iran, the pattern of mission creep is clear.

Korean War: US President Harry Truman framed the 1950 aggression as ensuring collective security, but the conflict escalated into a three-year war, entrenching a long-term US military position in South Korea. The fighting ended with an armistice in 1953, leaving the war technically unresolved.

Vietnam War: US escalation of the war, triggered when the US military reported an attack on one of its warships in the Gulf of Tonkin, expanded an initial “response” into a long and costly conflict whose aims kept shifting. The war, which included large-scale aerial herbicide spraying, ended with a US withdrawal in 1973 and the collapse of South Vietnam in 1975. Later investigations revealed that the Gulf of Tonkin attack never happened.

Iraq and Syria: The First Gulf War in 1991 ended quickly, but the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq set off a conflict that latest nearly nine years. The invasion, sold on claims of weapons of mass destruction, continued with new goals, like political stabilisation, after the original justification collapsed.

Similarly, the 2014 campaign against ISIL (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, despite aiming to avoid a large ground war, still embedded the US in a long-running deployment, illustrating incremental escalation.

Historian Max Paul Friedman noted that successive US presidents repeat the mistake of believing overwhelming military power can substitute for a viable political endgame. While the US has the capacity to “smash up states”, ensuring and installing a better replacement is a far rarer case.

While Trump claims the war in Iran could end in weeks, history – as we saw above – warns us otherwise.

Israel is learning the war playbook from its biggest sponsor: the US, which historically has set a clear pattern on selling a military escalation as “security”, wins the first few battles but then struggles to control what comes next.

Since the 1970s, the so-called Israeli “security” wars have been reshaping the Middle East.

Like the US, Israel’s war on Lebanon is an example of mission creep with a regional twist: Operations framed as border security are repeatedly expanded into deeper campaigns, triggering long-term blowback from forces like Hezbollah.

In 1978, Israel invaded southern Lebanon in what became known as Operation Litani. The United Nations Security Council responded with Resolution 425, calling on Israel to withdraw and creating a peacekeeping force, the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

In 1982, Israel launched a broader invasion that reached Lebanon’s capital, Beirut, and ended up occupying parts of southern Lebanon. Hezbollah then emerged as a central actor in resisting the Israeli occupation in the south, which continued until 2000.

UNIFIL’s own historical record ties its mandate and continuing presence to that escalation cycle and the repeated failure to stabilise Lebanon’s border.

In the 1990s, Israel ran major military campaigns in Lebanon. These episodes sharpened a pattern that still shapes the region: Leaders promise to restore deterrence quickly, but deterrence becomes a permanent file rather than an outcome.

In 2006, the Israel-Hezbollah war lasted for 33 days and destroyed major infrastructure in Lebanon. The war ended with UN Security Council Resolution 1701, which called for the cessation of hostilities and an expanded monitoring architecture centred on UNIFIL. Diplomats still treat 1701 as a cornerstone framework whenever escalation between Israel and Lebanon spikes precisely because none of the deeper political problems disappeared.

This history matters now because it shows how “bounded” campaigns create new systems: new armed actors, new front lines, new “deterrence” doctrines and a permanent state of tension and escalation.

Gaza: A genocidal war without an end date

Gaza illustrates a corrosive form of mission creep: military operations that are bound to fail with each round of escalation manufacturing the next.

After initial messaging in October 2023 suggested a swift campaign, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said at the end of that year that the war would continue for “many more months”. He has since dragged it into its third calendar year, leading to catastrophic civilian losses and accusations of genocide.

While human rights groups and UN experts have said Israel has committed genocide or carried out genocidal acts, Israel has rejected the characterisation.

Israel faces a genocide case at the International Court of Justice, and the International Criminal Court has issued arrest warrants against Netanyahu, former Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and late Hamas commander Mohammed Deif over the war.

What Iran war tells adversaries and allies

Without a clear and credible political end goal, any military action turns into a loop, morphing an “operation” into a “system”.

Rhetoric that accelerates such escalation includes the language of “imminent threat”, which compresses debate and makes a pause (truce, ceasefire) appear reckless.

In Iran’s case, Western leaders have also used nuclear warnings for decades. If a threat is permanently kept “only weeks away”, a war can be permanently presented as “necessary”.

As US and Israeli bombs rain down on Iranian territory, Washington is telling its adversaries – and allies – about energy, shipping and regional stability risks. Meanwhile, their European allies are reaching for the Iraq war analogy early on to avoid being dragged into a conflict that may have outgrown its sales pitch, as was seen with several nations condemning the killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei on the first day of the war.

The lesson is not how to run a war “better”. It is that leaders often sell a war as “limited” to win permission to start one. Then they incentivise escalation and punish restraint.

The history of modern wars shows how easily leaders meet the rhetorical burden of justification while avoiding the strategic burden of ending a war on terms that do not create the next one.