Category World News

United States President Donald Trump will host the heads of five Central Asian countries – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan – in an annual summit in Washington, DC, on Thursday. The group, founded in 2015, is known as C5+1, which refers to the five Central Asian countries and the US.

According to the US Department of State, the forum aims to increase cooperation between Washington and the Central Asian countries to “advance regional solutions to global challenges” through “fair and reciprocal economic partnerships, increased energy security, and promoting peace through strength”.

“C5+1 working groups support three pillars of engagement: economy, energy, and security,” it added.

But Thursday’s meeting with the heads of former Soviet republics comes as both Russia and China look to secure their own trade deals in the region.

Shairbek Dzhuraev, president of Crossroads Central Asia, an independent research institute, told Al Jazeera that he expects trade agreements to be discussed on Thursday, especially those involving “critical mineral resources”.

Here’s what we know about the summit:

What is the C5+1?

The forum was established in 2015 at its first meeting in Samarkand, Uzbekistan, when the foreign ministers of the six countries pledged to deepen cooperation over trade, transport, energy and communications.

Talks were also used to discuss security concerns relating to the war in Afghanistan before the US pulled out in 2021.

In 2023, then-US President Joe Biden held a meeting with Central Asian leaders on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly for the first time as well, marking a significant shift in US focus to the region.

According to a statement issued by Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the discussion between the two leaders in 2023 addressed “strengthening cooperation to address security challenges, including threats such as cybersecurity, terrorism, extremism, illegal migration and drug trafficking”.

Biden hailed the inaugural meeting of the leaders as a “historic moment” and claimed the countries were building on years of “close cooperation”. “A cooperation that is grounded in our shared commitment to sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity,” he said.

What trade deals have been agreed by the US in Central Asia recently?

In the first six months of Trump’s second term, the US has signed trade deals with Central Asia worth a collective $12.4bn.

In September, Trump hailed Uzbekistan’s government’s $8bn deal with US aviation manufacturer, Boeing, to buy Dreamliner aircraft as a “great deal”, in a post on his social media platform, Truth Social. Welcoming the deal signed by President Shavkat Mirziyoyev for Uzbekistan Airways to acquire 22 Dreamliners, Trump said it would create more than 35,000 jobs in the US. 

“President Mirziyoyev is a man of his word, and we will continue to work on many more items,” Trump wrote.

The same month, Kazakhstan signed a $4.2bn agreement with the US ​​locomotive parts maker Wabtec. According to the US Department of Commerce, the agreement will provide Kazakhstan with 300 locomotive kits to build locomotives for the Kazakh national rail company, Kazakhstan Temir Zholy.

Trump, again, took to Truth Social to trumpet the deal, referring to it as “the largest Railroad Equipment Purchase in History”.

Why are rare-earth minerals top of the agenda this year?

Central Asia has abundant reserves of rare-earth metals, which are crucial for the manufacture of everything from smartphones to air force jets.

In April, Kazakhstan reported that geologists had discovered deposits of the rare-earth metals, cerium, lanthanum, neodymium and yttrium – which are used in the manufacture of components of smartphones and computer hard disks.

While still preliminary, as the deposits need to be verified and processed, the deposits’ site in Karagandy, central Kazakhstan, is estimated to contain more than 20 million tonnes of these metals, according to the Ministry of Industry and Construction. If that proves to be correct, it is close to half the rare-earth resources of China, which has the most in the world.

At the end of October, Kazakhstan’s Bank for Development announced the launch of a $1bn financing programme to extract and process the rare-earth metals between 2025 and 2030.

Rare-earth metals, which are crucial for the manufacture of defence equipment, smartphones, electric vehicles and for the development of AI technology among many other uses, have become a flash point in the trade war between the US and China over the past year.

Since taking office in January, Trump has spoken frequently of the importance of the US acquiring more rare-earth materials and making it a top foreign policy goal.

China is home to the world’s largest reserves of rare-earth materials at 44 million tonnes. It also processes 90 percent of the world’s rare earths. The country has deposits of 12 of the 17 rare-earth metals on the periodic table, but placed restrictions on exports of seven of these in April this year. In October, it announced restrictions on five more, but has since agreed to delay those during talks between Trump and China’s President Xi Jinping in South Korea last week.

The US is actively seeking rare earth deals in other parts of the world. In October, Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described a framework agreement it had reached with the US as supporting a pipeline of $8.5bn “ready-to-go” projects which will enable Australia to massively increase its mining and processing capabilities. The two countries will each invest $1bn over the next six months into mining projects.

Meanwhile, a US agreement to assist with the rebuilding of Ukraine after the war with Russia ends, also features US access to rare earth deposits in the country. In May, following months of negotiations, the two countries signed a rare-earth minerals deal that would give the US preferential access to new minerals and natural resources licences in Ukraine.

It is, therefore, unsurprising that Trump is now interested in Central Asia. Dzhuraev explained that the region is “rich with mineral resources of various forms, particularly Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, the two biggest economies of the region”.

“So I expect certain talks on this subject, whether it will come out into some public announcement or not, I don’t know, but that will be the one big topic,” he said.

Who else is looking to cement relations in Central Asia?

Two of the US’s biggest rivals: Russia and China.

In October, Russia held its second Central Asia summit in Tajikistan, in which President Vladimir Putin also called for enhanced trade relations. The first meeting was held in 2022, at which the six countries agreed to strengthen relations.

Much of Central Asia once fell within the Soviet Union, making this a region that is close to Putin’s heart.

In an address to the five other heads of state within the region, Putin affirmed Moscow’s commitment to “further strengthening the strategic partnership and alliance with your states, as well as deepening constructive political, economic, and cultural ties”.

“Significant progress has already been achieved in all these areas. For instance, last year’s trade between Russia and the Central Asian states, the five nations, exceeded $45 billion. This is generally a good result,” he said.

According to the Observatory for Economic Complexity, a trade data visualisation platform, in 2023, the most common destinations for Russian exports included China at $129bn, India at $66.1bn, Turkiye at $31bn and Kazakhstan at $16.1bn.

Meanwhile, China has also been angling to up its influence in the region.

During a Kazakh-Chinese Business Council meeting in Beijing, which was attended by Kazakh President Tokayev and senior Chinese representatives in September, the two countries signed 70 trade agreements worth nearly $15bn, according to the Kazakh news agency, The Astana Times.

According to the Eurasian Development Bank, mutual trade between China and Central Asia in 2024 amounted to $66.2bn.

Will the US make inroads in Central Asia against this competition?

Dzhuraev said the US will struggle to compete with Russia and China when it comes to making trade deals with Central Asian countries.

Olive harvest season is under way across the occupied West Bank.

In every Palestinian home, there is a “teta” – a grandmother and keeper of family traditions, who shares her recipes for using olives and tells stories of when the whole family gathered to harvest them.

The small green or black fruits are primarily used to produce oil, a staple never missing from a Palestinian dinner table, as well as table olives that accompany many meals.

In this visual explainer, Al Jazeera looks at what makes the olive so special to Palestinian identity and life.

Olive trees have been cultivated across Palestine for thousands of years, serving as a source of livelihood, cultural heritage and resilience.

The olive harvest, known as “mawsim al-zaytoun”, begins in October, with preparations starting in September.

Families ready their tools as the first September rains, talat al-matar, soften the soil, wash the trees and, as many Palestinian proverbs say, bring “barakeh” (blessings) for the harvest and the year ahead.

More than 100,000 families rely on the harvest for their income. It runs through to November and brings together the entire community.

In the years before Israel’s war on Gaza began in October 2023, almost half of all cultivated land across the occupied West Bank and the Gaza Strip was planted with an estimated 10 million olive trees.

Palestinians use olives predominantly for oil, but every part of the tree finds a purpose:

Olive oil – About 90 percent of olives are used to extract oil, with different regions of Palestine producing distinct varieties.

Table olives – Eaten fresh, pickled or seasoned, table olives are a central feature of Palestinian cuisine, festivals and hospitality.

Soap – The city of Nablus is famous for its olive oil soap, which is rich in antioxidants and gentle on the skin.

Surrounded by three walls on a land of ruins, as Israeli bombs continue to rain down from the skies, for many in Gaza, the sea remains the only open horizon, a shimmering promise of elusive freedom.

Its waters, and the fish within them, have long nourished Palestinians cut off from the world, partially easing the pain of Israel’s bombardment, punishing siege and starvation policies.

Targeting a meal for his family, Salem Abu Amira – known to locals as “The Beast” – dives deep beneath the waves. Al Jazeera’s Ibrahim Alkhalili reports from Gaza City.

“People here call me ‘The Beast’ because I managed to catch a fish that was more than a metre and a half [5ft] long. It is rare – but the truth is I’ve caught many big fish,” Abu Amira tells Al Jazeera.

Free diving runs in Salem Abu Amira’s blood. He learned the craft from his father at a young age – a skill passed down through generations and a lifeline for his family.

Before Israel’s war, Gaza’s fishermen sailed far out to sea, where the waters teemed with fish. In 2020, the World Bank estimated that about 18,000 people in Gaza directly depended on fishing for their livelihoods, with an extended effect on more than 110,000 family members.

But Israel’s genocidal war decimated that and their lives.

“We can no longer reach the places we used to. Now we can only fish close to the shore – where there are no big fish,” Abu Amira says.

“Restrictions have been imposed on us since the beginning of the war and continue to this day. But I have no source of livelihood. I can’t just sit at home waiting for someone to support me,” he adds.

Before the war, Gaza’s fishermen hauled in more than 4,600 tonnes of fish each year, despite the constant risk of being arrested, injured, or killed by Israeli forces.

Since the war began, more than two years ago, most of their boats have been destroyed. The Ministry of Agriculture told the United Nations in a report that as of December 11, 2024, the Israeli military had killed 200 fishers and their associates out of approximately 6,000 individuals engaged in the fishing profession.

Those still trying to cast their nets just metres (some feet) from the shore have come under Israeli fire.

In January, Israel declared Gaza’s waters a “no-go zone”, banning fishing, swimming, and any access to the sea.

The result has been devastating: Gaza has lost 94 percent of its catch, cutting off one of its last remaining sources of food.

Fishing, once a vital source of both income and nourishment, has been brought to its knees.

“Fishermen are the most exposed to danger. Often, the occupation forbids them from going to the sea, and free divers cannot get their diving gear – which affects their ability to work in the coming days,” Zakaria Bakr, head of the Fishermen’s Committees in Gaza, told Al Jazeera.

After months of displacement, Abu Amira has returned home – restless, hungry for a catch, and preparing his small boat to venture back into the waters.

“The Beast” will dive again, searching for fish he can sell at the market. For fishermen like him, the sea isn’t just a workplace, it’s a lifeline.

“I am determined to pass on my profession to my children. It is a pleasure and a hobby. Fishing relieves stress and provides a source of income,” he says.

After hours in the water, Salem surfaces with a lucky catch: Several fish and an octopus to feed his family and sell in the market.

A months-long siege on the Malian capital, Bamako, by the armed al-Qaeda affiliate group, Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), has brought the city to breaking point, causing desperation among residents and, according to analysts, placing increasing pressure on the military government to negotiate with the group – something it has refused to do before now.

JNIM’s members have created an effective economic and fuel blockade by sealing off major highways used by tankers to transport fuel from neighbouring Senegal and the Ivory Coast to the landlocked Sahel country since September.

While JNIM has long laid siege to towns in other parts of the country, this is the first time it has used the tactic on the capital city.

The scale of the blockade, and the immense effect it has had on the city, is a sign of JNIM’s growing hold over Mali and a step towards the group’s stated aim of government change in Mali, Beverly Ochieng, Sahel analyst with intelligence firm Control Risks, told Al Jazeera.

For weeks, most of Bamako’s residents have been unable to buy any fuel for cars or motorcycles as supplies have dried up, bringing the normally bustling capital to a standstill. Many have had to wait in long fuel queues. Last week, the United States and the United Kingdom both advised their citizens to leave Mali and evacuated non-essential diplomatic staff.

Other Western nations have also advised their citizens to leave the country. Schools across Mali have closed and will remain shut until November 9 as staff struggle to commute. Power cuts have intensified.

Here’s what we know about the armed group responsible and why it appears to have Mali in a chokehold:

What is JNIM?

JNIM is the Sahel affiliate of al-Qaeda and the most active armed group in the region, according to conflict monitor ACLED. The group was formed in 2017 as a merger between groups that were formerly active against French and Malian forces that were first deployed during an armed rebellion in northern Mali in 2012. They include Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and three Malian armed groups – Ansar Dine, Al-Murabitun and Katiba Macina.

JNIM’s main aim is to capture and control territory and to expel Western influences in its region of control. Some analysts suggest that JNIM may be seeking to control major capitals and, ultimately, to govern the country as a whole.

It is unclear how many fighters the group has. The Washington Post has reported estimates of about 6,000, citing regional and western officials.

However, Ulf Laessing, Sahel analyst at the German think tank, Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), said JNIM most likely does not yet have the military capacity to capture large, urban territories that are well protected by soldiers. He also said the group would struggle to appeal to urban populations who may not hold the same grievances against the government as some rural communities.

While JNIM’s primary base is Mali, KAS revealed in a report that the group has Algerian roots via its members of the Algeria-based al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM).

The group is led by Iyad Ag-Ghali, a Malian and ethnic Tuareg from Mali’s northern Kidal region who founded Ansar Dine in 2012. That group’s stated aim was to impose its interpretation of Islamic law across Mali.

Ghali had previously led Tuareg uprisings against the Malian government, which is traditionally dominated by the majority Bambara ethnic group, in the early 1990s, demanding the creation of a sovereign country called Azawad.

However, he reformed his image by acting as a negotiator between the government and the rebels. In 2008, he was posted as a Malian diplomat to Saudi Arabia under the government of Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. When another rebellion began in 2012, however, Ghali sought a leadership role with the rebels but was rebuffed, leading him to create Ansar Dine.

According to the US Department of National Intelligence (DNI), Ghali has stated that JNIM’s strategy is to expand its presence across West Africa and to put down government forces and rival armed groups, such as the Mali-based Islamic State Sahel, through guerrilla-style attacks and the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

Simultaneously, it attempts to engage with local communities by providing them with material resources. Strict dress codes and bans on music are common in JNIM-controlled areas.

JNIM also destroys infrastructure, such as schools, communication towers and bridges, to weaken the government off the battlefield.

An overall death toll is unclear, but the group has killed thousands of people since 2017. Human rights groups accuse it of attacking civilians, especially people perceived to be assisting government forces. JNIM activity in Mali caused 207 deaths between January and April this year, according to ACLED data.

How has JNIM laid siege to Bamako?

JNIM began blocking oil tankers carrying fuel to Bamako in September.

That came after the military government in Bamako banned small-scale fuel sales in all rural areas – except at official service stations – from July 1. Usually, in these areas, traders can buy fuel in jerry cans, which they often resell later.

The move to ban this was aimed at crippling JNIM’s operations in its areas of control by limiting its supply lines and, thus, its ability to move around.

At the few places where fuel is still available in Bamako, prices soared last week by more than 400 percent, from $25 to $130 per litre ($6.25-$32.50 per gallon). Prices of transportation, food and other commodities have risen due to the crisis, and power cuts have been frequent.

Some car owners have simply abandoned their vehicles in front of petrol stations, with the military government threatening on Wednesday to impound them to ease traffic and reduce security risks.

A convoy of 300 fuel tankers reached Bamako on October 7, and another one with “dozens” of vehicles arrived on October 30, according to a government statement. Other attempts to truck in more fuel have met obstacles, however, as JNIM members ambush military-escorted convoys on highways and shoot at or kidnap soldiers and civilians.

Even as supplies in Bamako dry up, there are reports of JNIM setting fire to about 200 fuel tankers in southern and western Mali. Videos circulating on Malian social media channels show rows of oil tankers burning on a highway.

What is JNIM trying to achieve with this blockade?

Laessing of KAS said the group is probably hoping to leverage discontent with the government in the already troubled West African nation to put pressure on the military government to negotiate a power-sharing deal of sorts.

“They want to basically make people as angry as possible,” he said. “They could [be trying] to provoke protests which could bring down the current government and bring in a new one that’s more favourable towards them.”

Ochieng of Control Risks noted that, in its recent statements, JNIM has explicitly called for government change. While the previous civilian government of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita (2013-2020) had negotiated with JNIM, the present government of Colonel Assimi Goita will likely keep up its military response, Ochieng said.

Frustration at the situation is growing in Bamako, with residents calling for the government to act.

Speaking to Al Jazeera, driver Omar Sidibe said the military leaders ought to find out the reasons for the shortage and act on them. “It’s up to the government to play a full role and take action [and] uncover the real reason for this shortage.”

Which parts of Mali is the JNIM active in?

In Mali, the group operates in rural areas of northern, central and western Mali, where there is a reduced government presence and high discontent with the authorities among local communities.

In the areas it controls, JNIM presents itself as an alternative to the government, which it calls “puppets of the West”, in order to recruit fighters from several ethnic minorities which have long held grievances over their perceived marginalisation by the government, including the Tuareg, Arab, Fulani, and Songhai groups. Researchers note the group also has some members from the majority Bambara group.

In central Mali, the group seized Lere town last November and captured the town of Farabougou in August this year. Both are small towns, but Farabougou is close to Wagadou Forest, a known hiding place of JNIM.

JNIM’s hold on major towns is weaker because of the stronger government presence in larger areas. It therefore more commonly blockades major towns or cities by destroying roads and bridges leading to them. Currently, the western cities of Nioro and gold-rich Kayes are cut off. The group is also besieging the major cities of Timbuktu and Gao, as well as Menaka and Boni towns, located in the north and northeast.

How is JNIM funded?

For revenue, the group oversees artisanal gold mines, forcefully taxes community members, smuggles weapons and kidnaps foreigners for ransom, according to the US DNI. Kayes region, whose capital, Kayes, is under siege, is a major gold hub, accounting for 80 percent of Mali’s gold production, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats.

The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organised Crime (Gi-Toc) also reports cattle rustling schemes, estimating that JNIM made 91,400 euros ($104,000) in livestock sales of cattle between 2017 and 2019. Cattle looted in Mali are sold cheaply in communities on the border with Ghana and the Ivory Coast, through a complex chain of intermediaries.

In which other countries is JNIM active?

JNIM expanded into Burkina Faso in 2017 by linking up with Burkina-Faso-based armed group Ansarul-Islam, which pledged allegiance to the Malian group. Ansarul-Islam was formed in 2016 by Ibrahim Dicko, who had close ties with Amadou Koufa, JNIM’s deputy head since 2017.

In Burkina Faso, JNIM uses similar tactics of recruiting from marginalised ethnic groups. The country has rapidly become a JNIM hotspot, with the group operating – or holding territory – in 11 of 13 Burkina Faso regions outside of capital Ouagadougou. There were 512 reported casualties as a result of JNIM violence in the country between January and April this year. It is not known how many have died as a result of violence by the armed group in total.

Since 2022, JNIM has laid siege to the major northern Burkinabe city of Djibo, with authorities forced to airlift in supplies. In a notable attack in May 2025, JNIM fighters overran a military base in the town, killing approximately 200 soldiers. It killed a further 60 in Solle, about 48km (30 miles) west of Djibo.

In October 2025, the group temporarily took control of Sabce town, also located in the north of Burkina Faso, killing 11 police officers in the process, according to the International Crisis Group.

In a September report, Human Rights Watch said JNIM and a second armed group – Islamic State Sahel, which is linked to ISIL (ISIS) – massacred civilians in Burkina Faso between May and September, including a civilian convoy trying to transport humanitarian aid into the besieged northern town of Gorom Gorom.

Meanwhile, JNIM is also moving southwards, towards other West African nations with access to the sea. It launched an offensive on Kafolo town, in northern Ivory Coast, in 2020.

JNIM members embedded in national parks on the border regions with Burkina Faso have been launching sporadic attacks in northern Togo and the Benin Republic since 2022.

In October this year, it recorded its first attack on the Benin-Nigeria border, where one Nigerian policeman was killed. The area is not well-policed because the two countries have no established military cooperation, analyst Ochieng said.

“This area is also quite a commercially viable region; there are mining and other developments taking place there … it is likely to be one that [JNIM] will try to establish a foothold,” she added.

Why are countries struggling to fend off JNIM?

When Mali leader General Assimi Goita led soldiers to seize power in a 2020 coup, military leaders promised to defeat the armed group, as well as a host of others that had been on the rise in the country. Military leaders subsequently seizing power from civilian governments in Burkina Faso (2022) and in Niger (2023) have made the same promises.

However, Mali and its neighbours have struggled to hold JNIM at bay, with ACLED data noting the number of JNIM attacks increasing notably since 2020.

In 2022, Mali’s military government ended cooperation with 4,000-strong French forces deployed in 2013 to battle armed groups which had emerged at the time, as well as separatist Tuaregs in the north. The last group of French forces exited the country in August 2022.

Mali also terminated contracts with a 10,000-man UN peacekeeping force stationed in the country in 2023.

Bamako is now working with Russian fighters – initially 1,500 from the Wagner Mercenary Group, but since June, from the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps – estimated to be about 1,000 in number.

Russian officials are, to a lesser extent, also present in Burkina Faso and Niger, which have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) with Mali.

Results in Mali have been mixed. Wagner supported the Malian military in seizing swaths of land in the northern Kidal region from Tuareg rebels.

But the Russians also suffered ambushes. In July 2024, a contingent of Wagner and Malian troops was ambushed by rebels in Tinzaouaten, close to the Algerian border. Between 20 and 80 Russians and 25 to 40 Malians were killed, according to varying reports. Researchers noted it was Wagner’s worst defeat since it had deployed to West Africa.

In all, Wagner did not record much success in targeting armed groups like JNIM, analyst Laessing told Al Jazeera.

Alongside Malian forces, the Russians have also been accused by rights groups of committing gross human rights violations against rural communities in northern Mali perceived to be supportive of armed groups.

Could the Russian Africa Corps fighters end the siege on Bamako?

Laessing said the fuel crisis is pressuring Mali to divert military resources and personnel to protect fuel tankers, keeping them from consolidating territory won back from armed groups and further endangering the country.

He added that the crisis will be a test for Russian Africa Corp fighters, who have not proven as ready as Wagner fighters to take battle risks. A video circulating on Russian social media purports to show Africa Corps members providing air support to fuel tanker convoys. It has not been verified by Al Jazeera.

“If they can come in and allow the fuel to flow into Bamako, then the Russians will be seen as heroes,” Laessing said – at least by locals.

Laessing added that the governments of Mali and Burkina Faso, in the medium to long term, might eventually have to negotiate with JNIM to find a way to end the crisis.

While Goita’s government has not attempted to hold talks with the group in the past, in early October, it greenlit talks led by local leaders, according to conflict monitoring group Critical Threats – although it is unclear exactly how the government gave its approval.

US President Donald Trump labelled New York mayor-elect Zohran Mamdani ‘a communist’ and claimed New Yorkers would flee the city when he becomes mayor. In his election victory speech, Mamdani called Trump ‘a despot’ and said he had ‘betrayed the country’.