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United States President Donald Trump confirmed on Wednesday that he has authorised the CIA to carry out secret operations in Venezuela.

The New York Times first disclosed the directive, quoting US officials who privately said the administration’s strategy is focused on removing President Nicolas Maduro from power.

Trump also said his administration was mulling a land attack on Venezuela, amid sharply escalating tensions after multiple US strikes on Venezuelan boats in the Caribbean Sea in recent weeks and a troop build-up in those waters ordered by the US president.

Maduro appeared on national television Wednesday night, urging restraint and caution against any further escalation.

“No to regime change that reminds us of the failed wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya … No to coups d’état carried out by the CIA … Latin America does not want them, does not need them, and rejects them,” said the Venezuelan president in response to Trump’s announcement.

So what might Trump be planning? Are his moves legal? How has Venezuela responded, and what does history tell us about what covert CIA operations in Latin America might look like?

What did Trump announce?

“Why did you authorise the CIA to go into Venezuela?” a journalist asked the US president at a White House news conference.

“I authorised for two reasons, really,” Trump said.

“Number one, they [Venezuela] have emptied their prisons into the United States of America.

“And the other thing are drugs. We have a lot of drugs coming in from Venezuela, and a lot of the Venezuelan drugs come in through the sea, so you get to see that, but we’re going to stop them by land also,” he added.

When asked if the CIA “had the authority to take out Maduro”, Trump demurred – refusing to rule out regime change, though not committing to it, either.

“Oh, I don’t want to answer a question like that … That’s a ridiculous question for me to be given … not really a ridiculous question, but it would be a ridiculous question for me to answer. But I think Venezuela is feeling heat,” Trump added.

What operations has the US already carried out?

The US has carried out at least five strikes on boats in Venezuelan waters, alleging that the boats were carrying drugs, and killing a total of 27 people.

The latest attack took place on Tuesday, Trump said.

“Under my standing authorities as commander-in-chief, this morning, the Secretary of War, ordered a lethal kinetic strike on a vessel affiliated with a Designated Terrorist Organization (DTO) conducting narcotrafficking in the USSOUTHCOM area of responsibility – just off the Coast of Venezuela,” Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social platform. He added that six “male narcoterrorists aboard the vessel” were killed.

The first US strike on a Venezuelan boat was on September 2, killing 11 people. Two more attacks were carried out on September 15 and 19, each killing three people. A fourth strike occurred on October 3, with US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth reporting four people killed.

Trump and his administration have so far not provided any evidence that these bombed boats were carrying narcotics headed for the US.

Can the president launch secret or military actions without Congress?

Experts have previously told Al Jazeera that US strikes on Venezuelan boats possibly broke international law and went against the US Constitution.

Declared operations on Venezuelan land, whether by the CIA or the US military, would go even beyond maritime strikes in testing the legal authority of the president.

Salvador Santino Regilme, an associate professor at Leiden University in the Netherlands, explained to Al Jazeera last month that the use of deadly force during maritime operations must respect the right to life and adhere to the principles of law enforcement necessity and proportionality.

“UNCLOS [United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea] and the 1988 UN Drug Trafficking Convention emphasise cooperation, boarding and consent mechanisms at sea, not summary destruction. Any strike that kills suspected traffickers should trigger a prompt, independent, and transparent investigation,” Regilme said.

Constitutional lawyer Bruce Fein was even more definitive in his criticism of the US maritime operations.

“Any use of the military [except] in self-defence to an actual attack requires express congressional statutory authorisation. The military attack on the alleged Venezuelan drug traffickers was unconstitutional,” Fein told Al Jazeera last month.

The War Powers Resolution of 1973 is a federal law that requires the US president to obtain Congressional approval before committing to war. It also mandates that the president notify Congress within 48 hours of initiating any military action.

Fein told Al Jazeera that there would need to be a public vote in Congress for the approval of such a strike, and such a vote has not taken place.

At the beginning of his term, Trump designated Venezuelan drug cartels as foreign terrorist organisations. In a statement to Al Jazeera in August, Fein said this designation is “illegal because [it is] contrary to the statutory standards to qualify as a Foreign Terrorist Organization “.

The standards, according to the US Constitution, are that a group must be based outside the US, involved in terrorist acts or activities, and its terrorism must pose a threat to the safety of US citizens or to US national security.

Trump has also repeatedly alleged that Maduro’s administration is behind the Venezuelan drug cartels that the US administration has branded “terrorist” organisations, even though US intelligence agencies have themselves said there is no evidence to back this assertion.

How has Venezuela reacted?

Venezuela accused the US of violating international law and the United Nations charter.

“The purpose of US actions is to create legitimacy for an operation to change the regime in Venezuela, with the ultimate goal of taking control of all the country’s resources,” the government said in a statement.

Maduro also rebuked the CIA’s involvement in different parts of the world, without explicitly referencing Trump’s authorisation of the CIA to carry out operations in Venezuela.

Carlos Pina, a Venezuelan political scientist, said Trump’s announcement could unify Maduro’s political base domestically.

“Today, the Venezuelan president once again denounced US interference in Venezuela’s internal affairs and, in particular, reinforced the anti-colonialist discourse that a large number of leftist governments and parties in the region have used in the past to oppose Washington’s influence in their own countries,” Pina said.

“That said, in practical, real-world terms, Trump’s announcement will likely lead the Venezuelan government to increase its mechanisms of internal surveillance and repression – which, if left unchecked, could result in possible human rights violations.”

What is the CIA’s history in Latin America?

It is dirty, and while, at the moment, it is unclear what the US’s external espionage organisation plans for Venezuela, history offers clues to the nature of its operations in Central and South America and the Caribbean.

From the late 1800s through the early decades of the 20th century, the US carried out a series of military interventions in Central America — the so-called Banana Wars — to protect the interests of US corporates with interests in the region.

In 1934, under President Franklin D Roosevelt, the US adopted what was known as the “Good Neighbor Policy”, which in effect meant a commitment to not invade or occupy Latin American nations and to not interfere in their domestic affairs.

But the US did not remain a “good neighbour” for long.

Through the Cold War, in particular, the US funded several operations to unseat elected left-wing leaders in Latin American countries.

Here are some instances:

1950s in Guatemala

In 1954, elected Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbenz was toppled by local fighter groups backed by the CIA under the presidency of Dwight Eisenhower.

Arbenz had sought to nationalise a company, stoking fears within the US of more socialist policies in the country.

Under the CIA’s Operation PBSuccess, the agency trained fighters led by military officer Carlos Castillo Armas, who took power after the coup. A civil war raged in Guatemala from 1960 to 1996 between the Guatemalan government and military on the one hand, and leftist rebel groups on the other.

1960s in Cuba

In 1959, Cuban communist leader Fidel Castro came to power after overthrowing dictator Fulgencio Batista.

Under Eisenhower, the CIA devised a plan to train Cuban exiles to invade the country and overthrow Castro. Democratic President John F Kennedy, who won the 1960 election, was briefed about the plan during his inauguration.

Castro found out about the training camps through Cuban intelligence. In 1961, Kennedy signed off on the Bay of Pigs Invasion, a plan for the Cuban exiles to overthrow Castro. However, the invasion failed when the Cuban military overwhelmed them.

1960s in Brazil

In 1961, Joao Goulart came into office as president, with a mandate to pursue social and economic reforms. He maintained good relations with socialist countries such as Cuba and nationalised a subsidiary of the US-owned International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT).

In response, the CIA funded pro-US politicians and supported anti-communist groups. This undermined Goulart’s leadership, culminating in a military coup in 1964, which established a US-friendly dictatorship.

1960s in Ecuador

Ecuador had long been a basket case of political instability, with 27 presidents between 1925 and 1947. That, however, changed in the 1950s when the country witnessed a rare period of stability.

It was not to last. By the early 1960s, the US was worried about the pro-Cuba policies of President Jose Velasco Ibarra and his Vice President Carlos Julio Arosemena, who in fact advocated even closer relations with Soviet bloc nations.

The CIA, using US labour organisations as its conduits, financed the spread of anti-communist sentiment in the country.

“In the end, they [the CIA] owned almost everybody who was anybody [in Ecuador],” a CIA agent told analyst Roger Morris later, in a 2004 CIA-approved appraisal of the agency’s activities in Latin America.

Arosemena first staged a coup against Ibarra, and initially turned further to the left, before trying to moderate his positions. Then, in 1963, the military staged a coup against him, banning the communist party and severing ties with Cuba, aligning with US interests.

1960s and 70s in Bolivia

Between 1963 and 1964, the US used covert funding, largely through the CIA, to influence Bolivia’s politics.

The funding backed leaders that were friendly to the US, and supported a military coup in November 1964 led by General Rene Barrientos Ortuno against elected President Victor Paz Estenssoro. The coup was successful and forced Paz Estenssoro into exile.

But the US was not done with interfering in Bolivia.

By the early 1970s, Washington had eyes set on another regime change. This time, the target was President Juan Jose Torres, who had come to power in 1970 and had nationalised multiple US companies in the country.

According to the US State Department’s official history, the US ambassador in La Paz, in June 1971, told Washington that it needed to support Torres’s opponents. The White House secretly sought, and received $410,000 in what critics within the administration described as “coup money” to finance military leaders and political leaders opposed to Torres.

Two months later, senior military officer Hugo Banzer led a successful coup against Torres. The US continued to fund Banzer’s government, which ruled until 1978. Nearly two decades later, Banzer would return to power once again, after actually winning an election in 1997.

1970s in Chile

The CIA provided funding to help end the presidency of Salvador Allende, an elected leftist leader. Allende had planned to nationalise Chilean copper companies, many of which were owned by US interests.

The CIA funding was used to back Allende’s opponent and spread anti-communist sentiment. This spiralled into the 1973 military coup led by General Augusto Pinochet. Allende shot himself dead using an AK-47 rifle before he was captured: Doubts about the cause of his death lingered for decades before it was confirmed by an independent autopsy years later.

The brutal US-backed dictatorship of Augusto Pinochet lasted 17 years.

1970s: Operation Condor

In 1975, the CIA supported right-wing military dictatorships in six Latin American countries in setting up a transnational network of terror called Operation Condor. This began during the presidency of Gerald Ford.

These countries included Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay. The operation was aimed at crushing political dissidents, leftists and communist sympathisers. The dictatorships used a shared database to monitor dissidents and their families across state borders.

They used tactics such as exchanging intelligence, information, prisoners and torture techniques. Under the operation, at least 97 people were assassinated, according to Plan Condor, a joint initiative by Latin American organisations and the University of Oxford.

1980s in El Salvador

In December 1981, the Salvadoran military’s elite Atlacatl Battalion conducted a deadly massacre in the village of El Mozote, killing about 1,000 civilians, including women and children. This was during El Salvador’s civil war of 1980-92.

The battalion was trained and equipped by the US under its larger Cold War policy of suppressing leftist rebellions in Latin America. The US government greatly increased military aid to El Salvador between 1980 and 1982.

1980s in Grenada

It was a familiar story by now. Maurice Bishop, the prime minister of the tiny Caribbean island, had adopted Marxist-Leninist policies after seizing power himself in 1979 when the previous premier, Eric Gairy, was out of the country.

By the early 1980s, the US was worried about Cuban influence in the country. As bloody infighting broke out within Bishop’s party over a leadership struggle in October 1983, the US swooped in, invading the country, capturing Cubans in Grenada and ensuring that the country’s future was aligned with US priorities.

1980s in Panama

The US invaded Panama in 1989 during the presidency of Republican George HW Bush. The invasion was called Operation Just Cause.

The US underplayed the death toll and justified the invasion, saying it was carried out to remove President Manuel Noriega for alleged drug trafficking.

What are the possible risks or consequences for Venezuela and the region?

Pina, the Venezuelan analyst, told Al Jazeera that most other Latin American countries have so far been cautious in their response to Trump’s order and threat.

Pina said there are a few exceptions to this, such as Gustavo Petro’s Colombia, and those in the regional ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America) bloc: Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras and some Caribbean islands.

He said that while an escalation like this would normally cause serious friction between Latin American governments and the US, many Latin American countries have erred on the side of caution after Maduro returned to power through a controversial presidential election in July 2024.

“The current situation is due to the fact that Maduro ‘burned’ many diplomatic bridges after the presidential elections of July 28, 2024.”

The election in Venezuela resulted in widespread allegations of fraud from within and outside the country. The US, which has not had a diplomatic relationship with Venezuela since 2019, and its allies did not accept the election result. In July 2024, the Carter Center and a UN panel said they could not confirm the credibility of Venezuela’s election results, stating the vote lacked international standards for fairness and democracy. Nine Latin American countries also called for the results to be reviewed by independent observers.

Pina said that for the region, the most likely response is that some countries might try to act as mediators and encourage talks between Venezuela and the US to find a peaceful solution. However, at the moment, that seems unlikely, with both sides seeming “far” from reaching an agreement.

He added that, for now, he expects the US to continue to put pressure on Maduro to step down peacefully, while increasing its military and naval presence – but that Maduro is likely to resist these demands.

A full-fledged war will also have consequences for all of Latin America. Already, because of US sanctions on Venezuela and the economic crisis that has gripped the oil-rich nation for years, more than 8 million people have migrated from the country since 2014, mostly to other nations in the region.

Thousands of people in southern Tunisia joined a rally demanding the closure of a state-run phosphate plant blamed for cancers, respiratory illnesses, and a mass poisoning that hospitalised more than 120 people.

When asked whether United States President Donald Trump would invoke the Insurrection Act, Vice President JD Vance said this week that Trump is “looking at all his options”.

The decision would allow Trump to deploy the US military domestically for law enforcement purposes without congressional authorisation and over the objections of state governors.

Vance’s October 12 comment on NBC’s Meet the Press was just one of many in recent months about Trump’s ambitions to send the National Guard to Democratic cities such as Portland and Chicago.

But the legal terms being tossed around – Insurrection Act, plenary authority, martial law, Posse Comitatus Act – have traditionally not been commonly used in US politics. These terms defy simple definitions after decades of interpretation by the courts.

We explain what they are:

What is the Insurrection Act?

This 1807 law allows the US president to deploy federal military personnel domestically to suppress rebellion and enforce civilian law.

Invoking the Insurrection Act temporarily suspends another US law that forbids federal troops from conducting civilian law enforcement. A president can invoke the law after determining that “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion” against the federal government make it “impracticable to enforce” US law “by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”, the law says. In those cases, the Insurrection Act would allow the president to direct federal troops to enforce US laws or stop a rebellion.

The law is broadly written and does not define terms such as “insurrection” or “rebellion”. The US Supreme Court ruled in 1827 that the president has exclusive power to decide whether a situation represents an acceptable reason to invoke the law.

Chris Edelson, an American University assistant professor of government, previously said the law provides “limited authority” for the president to use the military to respond to “genuine emergencies – a breakdown in regular operational law when things are really falling apart”.

The Insurrection Act has been formally invoked about 30 times in the US since 1808, including when southern governors refused to integrate schools in the 1950s and 60s and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, after four white police officers were acquitted in the roadside beating of Rodney King, a Black man.

What is martial law?

People sometimes conflate martial law with the Insurrection Act. Martial law typically refers to imposing military law on civilians, while the Insurrection Act uses the military to impose civilian law. Martial law is more stringent and has fewer protections than civilian law, experts said.

The Supreme Court wrote in a 1946 ruling that the term martial law “carries no precise meaning” and that it was not defined in the Constitution or in an act of Congress. Legal experts say, because of this, it is not clear whether the US president has a legal path to declaring martial law in the way that it is commonly understood.

Still, it has been declared in the past. The US imposed martial law in Hawaii after the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and President Abraham Lincoln declared martial law in certain parts of the country during the Civil War.

The Supreme Court held in 1866 that martial law could be imposed only if civilian courts were not functioning.

The court “more or less found that martial law could only be declared in an active war zone”, said Chris Mirasola, University of Houston Law Center assistant professor. “The circumstances within which presidents have invoked martial law and that the Supreme Court has understood martial law are incredibly narrow. It would require an active hostility on US territory that prevents civilian legal proceedings from occurring.”

Trump, who has shown a willingness to challenge constitutional precedent, has continued to muse about using military powers against civilians. Trump told top US military commanders on September 30 that the military could be used against the “enemy within” and suggested that some cities could be used as military “training grounds”.

What is plenary authority?

“Plenary authority” is defined by the Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School as “power that is wide-ranging, broadly construed, and often limitless for all practical purposes”.

The term made headlines when White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller started to say that Trump has “plenary authority” to deploy National Guard troops to US cities in an October 6 CNN interview. Miller abruptly stopped talking, and CNN said the disruption was due to a technical glitch. But social media users said Miller froze because he mentioned plenary authority.

When the show returned, Miller finished his answer, saying he was “making the point that under federal law, Title 10 of the US Code, the president has the authority anytime he believes federal resources are insufficient to federalise the National Guard to carry out a mission necessary for public safety”.

Although the president has broad powers under the Constitution, like issuing pardons for federal crimes, he does not have limitless power. The US government is divided into three branches – legislative, executive and judicial – in order to have checks and balances.

Title 10 of the US Code outlines the role of the country’s armed forces and constrains what the military is allowed to do and what orders the president can lawfully issue.

It does not include terms like “plenary authority” or “plenary power”. Instead, it says when the president “is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws” and the US faces a foreign invasion, a rebellion, or danger of rebellion, the president “may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any state”.

A judge in Oregon has twice blocked the Trump administration from deploying National Guard troops to Portland; a federal appeals court also blocked the administration from deploying the guard to Chicago, saying troops can remain federalised for now but cannot be deployed.

Trump officials say the guard is needed to protect Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and federal facilities. Trump previously cited section 12406 of Title 10 when he called for National Guard troops to be sent to Los Angeles during immigration protests in June. A federal judge ruled in September that the deployment violated the law. The administration is appealing.

What is the Posse Comitatus Act?

The Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, generally prevents the use of the military as a domestic police force on US soil, with exceptions for the Insurrection Act.

The phrase “posse comitatus” refers to a group of people called upon by a county sheriff to maintain peace and suppress lawlessness. Think of Western movie depictions of posses of townspeople gathering to catch fugitives. “The Posse Comitatus Act is so named because one of the things it prohibits is using soldiers rather than civilians as a posse comitatus,” the Brennan Center for Justice, a nonprofit policy institute, wrote in 2021.

As the Posse Comitatus Act has been interpreted by the courts, civilian law enforcement officials cannot make “direct active use” of military personnel, including using federal military forces, over their citizens to “regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory authority,” according to the Congressional Research Service.

The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the National Guard when it is under state authority and the command of a governor; the law’s restrictions apply when the National Guard is federalised by the president. This means the National Guard generally cannot conduct arrests, searches or seizures unless there is an exception, such as the Insurrection Act.

The only National Guard exception is the District of Columbia’s, which is solely under federal control.

What is the National Guard?

The National Guard is a state-based military force with certain federal responsibilities. It often responds to domestic emergencies, such as natural disasters and civil unrest, and can support US military operations overseas.

More than 430,000 National Guard members serve in units in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the US territories of Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

The National Guard typically operates as a part-time reserve force that can be mobilised for active duty by governors. The guard also helps train foreign allies in more than 100 countries under the State Partnership Program.

A president, in some cases, can federalise and take control of a state’s National Guard over the objection of governors for domestic missions and to serve in wars overseas, but it rarely happens without governors’ consent. When the National Guard is federalised, its troops are subject to the same restrictions as federal troops.

The National Guard has been federally mobilised in the US several times, including in response to the 2020 protests over the murder of George Floyd; the 1992 Los Angeles riots; and civil unrest following the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.

The recent downward spiral in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations would have been hard to imagine when Pakistani military and civilian leaders welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021.

A Taliban government, Islamabad believed, would be friendly to Pakistan and would become a bulwark against any security threats to the country. After all, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services had for more than two decades supported the Afghan Taliban movement.

Between 2001 and 2021, this meant a contradictory foreign policy. On the one hand, by supporting the United States’ military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan recognised the US-backed governments that ruled the country. At the same time, Pakistan covertly tolerated – and even enabled – the resurgence of the Taliban inside Pakistani territory, which also included cohabitation with other Pakistani fighter groups.

Yet, that relationship has now collapsed as the Pakistani air force struck targets in Kabul for the first time this week.

An apparent disconnect in their mutual expectations and disrespect for each other’s capabilities make it harder for them to resurrect what they once had.

What is at stake for both countries?

The Pakistani security establishment, comprised of the army and the country’s powerful military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is responsible for devising and driving the nation’s Afghan policy.

Historically, the army has also exercised significant power over the civilian administrations, even when Pakistan was not under military rule.

Pakistan has faced a surge of unprecedented attacks against its security forces since 2021, coinciding with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 deaths were recorded for the first three quarters of 2025, towering over last year’s total figure of about 2,500 people killed in attacks across Pakistan.

Pakistan has blamed a majority of attacks on the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TTP, whose leaders are now based in Afghanistan. TTP members hail largely from the tribal areas of Pakistan, along the Afghan border.

Pakistan had hoped that TTP leaders would leave Afghanistan once the Pakistan-friendly Taliban government was established in Kabul. Some TTP fighters reportedly did return home, but this did not translate into a decline in violence. The TTP demands a localised implementation of Islamic law and the reinstatement of the former semi-autonomous status of tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, confronting a deadly and persistent uprising at home has become a national security crisis. The country is, meanwhile, also reeling from several other intersecting crises: A stunted economy, geopolitical tensions with archrival India – marked by the recent conflict in May – as well as growing domestic political discontent, and natural disasters.

Taliban leaders in Afghanistan insist that the TTP is a domestic challenge for Pakistan to address. In 2022, shortly after forming an interim administration, the Taliban government mediated talks between TTP leaders and the Pakistani army in Kabul. After initial indications of progress, underpinned by a temporary ceasefire, the talks collapsed.

For the Taliban government, which is heavily sanctioned and isolated from international financial institutions, the realities of ruling a vastly underdeveloped and economically poor country are stark. Over four years since taking power, Russia is the only country that has formally recognised the Taliban administration, though a growing number of countries – China, India and Iran among them – have acknowledged the group as Afghanistan’s rulers and are hosting their diplomatic representatives.

Afghans are suffering from the near-collapse of the economy, and public sector institutions, such as health and education services, are on the brink of a complete breakdown. Faced with severe food shortages and humanitarian challenges, Afghans suffer as United Nations-led aid agencies face funding cuts. A prolonged conflict with Pakistan is likely to further deepen these challenges.

Can both sides return to their past friendship?

Both sides appear, at the moment, to be digging their heels in. Though they have agreed to temporary ceasefires, neither side wants to look weak by admitting it needs to back down.

Official Pakistani government statements now refer to the Taliban government – whose return to power in Kabul was once celebrated – as a “regime”, calling for a more “inclusive” administration in Afghanistan. They warn of continuing attacks within Afghan territories if the Taliban fail to act against the TTP.

To be sure, Pakistan possesses a substantially more powerful military, technologically advanced weaponry, and considerable geopolitical leverage against the Taliban government. There is also a renewed sense of self-confidence as Pakistan considers it successfully fought the recent war with India in May 2025, including by downing multiple Indian jets.

Since the 1980s, it has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, a generation of whom were educated and have built livelihoods in Pakistani cities. This, according to Pakistani leaders and some public opinion, should mean that Afghans must bear goodwill towards Pakistan. Forcing out Afghan refugees will be a key leverage Pakistan would want to use against the Taliban government.

Fundamentally, Pakistani leaders view their country as a serious and powerful entity with strong global alliances – one that any Afghan government, especially one led by a group supported by Pakistan, should respect and cooperate with.

The Taliban, on the other hand, view themselves as victorious, battle-hardened fighters who waged a long and successful war against foreign occupation by a global superpower. Hence, a potential conflict imposed by a neighbour would be a lesser mission.

Taliban spokesmen are pushing back against Pakistani officials’ recent narrative, underlining the significance of the ongoing information war on both sides. They have alleged, for instance, that Pakistan’s tribal border areas shelter ISIL (ISIL) fighters with tacit backing from elements of the Pakistani army.

Nonetheless, as a landlocked country, Afghanistan is heavily dependent on trade routes via Pakistan, which remain shut due to ongoing tensions, resulting in major losses for traders on both sides. The Taliban government lacks air defence systems, radars or modern weaponry to counter any further incursions by Pakistani drones and jets.

The path to de-escalation

The Pakistani army continues to frame its fight against TTP as part of the wider confrontation with India. It has alleged, without evidence, that the armed group is backed by New Delhi. Pakistan also expects the Taliban to disown and distance themselves from the TTP and instead align themselves with Islamabad.

However, the TTP and Taliban share long-term camaraderie, ideological compatibility and social bonds that go beyond stringent organisational peculiarities. For the Taliban, a conflict with the TTP could also risk creating space for minacious actors such as the ISIL affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP) armed group.

And while Pakistan is stronger militarily, the Taliban have their own tools that could hurt Islamabad.

What if the Taliban’s Kandahar-based supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, were to issue a fatwa for war against Pakistan’s security establishment? The TTP leadership had already pledged allegiance to Akhunzada in 2021. But the Taliban’s top leader is also held in high religious regard by a large segment of Pakistani religious school students and religious leaders, and a call against Islamabad from Akhunzada could lead to serious internal security challenges for Pakistan.

Islamist political groups in Pakistan would also not support an all-out war with the Taliban. Meanwhile, any sustained Pakistani attacks against Afghanistan will likely bolster domestic support for the incumbent Taliban administration, even when there is palpable resentment among Afghans against the Taliban.

To prevent further escalation and seek meaningful political dialogue, there is an urgent need for a trusted mediation actor capable of sustainable engagement. This role is best suited for Middle Eastern and Muslim nations trusted by both sides, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

There is evidence that this is a fruitful pathway. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi confirmed in a news conference in New Delhi last week that the Taliban ceased retaliatory attacks against Pakistan after Qatar and Saudi Arabia mediated.

But first, there needs to be a real desire for peace from the leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Even as Afghan and Pakistani officials hurl warnings at each other, and their forces engage in repeated bouts of cross-border fire, both countries are acutely aware that war will cost them heavily.

However, this does not mean that relations will return to the erstwhile bilateral warmth anytime soon or that miscalculations cannot happen.

Geography and history bind Afghans and Pakistanis into interdependence, which needs to be capitalised upon.

Governments need to stop hoping in vain for the success of failed approaches that have been tried for decades. Afghan leaders must work at developing amicability with Pakistan. Pakistani leaders need to reciprocate by conceiving a wholesome foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is not coloured by rivalry with India.