After weeks of fighting along their disputed border, Thailand and Cambodia have put an end to fighting. Assed Baig of Al Jazeera reports that both militaries are still in place and that civilians have been displaced by the conflict are waiting to see if the truce will endure beyond the first 72 hours.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
Beijing claims that the two days of military exercises that simulate a blockade of key ports have been conducted in Taiwan. Taiwan retaliated by launching fighter jets and mobilizing troops.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
Donald Trump’s escalation of threats to Venezuela may be easy to overlook as one of his arbitrary whims, but it is too closely linked to major conflicts to be seen as a regional issue with little impact on the rest of the world.
Along with Ukraine, Venezuela is becoming a bargaining chip for the world’s superpowers.
Check out Antony Beevor’s history of World War II’s opening chapters to see how seemingly disparate conflagrations on different continents, such as the Nanjing massacre in China, Mussolini’s invasion of Abyssinia, and the Spanish Civil War, contributed to the preparation for the most heinous carnage in modern history.
Although there is always a threat of a third world war, this does not mean that the world is necessarily sluggish. A global agreement seems more likely than a global war as long as Trump and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, the two main players in Russian-US relations, are currently more likely to engage in mutually beneficial transactions than engage in confrontation.
Venezuela, a country with the largest proven oil reserves in the world and a political ally of China, Iran, and Russia, which the US-led West views as its archrivals, still matter internationally. Russia is the one of these three that finds itself in Venezuela’s most delicate situation. The Kremlin faces risks as a result of the US-driven escalation, but it also has the potential to gain.
The unforeseen thaw that occurred in US-Russia relations during Trump’s second term as president is what caused most of it.
The Kremlin has seen the US as a shaky partner before becoming a full-fledged adversary with an ambition to divide and rule in the former Soviet Union neighbourhood since Putin’s ascent to power in 2000.
When Trump arrived in the White House at the beginning of 2025, things abruptly returned to a kind of partnership. Although it still provides crucial intelligence to the Ukrainian army, the US almost stopped providing aid to Ukraine and assumed a more neutral position. Russia was even removed from the list of “direct threats” in the most recent iteration of the US’s National Security Strategy.
Putin has good reasons to believe that the conflict is coming to an end on his terms as the peace negotiations with Ukraine start. The most punishing of Russian demands in negotiations has recently been suggested by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy that he would consent to his army’s withdrawal from the north of the Donbass region. In 2025, the Kremlin’s position on negotiating terms was reaffirmed by him as one more concession he suggested he might be open to.
In the meantime, the countries of the European Union have failed to reach an agreement regarding the loan, which could provide Ukraine with stable funding in the upcoming years. The story demonstrated how far the European commitment to Ukraine has come, despite the fact that a less expensive option was found in incessant negotiations.
Given all of the above, it’s unlikely that the Kremlin would want to ruin a challenging but ultimately fruitful working relationship with Trump’s administration over something as distant and unrelated to Venezuela’s core interests.
Russia would indeed produce all the desired sounds. Vassily Nebenzia, the US’s UN envoy, claimed that the US is “aggressive neocolonialism” by threatening Venezuela. He claimed that it is “cynically imposing its order” while “trying to maintain global dominance and the right to exploit other countries’ riches with impunity.”
This is in reference to Venezuela’s openly demanding that its oil companies, which dominated the nation’s oil industry prior to its gradual nationalization in the 1970s, be allowed to do business there.
Russian oil companies have joint ventures with PDVSA, a Venezuelan oil monopoly, despite their turbulent history, not least as a result of US sanctions, but it appears that Russia does not have any interest in Venezuela’s riches.
However, Russia would not give up on rescuing a welcoming government in Latin America. Venezuela’s support will always be in line with the US’s pressure on Russia in relation to Ukraine.
The Kremlin won’t want to see the government fall, but Nicolas Maduro’s might. Russia has a history of adapting to new political regimes, which have taken their place as allies in developed nations affected by the US’s obsession with regime change. Syria and Iraq both serve as good examples.
There is a component of cynical political calculation as well. The US’s military action on Venezuela could potentially result in more geopolitical benefits than the losses.
Because it would give Russia and the US the same moral weight when it talks about the Ukraine war. Why can’t Russia follow the US’s example in its own country if it can impose its will through military hostility in what Americans refer to as “their backyard”? In the eyes of many, particularly in the Global South, the US aggression in Venezuela would support Russian aggression in Ukraine. It would encourage further divisions between the US and Europe and, ironically, foster polarization within the US itself.
The situation would be ideal for the Kremlin if the Trump administration continued to pursue its irrational desire to occupy Greenland in addition to Venezuela. It might even open doors for a resemblance to the EU-led region of Europe, which is currently its biggest global enemy.
The Russians view themselves as the mainstays of the old order and the most conservatives in terms of foreign policy. They view the US-led West as a revisionist force that helped to reverse the post-World War II order, and they also see the Ukrainian conflict as a means of reversing that revision.
Let us negotiate a new order, one in which the US can go as it pleases in its Western hemisphere and Russia can control the ex-Soviet neighbourhood, if there is no return to the old order, which the West is to blame.
The US would likely become bogged down in Venezuela for years, which would be ideal. However, Maduro is also alright if he falls quickly. The outcome might appear to be a transaction, with a US-friendly Venezuela in exchange for the Ukrainian conflict terminating in accordance with Russian terms.
Iraq’s new parliament is meeting its first session on Monday in Baghdad, Iraq. This is a highly anticipated event as post-election Iraq wrestles with the issue of who will serve in parliament and who will be in charge of the new government.
There is only one issue with who will be the prime minister, but it is in the minds of current prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who was given temporary power by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) in November, making his country a caretaker.
Al-Sudani will also need to demonstrate that he can manage the nation through a complex domestic and international position as he searches for new alliances to make up for a stumbling electoral bloc.
He wanted to use the time between the new parliament’s first session and election day, according to a source in al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC).
He successfully contested the independent electoral list and won about 46 out of 329 seats, but the FSC ruling sent him back to the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF), the organization he had been trying to break free from when he was nominated four years ago.
He now faces opposition from the SCF leadership, many of whom operate as outside powerbrokers and do not have any control over the RDC’s victory.
The SCF’s biggest challenge is figuring out how to win this election, when Shia parties with armed wings won big while choosing al-Sudani or another candidate for the title.
Armed organizations have long participated in the SCF and participated in Iraq, but pro-Iran and anti-West armed groups have never had such a significant presence and voice in parliament.
A large number of Shia Iraqis are uneasy about Iran’s enormous influence in their nation because of the powers Iraq has relations with.
80 to 90 of the roughly 180 MPs are held by the SCF, the majority of whom are US-admitted and affiliated with armed groups. In 2021, they held only 17 seats.
Faleh al-Fayyad, the head of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), received 10 seats in al-Sudani’s bloc, and Ahmed al-Asadi, the PMF’s minister of labor, received eight. He also leads the Jund al-Imam brigades, an armed group within the PMF.
Iraq could face off against the European Union, Gulf states, the United Kingdom, and the United States due to the increased involvement of pro-Iran, anti-Western armed groups in the government formation process.
The US has told Iraqi leaders that it won’t tolerate these groups, many of whom have long served as state-salaried organizations with political wings, holding positions in the government, according to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein.
Prior to now, the US had unstated “non-engagement” policies with cabinet members who were members of armed groups and who continued to maintain normal relations with the rest of the cabinet.
Washington’s relationship to the incoming administration will largely depend on how well these groups are represented, a problem that is still pending.
However, it is still to be seen whether the US will impose more severe sanctions on individuals or take crippling steps that could cripple the country, such as sanctioning the SOMO or limiting Baghdad’s access to US Federal Reserve funds.
The US has already rewarded many of the kingmakers involved in the formation of the government, including Shibl al-Zaidi, the PMF chief al-Fayyad, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali and Khadamat leader Shibl al-Zaidi.
Members of parliament will be sworn in when the session begins, and the parliament’s speaker will be chosen. According to the customary muhasasa system, which has existed since the first government under the post-2003 constitution, this candidate is a consensus Sunni candidate.
A Kurdish candidate will be chosen as the winner, according to Muhasasa. The president then chooses the SCF candidate for prime minister.
The FSC ratified the results more quickly than usual before the election, as President of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan had previously urged politicians to adhere to the constitutional timeline for creating a government, which is up to 90 days.
However, historically, no Iraqi government was created within constitutional deadlines, and the SCF’s struggle to find the right candidate while keeping the attention of the armed groups currently occupying parliament could slog along. In 2021, that time frame was more than 300 days.
Iran has historically played a significant role in achieving consensus among Shia factions regarding the prime minister.
Iran’s role this time is questioned because it is now weakened regionally as a result of Israeli and US attacks, a crippling economic crisis brought on by sanctions, and the degradation of its regional proxies.
After a meeting in Florida, US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy discuss potential solutions to the Russian-Russian conflict. However, they acknowledged that there are “thorny issues” to be resolved regarding the status of the Donbass region, which Russia has annexed.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
In Yemen’s already complex theater, political and military signals have gotten stronger. In an unusually short period of time, three successive statements were issued within a single context, beginning with an official Yemeni request from President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, the governing body of the internationally recognised government. The Saudi-led coalition then issued a political message to the minister of defense, which sets out the steps being taken and the course of action they will take.
What transpired is neither a routine truce nor an isolated incident. The sequence suggests an arrangement that uses Yemeni legitimacy as the political framework for a Saudi move aimed at restraining the expansion of an ally advancing eastward, while at the same time reducing the Houthis ‘ chances of exploiting any rift within the opposing camp. The three statements’ weight exceeded the words of their respective statements, which moved the situation from an open tug-of-war to a clear path based on a field response, an official request, and finally a political message that establishes the limits of movement and sets its course.
The names of Yemen’s governorates may seem like marginal details to a non-Arab reader, but Hadramout and al-Mahra are exceptions. With its oil and gas resources and related infrastructure, Hadramout contributes to Yemen’s economic development and is a key border crossing with Saudi Arabia, which contributes to both border security and trade. Al-Mahra controls ports, crossings, and movement routes that have an impact on regional security and the local economy because it borders Oman and Saudi Arabia. This location makes any tension in the east a quintessential border issue, not merely a local crisis, and any large-scale instability there will not remain confined within Yemen, as it impacts the country’s economy, raises border sensitivity within the region, and stirs concerns about the stability of trade routes.
Riyadh sees the east as a place where it strives to avoid chaos because of this. With the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is supported by the United Arab Emirates, and its forces in Hadramout and al-Mahra, the conflict has become a direct question of who has the authority to manage security and resources in areas that cannot support a protracted conflict.
The first step came through a statement attributed to a government source about a request by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council to take military measures to protect civilians in Hadramout and support the armed forces in imposing calm. The significance of this phrase is that it elevates the conflict from being one of conflict between forces within the same camp (the STC is a member of the Presidential Leadership Council), causing the supporting partner to take legal action.
In response to a request from the head of a recognized international governing body, the coalition has a clearer political justification for its intervention. Internally, the request sends a message no less important, as the presidency does not want to become a mere facade covering up imposed facts, and it seeks to affirm the idea that controlling the field happens through the state, even if it seeks regional support to achieve that.
The coalition issued a second statement, which urgently demanded that the STC step down from Hadramout and al-Mahra, hand over camps to the “Nation’s Shield,” and issue a warning against engaging directly in military operations that would otherwise be in conflict with de-escalation efforts. This text provides executive instructions, including those for escalation, handover, and reinstating the local authority.
The mention of the “Homeland Shield” forces in the statement is striking because the coalition is not merely calling for vacating positions, but is also proposing an alternative party to take them over. Riyadh can manage the eastern file without resorting to the logic of multiple forces, which lowers the likelihood of a security vacuum. The phrase “direct engagement” is the most explicit warning, because it raises the price of any attempt to forcefully impose a new reality on the coalition or test its limits.
The third statement by Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, addressed primarily to the Yemeni people, affirmed that the kingdom’s intervention came in response to a request from the legitimate government and in support of restoring the state and preserving Yemen’s security. The “Southern issue” was included in the political solution pipeline through the Riyadh Conference and Riyadh Agreement, ensuring southern participation in governance, and it was emphasized as a fair political cause that cannot be ignored. The STC should “heed to reason,” he instructed, and follow Saudi and Emirati mediation efforts to end the escalation and grant peaceful transfer of camps.
This framing works in two directions, it grants the STC political recognition of the Southern cause, while setting strict boundaries for its pursuit, as Riyadh – according to the statement – distinguishes between the justice of the cause and the use of force to change control maps in resource and border areas. It also provides the STC with a practical exit through peaceful handover as opposed to an open conflict.
This sequence puts the STC to a direct test. The coalition’s operational statement placed a cap on its movements, and the political framing from the Saudi defense minister gave a way out via peaceful handover. In this situation, a coordinated response would preserve the STC’s political discourse and influence in its traditional areas of influence while presenting any withdrawal as an engagement in de-escalation. Procrastination or direct defiance, however, raises risks, as it could lead to greater political and diplomatic pressure and portray it as the party obstructing the de-escalation process in a highly sensitive area. In addition, the three messages change the boundaries of expansion within the same camp because specific tactics for influencing specific areas or centers differ from forced attempts to reshape eastern Yemen.
The Houthis, an armed group with their own government backed by Iran, which control Yemen’s capital Sanaa and northwestern Yemen, are monitoring any rift among their opponents and seek to exploit it. The Yemeni presidency and the coalition’s swift coordination shows to Sanaa rulers that the opposing camp is capable of handling their disputes in sensitive areas and that placing a bet on internal fighting as a route to the east may not be possible. Additionally, creating security arrangements close to resource areas makes it more difficult to politicize their chaos and stifles any attempt to advance there in the future.
The phrase “Saudi–Emirati mediation” in the coalition’s statements and those by the Saudi defence minister appears highly sensitive because Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the STC is not merely one of political communication, but one of sponsorship, funding, and support that grants it freedom of movement and a constant backer. When the UAE and Saudi Arabia sign a letter of agreement as mediators, sending the STC the impression that it is protected, while putting Abu Dhabi in a tight corner because mediation requires a concrete commitment to stop escalation rather than just a declaration of intent.
This directs Abu Dhabi’s willingness to follow Saudi Arabia’s strategy and approach to an issue that threatens its border security and strategic interests, and serves as a test of the alignment of calculations within the coalition itself. But the question remains: will Abu Dhabi succeed in pushing the STC towards de-escalation, or will the political cover remain in place while developments on the ground move in a different direction?
A quick-term settlement that includes a planned handover of camps, a planned handover of camps, and security measures to stop any one party from imposing its dominance in Hadramout and al-Mahra is more likely to be the result of Saudi Arabia’s efforts. This path maintains a minimum level of stability and reduces the chances of clashes within the camp opposing the Houthis. If it fails, only a few deterrents will be developed to enforce the stated ceiling while allowing the mediation channel to remain open to prevent a full-scale explosion.
The cost of turning eastern Yemen into a contentious space has been increased by the three statements, but they have not caused a resolution.
In my view, what will determine the direction is not the statements alone, but the behaviour of the parties in the following days: will the STC choose a settlement that saves face, or will it bet on time? And will the “security alternative” arrangements help to lessen friction, or will they lead to new local sensitivity?
And one more thing about the Houthis: will they view this containment as a deterrent that lessens opportunities to invest in disputes, or will they use it as a chance to test the limits of movement?