In recent days, leaked recordings and documents have provided the rough outline of a conspiracy to launch an insurgency in the Alawite-dominated coastal region of Syria. Behind the plan are a number of high-level officials of the former regime of Bashar al-Assad living in exile. The leaks reveal the recruitment of fighters within the Alawite community, the movement and storage of weapons, and the transfer of payments to their families.
The revelations come months after an insurrection staged in the coastal region in March led to the deaths of more than 1,000 people, including civilians, government troops and Alawite fighters.
Similar violence erupted again in July in Suwayda, the Druze stronghold in southern Syria where several hundred Druze civilians were killed as government forces tried – unsuccessfully – to restore order after clashes between Sunni tribes and Druze militias.
There have also been sporadic clashes between the Kurdish-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and government forces despite a March 10 agreement to integrate the former into the national army.
Concerns are now growing that minority-dominated regions may be carved out, undermining the establishment of a strong Syrian state or even violating the territorial integrity of the country. Such a development, however, is not inevitable.
The Alawite challenge
While the leaked recordings and documents show that al-Assad regime remnants have not accepted their fate and are planning a comeback in some form, they are far from being successful. Most Alawites, deeply shaken by what they view as abandonment and betrayal by the al-Assad family, seem to have resigned themselves to living under a new authority and are trying to adapt to this reality.
While a small number of die-hard figures may still harbour fantasies of a return to power, possibly through the creation of a coastal enclave, such ambitions remain politically detached from the broader Alawite community.
What shapes Alawite attitudes today are economic deprivation and physical insecurity, not aspirations for secession or restoration of the former regime.
Last month, the response to calls for protests by Ghazal Ghazal, head of the so-called Islamic Alawite Council in Syria and the Diaspora, reflected accumulated grievances rather than realistic political projects.
The dissolution of state institutions, particularly the army and security services, has plunged hundreds of thousands of families into poverty. Even pensioners have gone unpaid for more than a year.
Should violence re-emerge among Alawites, it would be driven by poverty and desperation rather than ideological or political ambition. This situation must be addressed before it erupts into a full hunger mutiny.
The absence of transitional justice further aggravates tensions. It encourages victims of the former regime to seek revenge outside legal frameworks while collective blame directed at Alawites has led to frequent revenge killings in Alawite-dominated areas. Many Alawites now urge the government to publish a clear list of former regime officials responsible for major crimes, both to individualise accountability and to lift the burden of collective guilt imposed on their community.
Druze and Kurdish resistance
The situation is more complicated in the southwest region of Suwayda, where the local Druze community has categorically refused to allow government forces to enter their territory. Hikmat al-Hijri, a prominent Druze spiritual leader with known ties to Israel, has been suspicious of the new government, and his position hardened after the March massacres in the coastal region of Syria. Over the summer, he was elevated to the position of the sole political authority of the Druze community.
Suwayda has become a de facto autonomous zone after the failure of government forces backed by Sunni tribal fighters to impose control in July. Al-Hijri openly appealed to Israel, whose intervention forced Damascus to retreat.
Since then, he has overseen the creation of a so-called National Guard, led by former regime officers and financed and armed by Israel, while openly advocating for independence.
In the northeast, Damascus also faces a formidable challenge. The SDF has refused to fully implement the March 10 agreement and relinquish the political and military gains it has consolidated over the past decade.
The collapse of the latest round of talks to implement the agreement, held in Damascus on Sunday, sparked tense fighting in and around Kurdish-dominated neighbourhoods of Aleppo, threatening to plunge the country into yet another civil war – this time along ethnic faultlines.
Backed by the United States and enjoying good relations with Israel, the SDF commands a force of roughly 60,000 fighters and runs an autonomous civil administration that governs roughly one-third of the country, including a significant amount of Syria’s natural resources. In effect, the SDF aspires to a status resembling that of the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.
Maintaining unity
Dark predictions that Syria would slip back into a civil war have failed to materialise. However, the current situation still poses immense challenges.
Lacking decisive US backing while simultaneously fearing Israeli intervention and coordinated unrest both along the coast and in Suwayda, Damascus possesses little credible leverage to fully unify the country in the near term.
As minorities lack the capacity to challenge the new government and Damascus lacks the power to subjugate them, Syria risks sliding into a prolonged deadlock – one that may ultimately solidify into de facto partition.
Israel’s recent recognition of Somaliland as a breakaway entity has reinforced fears that it may employ similar tactics in Syria, aiming to weaken the state by promoting fragmentation along sectarian lines.
However, there are also other external powers that have vested interests in a stable and united Syria. Fearing a revival of ISIL (ISIS) and the return of Iranian influence, the US is pressuring both the SDF and the government in Damascus to implement the March 10 agreement. Turkiye is also applying pressure on the SDF to soften its position and agree to the terms of integration. Ankara has threatened to use military force to abort any attempt by Kurdish forces to break away from Syria.
Aiming to facilitate the return of Syrian refugees, many European countries, including Germany and the United Kingdom, have also put their weight behind efforts to stabilise Syria. The recent joint UK-French strike against ISIL targets in Syria following a wave of attacks by the US in December further demonstrates Paris’s and London’s interest in ensuring stability and security.
Yet, the government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa cannot rely on external support alone to maintain Syria’s unity and territorial integrity. Initiating an inclusive political process, forming a unity government and convening a national dialogue conference to draft a new constitution with broad participation from Syria’s political, ethnic and sectarian components can help win more support in Syria’s troubled regions.
The initiation of a transnational justice track along with national reconciliation would also help heal the wounds of the past 14 years. Some conciliatory gestures towards minorities on the coast and in Suwayda and the northeast would also help. Yet all these measures will have little impact if they are not accompanied by the right economic policies especially designed to address dire poverty and staggering unemployment.
Taken together, these policies would certainly help Damascus abort Israel’s wicked plans for Syria and maintain unity.
Source: Aljazeera
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