Pakistan appears to have positioned the geopolitical tensions appropriately. A defense cooperation agreement was signed by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia last month. In a region already rife with rivalries, an attack on one will be regarded as an attack on both under this bold pact, which would dramatically increase security guarantees. Islamabad is also looking into further export agreements and has quietly sent rare earth mineral samples to the US. For its part, Washington appears to have been recently drawn to Pakistan as a peripheral irritant.
These actions indicate momentum. It’s a renaissance of Pakistan’s foreign policy, according to commentators in Islamabad and Riyadh, and it’s a belated recognition of the nation’s strategic importance. The presence of Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif at the Gaza peace summit only served to give the impression that the Muslim world is once more receptive to its leaders.
This is not a miracle that overnight. In a region with varying degrees of uncertainty, pressure, and shifting alignments, it is the result. Harder realities lurk beneath the lenses.
The US withdrawal from Afghanistan is the first factor in Pakistan’s foreign policy push. It still struggles to fill a vacuum caused by Washington’s abrupt exit. The US needs a counterweight in the region given Iran’s hostile policies and Taliban-backed governments. Pakistan suddenly loses importance due to its geography, intelligence networks, and long-standing ties to Afghan affairs.
Five years after the United States ratified the agreement that made the US withdrawal possible, US President Donald Trump’s demand that the Taliban hand over the Bagram airbase highlights America’s desire for leverage. Pakistan becomes the only state with logistical resources and political connections to help Washington keep its presence in the area if that plan fails.
The uneasy US-Indian relationship is the second factor. Washington has benefited from a decade of Washington’s investment in its Indo-Pacific strategy, boosting Pakistan’s threat perceptions globally. The US-Indian conflict continues to grow. There are still contentious visa and tariff disputes. Washington has been irritated by India’s embrace of Moscow.
India is willing to hedge its bets with China, with Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Beijing in August. His “Make in India” initiative, which is based on East Asia’s low-cost export strategies, may undercut US manufacturing in terms of terms of economy. Pakistan appears to be useful again as a counterweight to India’s flirtatious relations with Beijing in the interests of maintaining balance in Asia.
Mineral diplomacy is the third and most difficult of the three. The focus of Islamabad’s outreach to Washington is on promises of access to rare earth minerals, many of which are found in Balochistan’s fragile region. This appears to be a win-win situation on paper: Pakistan gains funding and the US secures important resources. The reality is more gloomy. Despite decades of extraction, Kaboulistan continues to be Pakistan’s least developed province. Infrastructure projects are underused, airports are empty, and there is persistent high unemployment.
The provincial legislature’s passage of the Balochistan Mines and Minerals Act 2025 has only exacerbated the country’s unease. In accordance with the act, Islamabad is formally able to make recommendations for Balochistan’s mining policies and licensing decisions, which has sparked opposition from all sides of the political spectrum. Its critics claim that it recentizes Islamabad’s control and undermines provincial autonomy. Even moderate right-wing religious organizations, like the Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (JUI-F), have voiced opposition, calling the law yet another attempt to seize control of the province’s resources from local people.
This backlash highlights a perilous pattern. Without local involvement, resource exploitation causes animosity and insurgency. Islamabad runs the risk of further alienating a province that is already rife with conflict and militarisation by opening mineral wealth to foreign investors without any social safeguards. What appears to be saved in Islamabad can turn out to be possessed in Quetta.
These factors, taken together, demonstrate that Pakistan’s shift in its foreign policy is more of a calculated pivot under pressure than a revival. Islamabad’s newfound prominence is largely due to the Afghan vacuum, the reshaping of US-Indian relations, and the lure of mineral diplomacy. None, however, reduces underlying fragilities. When its priorities change, Washington might once more view Pakistan as disposable. India’s influence on US strategy is not diminishing. And if resource deals continue to be extractive and excluded, Balochistan’s grievances only get worse.
The reactions to the standing ovation in Riyadh, the visibility at the summit in Gaza, and the polite handshakes in Washington are not meant to denote a strategic rebirth. Pakistan plays smart, improvises under pressure, and tries to turn flaws into opportunities. The real test is at home, though. Foreign policy gains will remain fragile unless Islamabad can overcome regional inequalities, political mistrust, and governance failures.
In the end, Pakistan’s own stable social contract cannot be replaced by a minerals or defense pact. That is what Pakistan’s true Renaissance is all about.
Source: Aljazeera
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