After a meeting in Florida, US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy discuss potential solutions to the Russian-Russian conflict. However, they acknowledged that there are “thorny issues” to be resolved regarding the status of the Donbass region, which Russia has annexed.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
Molly-Mae often uses her YouTube vlogs to give fans an insight into her day-to-day life and beauty routines, showcasing products she swears by in her haircare and skincare regimens. In a recent vlog, the Love Island icon revealed that there’s one hair mask she uses after every hair wash.
Molly-Mae continued to tell fans that her bottle had run out before her stylist, Jack, started to pester me with this. The ensuing hair mask This leave-in Molecular Repair Hair Mask from K18 Biomimetic.
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This hair mask is described as “a leave-in molecular repair hair mask that heals damage from chemical processing, heat, chemical styling, and color-changing.” This makes it a great option for those who have bleached and frequently styled hair.
This treatment, which contains bio-active peptides, is said to increase overall strength and elasticity in all types of hair, reducing breakage, split ends, and color fading.
The mask has a light, moisturising formula that detangles and keeps the hair soft and smooth without weighing it down. It’s recommended to use this product for the first 4-6 consecutive washes following a service, followed by 3-4 wash afters as needed to maintain hair strength.
There are plenty of 5-star reviews online about this hair mask, and Molly-Mae is just one of them. One reviewer exclaims, “Love this! I used twice, and I can already tell that my hair is more brittle and hydrated.
This customer exclaims, “K18 is my go-to leave-in conditioner. After five or so hair washes in a row, I use it again after a break and then go back to using it like a regular conditioner every few months. My hair feels so silky and in excellent condition as a result. I highly recommend this product.
Another customer comments, “I get a scalp bleach every eight weeks, and I’ve started incorporating this K18 treatment into my hair care regimen on a weekly basis”! I can tell for certain how much my hair’s texture, strength, and overall health are all different! I’m obsessed with all of K18’s products, and I’m eager to try some more!
The cost of the hair mask seems to outweigh the advantages, with one customer saying, “Yes, it’s crazy expensive, but I haven’t come across a better alternative. I have fine hair, so be careful not to use too much of it. This product was a little too heavy when the highlights were lighter. My hair is now dyed, which makes for a fantastic hair day.
As the country prepares for the upcoming 2027 general elections, Federal Capital Territory (FCT) Minister Nyesom Wike has denied promising to give President Bola Tinubu the lead opposition party, PDP, control of the country.
Following an allegation made by the Governor of Oyo State, Wike made clear during a media conference in his Port Harcourt, the Rivers State capital, on Monday that the FCT Minister was responsible for the Peoples Democratic Party’s current crisis and the wave of PDP governors, lawmakers, and others who have defected to the All Progressives Congress (APC).
Makinde expressed regret for supporting Tinubu in the 2023 presidential election. He claimed that the outcome he had hoped for wasn’t what was achieved by the decision.
Makinde said the minister’s disagreement with Wike began when he told Tinubu at a meeting that he would “hold PDP” for the president ahead of the 2027 election.
Makinde stated, “I was speaking to the president and Wike in an open conversation. The president’s chief of staff was present at that meeting, along with a few others, and Wike addressed the president to inform him that PDP would be held for you in 2027.
I experienced shock. When we got up, we reached the veranda, and I said, “Week, ed, did we consent to this?” I assured him that I would never participate in this from the beginning. It’s my right to choose who I will support and what role I’ll play in 2027, but Mike can support him, which is within his rights.
Makinde claimed to have later discussed the subject with a mutual friend, hoping Wike would reconsider his position later.
After that meeting, he said, “I confided in a mutual friend of ours.” And I kept thinking, “OK, the president didn’t ask him to “do this for him.” He made the offer to do that.
“Look, maybe he was talking about an errand the president never sent,” I said when I told our mutual friend. Let’s therefore get him involved. See if he will resign. But he never did.
Read more recently: Wike Warns Party Leadership and PDP Crisis: We May Not Make It In 2027.
However, Wike refuted Makinde’s claims, saying that the Oyo State Governor was “frustrated” when he responded.
“Seyi Makinde has never referred to me as Wike,” she said. It’s unfortunate that that’s when I first heard him say that.
You must first inquire what the purpose of that meeting was and what would have inspired me to commit to holding down PDP for Tinubu? Why didn’t Seyin Makinde address the party at all this time so that they could see what Wike is up to? Why didn’t he let the alleged meeting go unmentioned?
There wasn’t such a meeting between us, let me set the record straight. After the election, I met with the President along with the former governors of Benue State, Otom, Abia, Ikpeazu, Enugu, Ugwuanyi, and Seyi Makinde to talk about a number of issues.
I called the Chief of Staff to remind us of what we had discussed while we were there. Therefore, it is completely inappropriate for anyone to have stated in a meeting that they would hold PDP for you. That is unfair. Very unfair indeed.
“You can feel frustration if you watch Seyi.” And this young man has been repeatedly reminded of how important it is to work with contractors. Different regulations apply. Seyi Makinde started politics when? Ambitions should be good, but they must be tailored in accordance with the regulations.
Makinde “does not have the guts to tell us he wants to run for president,” Wike claims.
Let him tell someone, and we’ll find out if he has. We are not children. You believe that people are unaware of the things you can do. They are aware.
In Yemen’s already complex theater, political and military signals have gotten stronger. In an unusually short period of time, three successive statements were issued within a single context, beginning with an official Yemeni request from President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, the governing body of the internationally recognised government. The Saudi-led coalition then issued a political message to the minister of defense, which sets out the steps being taken and the course of action they will take.
What transpired is neither a routine truce nor an isolated incident. The sequence suggests an arrangement that uses Yemeni legitimacy as the political framework for a Saudi move aimed at restraining the expansion of an ally advancing eastward, while at the same time reducing the Houthis ‘ chances of exploiting any rift within the opposing camp. The three statements’ weight exceeded the words of their respective statements, which moved the situation from an open tug-of-war to a clear path based on a field response, an official request, and finally a political message that establishes the limits of movement and sets its course.
The names of Yemen’s governorates may seem like marginal details to a non-Arab reader, but Hadramout and al-Mahra are exceptions. With its oil and gas resources and related infrastructure, Hadramout contributes to Yemen’s economic development and is a key border crossing with Saudi Arabia, which contributes to both border security and trade. Al-Mahra controls ports, crossings, and movement routes that have an impact on regional security and the local economy because it borders Oman and Saudi Arabia. This location makes any tension in the east a quintessential border issue, not merely a local crisis, and any large-scale instability there will not remain confined within Yemen, as it impacts the country’s economy, raises border sensitivity within the region, and stirs concerns about the stability of trade routes.
Riyadh sees the east as a place where it strives to avoid chaos because of this. With the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is supported by the United Arab Emirates, and its forces in Hadramout and al-Mahra, the conflict has become a direct question of who has the authority to manage security and resources in areas that cannot support a protracted conflict.
The first step came through a statement attributed to a government source about a request by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council to take military measures to protect civilians in Hadramout and support the armed forces in imposing calm. The significance of this phrase is that it elevates the conflict from being one of conflict between forces within the same camp (the STC is a member of the Presidential Leadership Council), causing the supporting partner to take legal action.
In response to a request from the head of a recognized international governing body, the coalition has a clearer political justification for its intervention. Internally, the request sends a message no less important, as the presidency does not want to become a mere facade covering up imposed facts, and it seeks to affirm the idea that controlling the field happens through the state, even if it seeks regional support to achieve that.
The coalition issued a second statement, which urgently demanded that the STC step down from Hadramout and al-Mahra, hand over camps to the “Nation’s Shield,” and issue a warning against engaging directly in military operations that would otherwise be in conflict with de-escalation efforts. This text provides executive instructions, including those for escalation, handover, and reinstating the local authority.
The mention of the “Homeland Shield” forces in the statement is striking because the coalition is not merely calling for vacating positions, but is also proposing an alternative party to take them over. Riyadh can manage the eastern file without resorting to the logic of multiple forces, which lowers the likelihood of a security vacuum. The phrase “direct engagement” is the most explicit warning, because it raises the price of any attempt to forcefully impose a new reality on the coalition or test its limits.
The third statement by Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, addressed primarily to the Yemeni people, affirmed that the kingdom’s intervention came in response to a request from the legitimate government and in support of restoring the state and preserving Yemen’s security. The “Southern issue” was included in the political solution pipeline through the Riyadh Conference and Riyadh Agreement, ensuring southern participation in governance, and it was emphasized as a fair political cause that cannot be ignored. The STC should “heed to reason,” he instructed, and follow Saudi and Emirati mediation efforts to end the escalation and grant peaceful transfer of camps.
This framing works in two directions, it grants the STC political recognition of the Southern cause, while setting strict boundaries for its pursuit, as Riyadh – according to the statement – distinguishes between the justice of the cause and the use of force to change control maps in resource and border areas. It also provides the STC with a practical exit through peaceful handover as opposed to an open conflict.
This sequence puts the STC to a direct test. The coalition’s operational statement placed a cap on its movements, and the political framing from the Saudi defense minister gave a way out via peaceful handover. In this situation, a coordinated response would preserve the STC’s political discourse and influence in its traditional areas of influence while presenting any withdrawal as an engagement in de-escalation. Procrastination or direct defiance, however, raises risks, as it could lead to greater political and diplomatic pressure and portray it as the party obstructing the de-escalation process in a highly sensitive area. In addition, the three messages change the boundaries of expansion within the same camp because specific tactics for influencing specific areas or centers differ from forced attempts to reshape eastern Yemen.
The Houthis, an armed group with their own government backed by Iran, which control Yemen’s capital Sanaa and northwestern Yemen, are monitoring any rift among their opponents and seek to exploit it. The Yemeni presidency and the coalition’s swift coordination shows to Sanaa rulers that the opposing camp is capable of handling their disputes in sensitive areas and that placing a bet on internal fighting as a route to the east may not be possible. Additionally, creating security arrangements close to resource areas makes it more difficult to politicize their chaos and stifles any attempt to advance there in the future.
The phrase “Saudi–Emirati mediation” in the coalition’s statements and those by the Saudi defence minister appears highly sensitive because Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the STC is not merely one of political communication, but one of sponsorship, funding, and support that grants it freedom of movement and a constant backer. When the UAE and Saudi Arabia sign a letter of agreement as mediators, sending the STC the impression that it is protected, while putting Abu Dhabi in a tight corner because mediation requires a concrete commitment to stop escalation rather than just a declaration of intent.
This directs Abu Dhabi’s willingness to follow Saudi Arabia’s strategy and approach to an issue that threatens its border security and strategic interests, and serves as a test of the alignment of calculations within the coalition itself. But the question remains: will Abu Dhabi succeed in pushing the STC towards de-escalation, or will the political cover remain in place while developments on the ground move in a different direction?
A quick-term settlement that includes a planned handover of camps, a planned handover of camps, and security measures to stop any one party from imposing its dominance in Hadramout and al-Mahra is more likely to be the result of Saudi Arabia’s efforts. This path maintains a minimum level of stability and reduces the chances of clashes within the camp opposing the Houthis. If it fails, only a few deterrents will be developed to enforce the stated ceiling while allowing the mediation channel to remain open to prevent a full-scale explosion.
The cost of turning eastern Yemen into a contentious space has been increased by the three statements, but they have not caused a resolution.
In my view, what will determine the direction is not the statements alone, but the behaviour of the parties in the following days: will the STC choose a settlement that saves face, or will it bet on time? And will the “security alternative” arrangements help to lessen friction, or will they lead to new local sensitivity?
And one more thing about the Houthis: will they view this containment as a deterrent that lessens opportunities to invest in disputes, or will they use it as a chance to test the limits of movement?
A bowler from Bhutan has become the first cricketer to take eight wickets in a T20 international.
Left-arm spinner Sonam Yeshey finished with fine figures of 8-7 from four overs in his side’s 82-run win over Myanmar in the third of five men’s T20s between the sides in Gelephu.
The 22-year-old now has the best-ever figures of any bowler in men’s or women’s T20 international cricket.
Six of Yeshey’s wickets were caught while one was bowled and the other lbw.
Bhutan were victorious after they made 127-9 then bowled out Myanmar for 45.
Malaysian seamer Syazrul Idrus previously held the best T20 figures for a man with the 7-8 he claimed against China in July 2023.
Indonesia off-spinner Rohmalia Rohmalia has the best figures in women’s T20s for her 7-0 against Mongolia in April 2024.
Bhutan are an Associate member of the International Cricket Council (ICC) and many players representing countries at that level are unpaid amateurs.
However, Bhutan have 36 players – equally split across their men’s and women’s national sides – who are paid via central contracts.
The year 2025 was one that asked plenty of questions of Andy Farrell’s Ireland team. Will 2026 provide the answers?
Throughout their tortured World Cup history and failed efforts to reach that first semi-final, the team has been accused of all too frequently peaking at the midway point of the four-year-cycle.
Nobody, though, will be making that claim this time around.
In 2024, Ireland still won the Six Nations, with the magnitude of that achievement not lost on anyone old enough to remember the 24-year wait for such a title between 1985 and 2009.
However, there was undeniably a lingering concern over how they left a Grand Slam behind them with defeat by England in Twickenham.
A split series in South Africa that summer was, again, not a poor return in isolation but with hindsight it feels increasingly important that the manner of the loss was decidedly more emphatic than that of the win.
Their November campaign began with a muddled performance against the All Blacks and it felt as if the side never truly regained their rhythm.
The same, perhaps, could be said of 2025 as a whole.
Opening with a pair of Six Nations wins over England and Scotland augured well, but they were decisively beaten by France at home either side of laboured away wins over Wales and Italy.
A summer tour without the sizeable contingent of both players and coaches who were with the British and Irish Lions in Australia offered little insight or measure of progress.
Losses against New Zealand and South Africa when back to a full complement in November only heightened the fear that, having slipped from their 2023 peak, the gap is widening between Ireland and the very best.
Perhaps the most dispiriting aspect of those home defeats by France and South Africa was how Ireland felt simply overpowered by both, in contact and – against the latter especially – at the scrum.
The nature of those losses has only heightened concerns over the squad’s age-profile.
Fifteen of the players called up by Farrell for November are the other side of 30-years-old, while a further four will be by the time of the 2027 World Cup.
Munster forwards Edwin Edogbo and Brian Gleeson, as well as Ulster centre Jude Postlethwaite, are all uncapped and would offer both new blood and physicality come the 2026 Six Nations.
Leinster props Paddy McCarthy and Tom Clarkson, and the fit-again Ulster lock Cormac Izuchukwu, already have international experience but greater exposure for the trio would also fit the profile for a campaign that feels a tipping point in the build-up to Australia 2027.
Ireland are not prone to throwing the baby out with the bathwater, though.
Will Farrell freshen up a largely settled matchday squad with such promising but untested players or continue to rely upon those possessing such credit in the bank with a coach who will mark a decade on the Irish ticket in 2026?
How some of those experienced campaigners shift what has felt like a Lions hangover is an intriguing subplot.
There is more to it, however, than simply personnel.
Given the physical profile of their squad even through what has been a golden era across the past decade and a half, Ireland have become used to having to box clever to enjoy their historic successes.
But, while lengthy phase-play was once their calling card, changing interpretations of the defensive breakdown have rendered that part of their game as less effective than before.
If Farrell’s side are looking to garner some momentum in the build-up to a World Cup, 2026 will see the Ireland women seeking to harness the impetus generated from their own global showpiece.
Ireland’s rebuild from the nadir of their World Cup qualifying failure in 2021 really took flight in 2024, when a third-place finish in the Six Nations ensured promotion to the top-tier of WXV.
Once there, they showed they belonged with the best by beating New Zealand in Vancouver. Another third place in the 2025 Six Nations did not feel quite the achievement of the past year, especially given the campaign ended with a gut-punch defeat by Scotland in Edinburgh.
Having missed out on the previous World Cup, their showings in England were considered around par with wins over Japan and Spain, but a pool-stage defeat by the Black Ferns and subsequent quarter-final loss to France.
On another day they could have battled past Les Bleus in horrible conditions at Sandy Park but instead missed out on the becoming the first Irish senior side to win a last-eight tie at the tournament despite holding a 13-0 lead.
Off the field, however, the World Cup represented a real reconnection between the team and the Irish public.
From viral social media videos to the ‘release the fleece’ campaign, an engaging squad achieved real cut through even in non-rugby circles with interest around games seeming to mushroom in tandem.
It is already confirmed that 2026 will bring a historic standalone fixture at the Aviva Stadium when Scotland are in Dublin for the final round of the Six Nations in May.
With Italy in Galway and Wales in Belfast before that, Scott Bemand’s side will surely be targeting a three-win campaign for the first time since 2020.
A restructured WXV competition with a first Test window starting in the autumn provides a new challenge too.
How Ireland’s top players are prepared for those campaigns will continue to be of keen interest in the early months of 2026.
For home-based players, the Celtic Challenge continues to be used as a way to get ready for the Six Nations, although it will be hoped between now and March to see more competitive matches than in recent iterations of the championship.
Increasingly, though, there is a real Irish presence in the Premiership Women’s Rugby too. Star back row Aoife Wafer made her Harlequins bow this month, while key forwards Brittany Hogan and Niamh O’Dowd will debut for Sale and Gloucester-Hartpury in the new year.