Traditional influences on the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) include regional rivalries, ethnic tensions, and weak political institutions. In light of these events, the June signing of the Washington Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda and the July signing of the March 23 Movement (M23) and the Doha Declaration of Principles are significant diplomatic achievements.
These agreements, which were facilitated by the US and Qatar, represent an unusual moment of regional and local alignment that will help to maintain regional harmony. Two crucial elements affect their ultimate success: political narrative management and credible implementation. The progress embodied in these agreements runs the risk of stagnation or reversal without ongoing international oversight to ensure implementation and efforts to reframe adversarial discourses among elites and communities.
The DRC and Rwanda, both of which are at the center of the eastern Congo crisis, have come to terms with the Washington Agreement. The agreement agrees that both parties’ accusations are destabilizing and commits them to a ceasefire and de-escalation of support for armed groups. It provides a framework for future security cooperation, a mutual recognition of sovereignty, and a commitment to use third-party mediation as a guarantee of commitments.
The Doha Declaration of Principles, on the other hand, provides a detailed outline of how the DRC government and M23 rebels can reach a comprehensive peace agreement. The document, which is built on seven pillars: a permanent ceasefire, confidence-building measures, restoration of government control, the return of displaced people, regional mechanisms, and a commitment to achieving a final peace agreement, offers a holistic view of the armed conflict. It spells out sequenced actions like detainee release, oversight mechanisms, and post-conflict reintegration, and it clearly prohibits sabotage, propaganda, and territorial gains by force.
The commitment to sequencing and timetabling is one of these two agreements’ most admirable qualities. The Doha Declaration specifies the steps needed to implement confidence-building measures, begin direct negotiations, and sign a final peace agreement. Similar to how closely the Washington Agreement and the Doha process are related, the Washington Agreement’s alignment reflects an understanding of how regional alignments and domestic armed group behavior intersect.
Additionally, both documents confirm the roles of the African Union and the UN Organization for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and also highlight the role of external guarantors, Qatar and the US. This reflects a multilateral peace-building model that includes non-Western and Western actors who work together to strengthen one another.
According to research on conflict mediation, collaborating with multiple mediators increases the likelihood of reaching peace agreements and strengthens those settlements’ viability and legitimacy. Joint mediation efforts frequently combine various advantages, such as resources, leverage, and normative legitimacy, to give the parties involved more robust and palatable negotiated outcomes.
Despite these accomplishments, the real test lies ahead. Due to poor implementation, mistrust, and political manipulation, many previous peace agreements in the DRC have fallen apart. Similar risks are present in the current agreements.
Conflict parties’ lack of political will continues to be problematic. In cases like Nairobi and Luanda, parties may use declarations to gain time or strengthen international legitimacy rather than pursue peace.
The parties involved in the conflict have repeatedly hampered previous peace efforts by delays and political grandstanding, but both the Doha and Washington frameworks are vulnerable.
Therefore, it is crucial to maintain pressure on the parties and advance toward a long-term settlement through sustained and credible international political will and committed mediation.
The discursive environment within which the agreements are framed is equally significant. Public opinion in the DRC remains sceptical of M23’s intentions and deeply suspicious of Rwanda’s role. In contrast, Kigali sees Kinshasa’s ties to rebel-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as a persistent threat. It is crucial to manage these narratives, especially in the national media and on social media.
They run the risk of collapse if elites and communities view the agreements as betrayals or weak points. To combat anti-peace myths, international partners should start a public outreach campaign. Disinformation is being suppressed, as well as increasing peace dividends.
Additionally, the implementation of border-security coordination, refugee return, and demobilization and reintegration of fighters (DDR) programs requires stable funding. Finally, a regional peacebuilding agreement must win the support of neighboring states and stop new spoilers from emerging.
The resolution of one of Africa’s most bloody conflicts is made possible by the Washington and Doha agreements. They exhibit a rare instance of coordinated multilateral action, strategic planning, and political will.
International oversight must be sustained and credible, and the discursive space must be carefully managed in order to ensure their success. These commendable accomplishments run the risk of becoming yet another unfulfilled promise in Congo’s long search for peace without such measures.
