Archive June 30, 2025

Over the weekend, thousands of people in Serbia took to the streets to protest widespread corruption and the end of democratic freedoms.

Demonstrators clashed with riot police in Belgrade, the capital, after nearly eight months of unwavering opposition to populist President Aleksandar Vucic. They called the government “illegitimate” and threw rocks at riot police.

On Sunday, police claimed that 22 protesters sought medical attention while 48 officers were hurt. Ivica Dacic, the minister of interior, reported that 38 of the 77 detained people remained in custody on Sunday, the majority of whom were facing criminal charges.

Vucic charged the organizers with staging violent protests and attacking police, calling them “terrorists” who “tried to overthrow the state.”

Since taking office as prime minister in 2014 and president since 2017, critics accuse him of being more authoritarian. After bloody protests, Serbians have a history of rooting strongman leaders. They removed Slobodan Milosevic 25 years ago.

What demands do protesters have?

16 people were killed when a renovated rail station canopy in Novi Sad collapsed, prompting anti-government protests to begin in November. Many Serbians attributed the tragedy to the state’s infrastructure projects’ lack of oversight.

Vucic and his Serbian Progressive Party remained in power thanks to a reorganized administration following the disaster.

Since then, the student-led protests have focused their demands on the necessity of substitute elections in place of the 2027 regular elections. Organisers had issued an “ultimatum” for Vucic to make an announcement of a new vote by 9 p.m. (GMT) that day, a demand he rejected.

Protesters are also urging the government to carry out a number of reforms, including one that would allow all political participants to have access to the media, and preventative measures to stop vote-buying, to ensure that elections are free and fair.

Other requests include re-establishing the educational system, recognizing student bodies, or plenums, as legal entities, ensuring fair wages for all workers in the education sector, and respecting universities’ autonomy.

Vucic maintains a pro-European stance while Serbia is formally requesting EU membership. However, critics have also criticized the deepening ties between his government and Russia and China.

What has changed since the most recent protests?

The largest rally on Saturday since the Novi Sad disaster was the largest. According to sources, the crowd size was 36, 000, which is far below the Archive of Public Gatherings’ consensus estimate of 140, 000 people gathered.

This time, unlike previous peaceful demonstrations, police and protesters clashed violently with each other. In Belgrade, protesters hurled bottles and flares at rows of officers while using tear gas and batons.

Without providing any proof, Vucic has repeatedly asserted that the protests are part of a foreign plot to devastate his government. When he refers to an external country that seeks to destabilize Serbia, he has not specified who to refer to. There would be “no negotiations” with “terrorists,” according to Vucic.

They purposefully wanted to cause bloodshed. He declared that “the time for accountability is near.”

The government has been running a “smear campaign,” according to Engjellushe Morina, senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR).

According to Morina, “the government-supported media claims that they are terrorists and that they must be dealt with.”

The analyst said, “The government is unwilling to go any further,” adding that the situation is “emerging and both the government and protesters are determined not to back down this time.”

Have protesters in Serbia previously imposed changes on the government?

Yes . In the so-called “bulldozer Revolution,” they ousted Milosevic, who had been in power since 1989.

Following a presidential election that turned out to be significant irregularities but in which Milosevic won, a popular uprising started on September 24, 2000.

The protests came to a head with a bulldozer striking the Radio Television of Serbia, which is regarded as the epicenter of the government’s propaganda apparatus, on October 5.

Two days later, Milosevic resigned. He was detained in 2001 on suspicion of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and the Belgrade government gave him to a Hague international tribunal. His trial there began in 2002, but Milosevic’s progress was slowed by his deteriorating health. In his cell in 2006, Milosevic was discovered dead.

The nation’s memory is etched on the wake of the protests that occurred in October 2000. Despite the government’s efforts to portray the protests as being foreign-led, Morina, an ECFR fellow, claimed that Vucic and Milosevic have stronger ties to the nation’s security apparatus than the protesters did in 2000.

Therefore, the ECFR analyst claimed that protesters had little faith in short-term gains. They are aware that this might have to continue for a while, she said.

What will the protest movement do next?

The student-led protest movement has pledged to stand up for what they believe. On Instagram, it stated that “this is not a time for withdrawal.”

Organisers of the rally on Saturday issued a statement to the crowd, urging Serbians to “take freedom into your own hands.” According to the statement, “the authorities had all the means and all the time to meet the demands and stop an escalation.”

Vucic, on his part, predicted more arrests. Eight people were detained later on Sunday on suspicion of planning to attack state institutions and block roads. Following that are likely more arrests.

The president said, “This is not the end, there will be many more arrests for attacking police,” adding that “identification of all individuals is underway.”

Arrests, in Morina’s opinion, could allow the movement to resume its march, but they are unlikely to stop the nationwide protests.

The analyst said, “They’re serious, and I don’t think they’ll leave quickly,” adding that she anticipates protesters to “eventually prevail.”

Donald Trump, the president of the United States, quickly declared victory after directly attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. After the “bombing campaign wiped out Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons,” his administration claimed that “the world is far safer.”

However, much thought has been given to the extent to which Iran’s nuclear program was actually rerouted in the wake of the strikes. Craters reveal little about what lived deep beneath layers of concrete, according to Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Because the site was too deep underground, the Trump administration acknowledged that at least one site had been spared bunker bombings. Iran’s centrifuges and its stockpile of uranium with a 60% enriched content are still undetermined.

The Iranian nuclear program’s damage is still unknown, but the non-proliferation regime that kept it open for years has been in disarray.

This obscene military move may have the opposite effect of reducing nuclear proliferation, increasing the nuclear threat it sought to contain, making the Middle East and the rest of the world a much safer place.

A thoroughly investigated nuclear program

Iran’s nuclear program had remained largely peaceful prior to this month’s attack.

It was supported by the US Atoms for Peace initiative in the 1950s. It expanded to include a number of nuclear facilities over the course of the following decades.

The Tehran Research Reactor, an installation built with US assistance in 1967 and used for the country’s main isotope production, the Natanz nuclear facility, the country’s main enrichment site, the Fordow underground plant near Qom, and the Bushehr nuclear plant, the only one still operating in Iran, are just a few examples.

Iran is working on the Darkhovin and Sirik power plant projects, but those are still in their early stages.

The IAEA has meticulously monitored the Iranian nuclear program for decades. In 1968, the nation ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), legally committing itself to abandoning nuclear activity and putting all nuclear materials under IAEA’s protections.

In 1974, Iran ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which established 18 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside of those facilities (LOFs). These included radioisotope-using research reactors, conversion and fuel-making facilities, laboratories, and hospital facilities.

The IAEA occasionally used more intrusive verification techniques and pressured Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, an agreement for expanded inspections, especially after previously secret sites were exposed in 2002. From 2003 to 2006, the nation voluntarily did this.

Iran and the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, France, and Germany all signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. In exchange for sanctions relief, it agreed to reduce its stockpile of uranium by 97 percent and abide by strict uranium enrichment caps.

Iran’s program was given even greater access than it had before, and IAEA was able to install cameras and remote sensors at nuclear sites, enabling real-time monitoring. Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, three of the three recent nuclear facilities that the US recently attacked, were covered by this expanded access, which included all the main sites of Iran’s nuclear program. While it remained in force, the JCPOA proved to be extremely effective.

Putting a stop to nuclear diplomacy

Trump vowed to leave the JCPOA in 2018, saying that Iran would receive “too much in exchange for too little” under its terms during his first term as president. The US reimposed sanctions and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign to stifle Iran’s economy in response to repeated pleas from European allies to keep the agreement.

Trump’s withdrawal had immediate effects. Iran began reducing its compliance with the agreement as a result of the deal’s benefits being lost. Tehran announced in 2020 that it would no longer be subject to any operational restrictions in the nuclear deal after Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was killed by a Trump-ordered air strike.

Unsurprisingly, Trump’s actions significantly exacerbated any fresh negotiating efforts with Iran. Under the second Trump administration, US officials attempted to rekindle diplomatic relations with Iran, holding several indirect exchanges.

Iranian leaders demanded assurances that a new agreement would not be hampered by unilateral sanctions or changes, and Washington responded with little flexibility by making even more stringent demands.

What was proposed was a less favorable deal than the JCPOA, and it was from a nation whose promises had been unreliable, from Iran’s point of view.

The US-Israeli attacks nearly ended negotiations efforts. Iran ordered its negotiators home within hours of the attacks and resumed a new round of negotiations with the US in Oman.

Iran’s parliament began drafting legislation to end the NPT in the days following the bombing. A withdrawal could undermine the foundational agreement between the world’s arms control if Iran accepts it.

The NPT has restricted the use of nuclear weapons to a select few states for 50 years. Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, which it did four years later, would be the most significant violation of the NPT.

Iran would no longer be subject to any restrictions or inspections, leaving the rest of the world unaware of its activities. Other regional powers would likely follow suit if Iran’s opaque nuclear program ended decades of restraint.

It’s not easy to leave the NPT. It demands the transfer or ongoing safeguarding of all imported nuclear technology, as well as three months’ notice, a public justification, and continued liability for past violations. If a potential quitter still believes there is any value in remaining at the table, the treaty depositories and the UN Security Council could use these tactics to pressure them back.

Iran’s parliament passed legislation to end all cooperation with the IAEA, despite the fact that it has not yet declared that it is leaving the NPT. This indicates blatantly that Iran’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy is unlikely to last.

The only option left is diplomacy, which is still in use today.

The US effectively told every non-nuclear state that cooperation buys little safety by bombing facilities under active IAEA safeguards.

A country that allowed inspectors to inspect its sites and continued to do so under a negotiated agreement faced military force as a result of the strikes. If states decide that implementing the NPT and permitting inspections won’t adequately defend them from attack or coercion, they may choose to develop a nuclear deterrent as their only reliable security guarantee. After North Korea made it clear that it had a nuclear weapon, the US is not considering attacking its nuclear facilities.

Whatever temporary setback this poorly thought-out display of force was intended to achieve now runs the risk of a strategic collapse of the non-proliferation regime and regional stability.

The Middle East and the rest of the world are still in the US’s reach to stop a nuclear arms race. It must redouble its diplomatic efforts in order to do that and confront the growing distrust it has caused head-on.

Negotiating a deal must be made, but American diplomacy must revert to realism in order to do so. The maximalist demand for “zero enrichment” should be abandoned in Washington. According to experts in arms control, insisting that Iran has no enrichment capability is unrealistic and unnecessary. Iran’s bombing-pathway can be effectively blocked by a tightly controlled enrichment program combined with rigorous monitoring, according to the JCPOA. In exchange for security guarantees and sanctions relief, the US needs to formally declare its willingness to accept a similar arrangement.

Tehran, for its part, has indicated that it will return its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and cap enrichment levels if given a fair offer, despite its opposition to completely renuating to its original enrichment rights.

In the end, diplomatic communication and ongoing international cooperation are still the best means of reducing risks of nuclear proliferation, as opposed to risky unilateral actions. A serious strategic error was made during the strikes. A similarly dramatic recommitment to the hard work of diplomacy will be required to repair the damage.

Around 10 meters from Tareq Abu Azzoum’s broadcasting location, an Israeli bomb targeted the courtyard of Al-Aqsa Hospital in Gaza. He claimed that Israel had not given them any warning in the aftermath.