After weeks of fighting along their disputed border, Thailand and Cambodia have put an end to fighting. Assed Baig of Al Jazeera reports that both militaries are still in place and that civilians have been displaced by the conflict are waiting to see if the truce will endure beyond the first 72 hours.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
Iraq’s new parliament is meeting its first session on Monday in Baghdad, Iraq. This is a highly anticipated event as post-election Iraq wrestles with the issue of who will serve in parliament and who will be in charge of the new government.
There is only one issue with who will be the prime minister, but it is in the minds of current prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, who was given temporary power by the Federal Supreme Court (FSC) in November, making his country a caretaker.
Al-Sudani will also need to demonstrate that he can manage the nation through a complex domestic and international position as he searches for new alliances to make up for a stumbling electoral bloc.
He wanted to use the time between the new parliament’s first session and election day, according to a source in al-Sudani’s Reconstruction and Development Coalition (RDC).
He successfully contested the independent electoral list and won about 46 out of 329 seats, but the FSC ruling sent him back to the Shia Coordination Framework (SCF), the organization he had been trying to break free from when he was nominated four years ago.
He now faces opposition from the SCF leadership, many of whom operate as outside powerbrokers and do not have any control over the RDC’s victory.
The SCF’s biggest challenge is figuring out how to win this election, when Shia parties with armed wings won big while choosing al-Sudani or another candidate for the title.
Armed organizations have long participated in the SCF and participated in Iraq, but pro-Iran and anti-West armed groups have never had such a significant presence and voice in parliament.
A large number of Shia Iraqis are uneasy about Iran’s enormous influence in their nation because of the powers Iraq has relations with.
80 to 90 of the roughly 180 MPs are held by the SCF, the majority of whom are US-admitted and affiliated with armed groups. In 2021, they held only 17 seats.
Faleh al-Fayyad, the head of the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF), received 10 seats in al-Sudani’s bloc, and Ahmed al-Asadi, the PMF’s minister of labor, received eight. He also leads the Jund al-Imam brigades, an armed group within the PMF.
Iraq could face off against the European Union, Gulf states, the United Kingdom, and the United States due to the increased involvement of pro-Iran, anti-Western armed groups in the government formation process.
The US has told Iraqi leaders that it won’t tolerate these groups, many of whom have long served as state-salaried organizations with political wings, holding positions in the government, according to Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein.
Prior to now, the US had unstated “non-engagement” policies with cabinet members who were members of armed groups and who continued to maintain normal relations with the rest of the cabinet.
Washington’s relationship to the incoming administration will largely depend on how well these groups are represented, a problem that is still pending.
However, it is still to be seen whether the US will impose more severe sanctions on individuals or take crippling steps that could cripple the country, such as sanctioning the SOMO or limiting Baghdad’s access to US Federal Reserve funds.
The US has already rewarded many of the kingmakers involved in the formation of the government, including Shibl al-Zaidi, the PMF chief al-Fayyad, and Asaib Ahl al-Haq leader Qais al-Khazali and Khadamat leader Shibl al-Zaidi.
Members of parliament will be sworn in when the session begins, and the parliament’s speaker will be chosen. According to the customary muhasasa system, which has existed since the first government under the post-2003 constitution, this candidate is a consensus Sunni candidate.
A Kurdish candidate will be chosen as the winner, according to Muhasasa. The president then chooses the SCF candidate for prime minister.
The FSC ratified the results more quickly than usual before the election, as President of the Supreme Judicial Council Faiq Zaidan had previously urged politicians to adhere to the constitutional timeline for creating a government, which is up to 90 days.
However, historically, no Iraqi government was created within constitutional deadlines, and the SCF’s struggle to find the right candidate while keeping the attention of the armed groups currently occupying parliament could slog along. In 2021, that time frame was more than 300 days.
Iran has historically played a significant role in achieving consensus among Shia factions regarding the prime minister.
Iran’s role this time is questioned because it is now weakened regionally as a result of Israeli and US attacks, a crippling economic crisis brought on by sanctions, and the degradation of its regional proxies.
After a meeting in Florida, US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelenskyy discuss potential solutions to the Russian-Russian conflict. However, they acknowledged that there are “thorny issues” to be resolved regarding the status of the Donbass region, which Russia has annexed.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
In Yemen’s already complex theater, political and military signals have gotten stronger. In an unusually short period of time, three successive statements were issued within a single context, beginning with an official Yemeni request from President Rashad al-Alimi, the head of Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council, the governing body of the internationally recognised government. The Saudi-led coalition then issued a political message to the minister of defense, which sets out the steps being taken and the course of action they will take.
What transpired is neither a routine truce nor an isolated incident. The sequence suggests an arrangement that uses Yemeni legitimacy as the political framework for a Saudi move aimed at restraining the expansion of an ally advancing eastward, while at the same time reducing the Houthis ‘ chances of exploiting any rift within the opposing camp. The three statements’ weight exceeded the words of their respective statements, which moved the situation from an open tug-of-war to a clear path based on a field response, an official request, and finally a political message that establishes the limits of movement and sets its course.
The names of Yemen’s governorates may seem like marginal details to a non-Arab reader, but Hadramout and al-Mahra are exceptions. With its oil and gas resources and related infrastructure, Hadramout contributes to Yemen’s economic development and is a key border crossing with Saudi Arabia, which contributes to both border security and trade. Al-Mahra controls ports, crossings, and movement routes that have an impact on regional security and the local economy because it borders Oman and Saudi Arabia. This location makes any tension in the east a quintessential border issue, not merely a local crisis, and any large-scale instability there will not remain confined within Yemen, as it impacts the country’s economy, raises border sensitivity within the region, and stirs concerns about the stability of trade routes.
Riyadh sees the east as a place where it strives to avoid chaos because of this. With the emergence of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), which is supported by the United Arab Emirates, and its forces in Hadramout and al-Mahra, the conflict has become a direct question of who has the authority to manage security and resources in areas that cannot support a protracted conflict.
The first step came through a statement attributed to a government source about a request by the chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council to take military measures to protect civilians in Hadramout and support the armed forces in imposing calm. The significance of this phrase is that it elevates the conflict from being one of conflict between forces within the same camp (the STC is a member of the Presidential Leadership Council), causing the supporting partner to take legal action.
In response to a request from the head of a recognized international governing body, the coalition has a clearer political justification for its intervention. Internally, the request sends a message no less important, as the presidency does not want to become a mere facade covering up imposed facts, and it seeks to affirm the idea that controlling the field happens through the state, even if it seeks regional support to achieve that.
The coalition issued a second statement, which urgently demanded that the STC step down from Hadramout and al-Mahra, hand over camps to the “Nation’s Shield,” and issue a warning against engaging directly in military operations that would otherwise be in conflict with de-escalation efforts. This text provides executive instructions, including those for escalation, handover, and reinstating the local authority.
The mention of the “Homeland Shield” forces in the statement is striking because the coalition is not merely calling for vacating positions, but is also proposing an alternative party to take them over. Riyadh can manage the eastern file without resorting to the logic of multiple forces, which lowers the likelihood of a security vacuum. The phrase “direct engagement” is the most explicit warning, because it raises the price of any attempt to forcefully impose a new reality on the coalition or test its limits.
The third statement by Saudi Defence Minister Prince Khalid bin Salman Al Saud, addressed primarily to the Yemeni people, affirmed that the kingdom’s intervention came in response to a request from the legitimate government and in support of restoring the state and preserving Yemen’s security. The “Southern issue” was included in the political solution pipeline through the Riyadh Conference and Riyadh Agreement, ensuring southern participation in governance, and it was emphasized as a fair political cause that cannot be ignored. The STC should “heed to reason,” he instructed, and follow Saudi and Emirati mediation efforts to end the escalation and grant peaceful transfer of camps.
This framing works in two directions, it grants the STC political recognition of the Southern cause, while setting strict boundaries for its pursuit, as Riyadh – according to the statement – distinguishes between the justice of the cause and the use of force to change control maps in resource and border areas. It also provides the STC with a practical exit through peaceful handover as opposed to an open conflict.
This sequence puts the STC to a direct test. The coalition’s operational statement placed a cap on its movements, and the political framing from the Saudi defense minister gave a way out via peaceful handover. In this situation, a coordinated response would preserve the STC’s political discourse and influence in its traditional areas of influence while presenting any withdrawal as an engagement in de-escalation. Procrastination or direct defiance, however, raises risks, as it could lead to greater political and diplomatic pressure and portray it as the party obstructing the de-escalation process in a highly sensitive area. In addition, the three messages change the boundaries of expansion within the same camp because specific tactics for influencing specific areas or centers differ from forced attempts to reshape eastern Yemen.
The Houthis, an armed group with their own government backed by Iran, which control Yemen’s capital Sanaa and northwestern Yemen, are monitoring any rift among their opponents and seek to exploit it. The Yemeni presidency and the coalition’s swift coordination shows to Sanaa rulers that the opposing camp is capable of handling their disputes in sensitive areas and that placing a bet on internal fighting as a route to the east may not be possible. Additionally, creating security arrangements close to resource areas makes it more difficult to politicize their chaos and stifles any attempt to advance there in the future.
The phrase “Saudi–Emirati mediation” in the coalition’s statements and those by the Saudi defence minister appears highly sensitive because Abu Dhabi’s relationship with the STC is not merely one of political communication, but one of sponsorship, funding, and support that grants it freedom of movement and a constant backer. When the UAE and Saudi Arabia sign a letter of agreement as mediators, sending the STC the impression that it is protected, while putting Abu Dhabi in a tight corner because mediation requires a concrete commitment to stop escalation rather than just a declaration of intent.
This directs Abu Dhabi’s willingness to follow Saudi Arabia’s strategy and approach to an issue that threatens its border security and strategic interests, and serves as a test of the alignment of calculations within the coalition itself. But the question remains: will Abu Dhabi succeed in pushing the STC towards de-escalation, or will the political cover remain in place while developments on the ground move in a different direction?
A quick-term settlement that includes a planned handover of camps, a planned handover of camps, and security measures to stop any one party from imposing its dominance in Hadramout and al-Mahra is more likely to be the result of Saudi Arabia’s efforts. This path maintains a minimum level of stability and reduces the chances of clashes within the camp opposing the Houthis. If it fails, only a few deterrents will be developed to enforce the stated ceiling while allowing the mediation channel to remain open to prevent a full-scale explosion.
The cost of turning eastern Yemen into a contentious space has been increased by the three statements, but they have not caused a resolution.
In my view, what will determine the direction is not the statements alone, but the behaviour of the parties in the following days: will the STC choose a settlement that saves face, or will it bet on time? And will the “security alternative” arrangements help to lessen friction, or will they lead to new local sensitivity?
And one more thing about the Houthis: will they view this containment as a deterrent that lessens opportunities to invest in disputes, or will they use it as a chance to test the limits of movement?
As Israel continues to obstruct essential shelter and aid into the area, displaced Palestinians in Gaza are in further misery as a result of their ongoing bombardment, siege, and loss in the country’s genocidal war for more than two years.
After heavy winter rains slammed the area in recent days, flimsy tents were flooded and makeshift camps were covered in mud on Monday.
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Since Israel’s war destroyed an estimated 80% of the buildings in Gaza, Palestinians in Gaza are now forced to take shelter in tents and other makeshift structures due to the harsh conditions.
Officials are advising people that prolonged weather also presents new risks for disease and illness, including the risk of floodwater contamination from overburdened and damaged sewage systems and the possibility of damaged buildings collapsing in the midst of heavy rain.
A partially destroyed wall collapsed onto a 30-year-old woman’s tent on Sunday in the Remal neighborhood of Gaza City in the middle of fierce winds, killing her, according to Al Jazeera Arabic.
Although officials have cautioned people against using tents to shelter in damaged buildings, they only offer moderate protection from the heavy rain and no real protection from flooding.
According to the authorities in Gaza, at least 15 people have died this month from hypothermia, including three babies, as a result of the rains and the soaring temperatures.
The infant’s death from the extreme cold was the latest one to come from Arkan Firas Musleh, two months old.
According to Al Jazeera’s Hind Khoudary, a reporter from the Zeitoun neighborhood in Gaza City, where the majority of the buildings have been reduced to rubble by Israeli attacks, deep puddles and thick mud were created in some places by the heavy rains.
People are having trouble moving through those mud puddles, she said. These include sewage, trash, and water.
In response to reports of flooded tents being reported by residents, a team of municipal workers tried to pump sewage from the stale network.
She said that “family members are complaining that sewage water has been entering their tents.”
Aid organizations have urged Israel to put pressure on it to lift restrictions on the country’s access to life-saving aid, which they claim are far below the amount required by the US-brokered ceasefire.
“More rain,” More human suffering, despair, and death are what commissioner-general of UNRWA, the top UN agency coordinating aid in Gaza, wrote on social media on Sunday.
More than two years of suffering are being made worse by the harsh winter weather. In ruins and flimsy, waterlogged tents, people in Gaza are surviving.
He continued, “This is unavoidable. There is nothing about this.” At the required scale, aid supplies are not permitted inside.
Israeli attacks on Palestinians continue in Gaza despite the ceasefire that ended on October 10.
A medical source told Al Jazeera Arabic that three Palestinians were hurt on Monday when Israeli forces attacked the Jabalia camp in northern Gaza.
According to witnesses, the attack took place in a location where Israeli forces had withdrawn under the ceasefire agreement.
According to Al Jazeera Arabic, witnesses also reported an Israeli airstrike on the eastern regions of the Bureij camp in central Gaza, artillery shelling east of Rafah, and additional Israeli attacks east of Gaza City.
A preliminary truce, followed by steps toward a wider peace, was a 20-point plan proposed by US President Donald Trump in September. In the first phase, there have been both the exchange of prisoners detained in Gaza and in Israeli jails, as well as the partial withdrawal of Israeli forces from the enclave. It still occupies the majority of the land, though.
However, Israeli attacks continue despite the fact that humanitarian aid has not arrived where promised.
Published On 29 Dec 2025
In the midst of intense competition, athletes who had the full spectrum of triumph, frustration, and heartbreak etched on their faces as they endured the full spectrum of triumph, frustration, and heartbreak, in this photo collection capture some of the most spectacular and definitive sporting moments of 2025.
Cycling riders battled through challenging mountain ascents that pushed the limits of endurance in the Tour de France, creating their signature human drama.
Football experienced a number of milestones. Qatar hosted the Arab Cup, which was a success in Qatar after the 2022 World Cup, and saw widespread celebration both domestically and internationally. After years of searching for a title, Paris Saint-Germain finally won the Champions League championship.
The Indian women’s cricket team broke records with their triumph with their triumph while England’s triumph in the Women’s Euro 2025 championship captivated the entire country.