Muhammad Shurrab’s goal has always been to spread happiness. His social media accounts had long been well-known in Gaza; they were well-known for their funny posts, comedic skits about daily life, and acting, which he had performed in local productions.
On his Facebook page, a pin read, “I adore creativity, whatever it is, and whatever it will be.”
Mahmoud’s videos continued despite Israel’s occupation of Gaza putting many of his dreams on hold. He remained cheerful throughout, even making jokes, but the focus was now on humanitarian assistance.
Mahmoud gained notoriety in displacement camps, helping to set up tents for families who had lost everything, and distributing baby formula in crates filled with bottled water and cooking oil. He gathered donors’ opinions on social media across the globe using his platforms.
And he quickly shifted from one area to another under bombardment, believing that he could not stop. ”
In al-Mawasi, a so-called Israeli “humanitarian zone” west of Khan Younis in southern Gaza, an Israeli air attack struck the tent where Mahmoud was sleeping on June 21. The strike claimed the life of Mahmoud.
[Photo by Lama Shubeir of Mahmoud Shurrab and his daughter Dalal]
Dalal Shubeir, his daughter, Dalal, and his wife Lama Shubeir, 32, left behind. Mahmoud saw a chance to transport them to Egypt before the war, while he stayed behind to assist the people of Gaza.
He [sent us away] to safeguard the life of his daughter, Lama told Al Jazeera. He wanted her to live in peace like any other child in the world because he was so afraid for her. He desired that Dalal develop safely. But I never imagined that after a year and a half, we would be apart without seeing each other again. ”
a spirit of charity
At the age of nine, Mahmoud lost his father Khamis in Khan Younis. Along with comedy and acting, Khamis was well-known for his charitable work, which later became one of Mahmoud’s passions.
His main motivation, according to Lama, was to “make people happy.”
Before getting married in 2019, the couple had first met on a recreational trip in 2010.
Mahmoud cherished bringing joy to people, Lama said. He merely wanted to live a happy life with us. For being straightforward and eager to assist, people admired him. ”
Mahmoud chose to remain in Gaza when the war broke out, despite the risks, so it might not surprise him.
He never hesitated to give a donation to him in order to help him with a worthwhile cause, Lama said. He would say, “People need me. People need me. I’m in complete control. ‘”
Mahmoud concentrated on aid projects, including water distribution [Courtesy of Lama Shubeir] once Israel’s war against Gaza began.
He was a member of the community, embracing its joys and sorrows, because of his charitable work. He was more than just a celebrity in Khan Younis.
Mousa Awad, a 27-year-old woman from Khan Younis, described Mahmoud as kind, tall, and with a beautiful smile. We laughed just seeing him, he said. In every camp where people are forced to live. I called him the day before and he arrived the next day when we needed drinking water.
He always said he wanted to see his daughter soon despite looking exhausted. ”
Love for his family
If there were no communications lines, Mahmoud longed for his daughter Dalal, who he called every morning and every night. He was relieved to know that she had begun lessons for swimming and preschool outside of Gaza’s horrors.
He called just two hours before his death and remained silent for 50 minutes while Dalal and her mother ate breakfast. He had to cut off the request to concentrate on his planned water distribution campaign.
Lama has to accept Mahmoud’s passing.
She claimed that she had taken him away from his daughter and I. Through joy and hardship, I spent the majority of my life with him. He was so passionate about our daughter. He had a dream in which she would return, how Gaza would be rebuilt, and how one day he would start anew. ”
Traditional influences on the conflict in the eastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) include regional rivalries, ethnic tensions, and weak political institutions. In light of these events, the June signing of the Washington Agreement between the DRC and Rwanda and the July signing of the March 23 Movement (M23) and the Doha Declaration of Principles are significant diplomatic achievements.
These agreements, which were facilitated by the US and Qatar, represent an unusual moment of regional and local alignment that will help to maintain regional harmony. Two crucial elements affect their ultimate success: political narrative management and credible implementation. The progress embodied in these agreements runs the risk of stagnation or reversal without ongoing international oversight to ensure implementation and efforts to reframe adversarial discourses among elites and communities.
The DRC and Rwanda, both of which are at the center of the eastern Congo crisis, have come to terms with the Washington Agreement. The agreement agrees that both parties’ accusations are destabilizing and commits them to a ceasefire and de-escalation of support for armed groups. It provides a framework for future security cooperation, a mutual recognition of sovereignty, and a commitment to use third-party mediation as a guarantee of commitments.
The Doha Declaration of Principles, on the other hand, provides a detailed outline of how the DRC government and M23 rebels can reach a comprehensive peace agreement. The document, which is built on seven pillars: a permanent ceasefire, confidence-building measures, restoration of government control, the return of displaced people, regional mechanisms, and a commitment to achieving a final peace agreement, offers a holistic view of the armed conflict. It spells out sequenced actions like detainee release, oversight mechanisms, and post-conflict reintegration, and it clearly prohibits sabotage, propaganda, and territorial gains by force.
The commitment to sequencing and timetabling is one of these two agreements’ most admirable qualities. The Doha Declaration specifies the steps needed to implement confidence-building measures, begin direct negotiations, and sign a final peace agreement. Similar to how closely the Washington Agreement and the Doha process are related, the Washington Agreement’s alignment reflects an understanding of how regional alignments and domestic armed group behavior intersect.
Additionally, both documents confirm the roles of the African Union and the UN Organization for Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), and also highlight the role of external guarantors, Qatar and the US. This reflects a multilateral peace-building model that includes non-Western and Western actors who work together to strengthen one another.
According to research on conflict mediation, collaborating with multiple mediators increases the likelihood of reaching peace agreements and strengthens those settlements’ viability and legitimacy. Joint mediation efforts frequently combine various advantages, such as resources, leverage, and normative legitimacy, to give the parties involved more robust and palatable negotiated outcomes.
Despite these accomplishments, the real test lies ahead. Due to poor implementation, mistrust, and political manipulation, many previous peace agreements in the DRC have fallen apart. Similar risks are present in the current agreements.
Conflict parties’ lack of political will continues to be problematic. In cases like Nairobi and Luanda, parties may use declarations to gain time or strengthen international legitimacy rather than pursue peace.
The parties involved in the conflict have repeatedly hampered previous peace efforts by delays and political grandstanding, but both the Doha and Washington frameworks are vulnerable.
Therefore, it is crucial to maintain pressure on the parties and advance toward a long-term settlement through sustained and credible international political will and committed mediation.
The discursive environment within which the agreements are framed is equally significant. Public opinion in the DRC remains sceptical of M23’s intentions and deeply suspicious of Rwanda’s role. In contrast, Kigali sees Kinshasa’s ties to rebel-led Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) as a persistent threat. It is crucial to manage these narratives, especially in the national media and on social media.
They run the risk of collapse if elites and communities view the agreements as betrayals or weak points. To combat anti-peace myths, international partners should start a public outreach campaign. Disinformation is being suppressed, as well as increasing peace dividends.
Additionally, the implementation of border-security coordination, refugee return, and demobilization and reintegration of fighters (DDR) programs requires stable funding. Finally, a regional peacebuilding agreement must win the support of neighboring states and stop new spoilers from emerging.
The resolution of one of Africa’s most bloody conflicts is made possible by the Washington and Doha agreements. They exhibit a rare instance of coordinated multilateral action, strategic planning, and political will.
International oversight must be sustained and credible, and the discursive space must be carefully managed in order to ensure their success. These commendable accomplishments run the risk of becoming yet another unfulfilled promise in Congo’s long search for peace without such measures.
Many people in Ethiopia’s fragile, troubled northern Tigray region are being impacted by an oddly familiar set of headlines.
Successive delegations of civil society and religious leaders have, in recent weeks, travelled to the Tigrayan capital, Mekelle, for “dialogue”. Some may find it to be a remembrance of the events that took place in the days leading up to Tigray’s invasion in November 2020.
About 5 million people were internally and 600,000 were killed in the war. It brought global attention to Ethiopia’s fractured politics and tarnished the reputation of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, who had won a Nobel Peace Prize for mending long-severed ties with neighbouring Eritrea.
The war was supposed to end with a ceasefire two years later, but according to analysts, another conflict may be brewing. Eritrea and, possibly, that nation’s own allies could be involved in this situation, as well as the Tigrayan regional authorities. It is not a conflict that the region can withstand, experts fear.
Abel Abate Demissie, an analyst for the Chatham House think tank in the United Kingdom, told Al Jazeera, “We are now at a point where we are all frightened at another conflict in Tigray and with Eritrea. It would be “absolutely devastating.”
Fractured agreements signed back in November 2022 that ended the war between the regional Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and the federal government are at the root of the tensions. Analysts claim that this is the most terrifying development of the year because of the growing resentment between neighboring Ethiopia and Eritrea.
As neighboring Sudan, South Sudan, and Somalia deal with the ongoing armed conflict, war there could undermine regional stability. Ethiopia is a key player in East Africa. It could also affect Africa’s self-reliance in the aviation sector, as Addis Ababa is one of Africa’s most important air travel hubs.
On February 12, 2025, internally displaced people in Ethiopia’s Tigray region, Sebacare, pass through the camp.
Disregarded as a peace agreement
War broke out in Tigray in November 2020 after Ethiopia’s Abiy accused the TPLF of attacking a command centre of the national army, the Ethiopian National Defence Force (ENDF).
In what experts claim was an autocratic system, the TPLF ruled Addis Ababa’s ruling coalition for decades. In Ethiopia, where regions are divided along ethnic lines, the group was despised in nearly all ten of its regions. Eritrea, which fought a border war with TPLF-dominated Ethiopia in 1998, also had gripes with the party. Abiy, an Oromo, won the election in 2018 and began working on reforms to create a more powerful central government. However, the TPLF sought to overthrow Abiy’s administration by posing a threat to its authority.
Addis Ababa, in its military response to the TPLF attack, teamed up with other TPLF-opposed entities, including the Amhara army and allied militias, as well as Eritrean forces. Rights groups claimed that the federal government purposefully obstructing aid to Tigrayans and causing a near-famine were all sides were accused of attacking civilians. Many Tigrayans claim that the conflict was a genocide, while the United States described Amhara militia attacks as “ethnic cleansing.” Many were forcibly displaced from western Tigray, which the Amhara region claims. There were countless women raped.
The Pretoria peace agreement was signed by Addis Ababa and the TPLF in November 2022. The ceasefire deal mandated that the TPLF disarm and a new government be jointly appointed by both sides. Additionally, it mandated that all third-party armies withdraw and that Addis Abeba supervise the safe return of displaced people.
However, Getachew Reda, the Abiy-appointed Tigray mayor, and Debretsion Gebremichael, the TPLF’s head, and a power conflict broke out in the organization. It began when Getachew attempted to implement the disarmament clause. However, he was allegedly a sellout by the core TPLF members. The TPLF faction, in conjunction with Debretsion, staged a coup in March, seizing control of Mekelle radio station, and forcing Getachew to flee Mekelle to Addis Ababa. The coup was a direct affront to Abiy, analysts say. Addis Ababa and TPLF have exchanged insults and threatened attacks, despite the fact that he has since removed an additional interim president from Debretsion’s camp.
According to Chatham House’s Abel, “Both sides have downplayed their responsibility,” referring to how both parties appear to have resisted the Pretoria agreement. The TPLF accuses Addis Ababa of failing to resettle people, with some 1.6 million still displaced, and is threatening to forcibly return them. The national electoral body claims that the government has revoked its status as a political party because the TPLF has previously convened a general assembly.
On the other hand, Addis Ababa accuses the TPLF of uniting with Eritrea and faults it for not disarming.
In a speech in parliament in July, Abiy urged religious leaders and civil society members to warn TPLF leaders against escalation, because when conflict starts, “it would be too late”.
The Tigray Democratic Solidarity Party is the name of Getachew’s new political organization after being fired from the TPLF. According to analysts, Tigray could be the place the party would be.
Meanwhile, Amhara militias and the TPLF continue to clash. Many of the young members of the TPLF who enlisted in the TPLF in the 2020 conflict attempted an attack on the TPLF in July, starting new militias allied with Getachew’s group.
On March 18, 2021, soldiers dressed as Eritreans parade past the town of Adigrat, Ethiopia [Baz Ratner/Reuters]
The problem with Eritrea
Since 2020, Ethiopia and Eritrea have been at odds with one another because of their ongoing entanglement.
After Abiy’s government and the TPLF reached agreement, cracks started to appear in their pasture. President Isaias Afwerki, who has been Eritrea’s de facto leader since 1994, was reportedly angered as he did not feel sufficiently consulted, even as Eritrean troops are still in Tigray.
However, Abiy’s assertions that landlocked Ethiopia has an “existential” need to access a seaport since 2023 are a bigger problem. As a result of Eritrea’s campaign to secede in 1993, Asmara believes that Addis Ababa may invade and seize the coastal areas it had previously lost. In one comment, Abiy described Ethiopia losing sea access as a “historical mistake”.
According to analysts, Eritrea has been expanding its defenses by sending military tanks to the border, while Ethiopia has also done so. Eritrea solicited conscription into the military in February. Asmara is also reportedly in cahoots with the TPLF to undermine Abiy, although officials deny this.
According to analyst Abel, neither party is really going to war and is just posturing. Ethiopia is not interested in tarnishing its reputation as a developing regional leader in Addis Ababa, where the African Union has its main office.
“The problem, though, is it only takes one small act to ignite a war, even if both sides don’t want it”, the analyst said.
Abiy made an attempt to minimize the tensions during a legislative address in March.
He continued, implying that any port deals would be commercial because “our intention is to negotiate based on the principle of give and take.” “Our plan is not to fight but to work together and grow together”.
Abiy’s search for a port has irritated Asmara as well. After Abiy sealed a port deal with Somaliland’s self-declared state last year, neighboring Somalia almost declared war. Somalia, which views Somaliland as part of its territory, was furious, but Turkiye, Somalia’s close ally, mediated repairs between the two in December. Eritrea met with Somalia and Egypt before the two countries agreed to a truce. Egypt is also angry with Addis Ababa over the Grand Renaissance Dam, which it claims will encroach upon the country’s water supply from the Nile.
Isaias Afwerki, president of Eritrea, and Abiy Ahmed, Ethiopia’s prime minister, attend the ceremony observing the reopening of the Eritrean Embassy in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia [Tiksa Negeri/Reuters]
Can all sides find peace?
Analysts claim that the key to finding common ground lies primarily with Abiy because Asmara, for one, lacks diplomacy and appears more confident in the support of rumored Eritrean backing.
The big question is whether Abiy will and will be able to rekindle diplomatic ties with Eritrea or the TPLF without feeling isolated on either side. In the background, as well, are the Amhara militias who are still present in disputed western Tigray. Any efforts to get rid of them could cause conflict.
In any case, according to analyst Micheal Tsegay Assefa’s conclusion in a brief for the Atlas Institute for International Affairs, Abiy is already experiencing a legitimacy crisis.
“Regional leaders, particularly from Amhara and Oromia, increasingly question the central government’s capacity to secure peace and manage inter-regional conflicts”, he wrote, due to Addis Ababa’s inability to enforce the peace deal.
Tigrayans are once more frightened of losing their lives as the sabre-rattling continues. Numerous people are fleeing the area as a result of the recent upheaval, some taking deadly paths to avoid the entire country.
Researchers say Ethiopian migrants attempting, and dying, to enter Yemen via the Gulf of Aden increasingly appear to be from Tigray, based on the clothing or jewellery found by rescuers during shipwrecks.
Another war must not occur, according to analysts.
A law in Cambodia has been passed that gives the government the authority to revoke citizenship for people who “collude” with foreigners.
Anyone found guilty of conspiring with foreign countries, plotting against Cambodian interests, or engaging in “destruction of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national security” is granted a new legal authority under the law that was passed on Monday.
The 125-member National Assembly, which is dominated by the long-running Cambodian People’s Party, approved the legislation by all but five members.
A committee established at the request of Interior Minister Sar Sokha decides citizenship revocation under the law.
Although the upper house, the king, and the government of Cambodia still have to approve the legislation, these procedures are still regarded as formalities.
The action is in response to the government’s continued crackdown on its foes, which included former strongman leader Hun Sen and his son, current prime minister Hun Manet.
Hun Sen, who ruled Cambodia for more than three decades before his son took control in 2023, stated in June that it needed to impose laws against those who “side with foreign nations.”
In the midst of the crackdown, a number of well-known political figures have fled Cambodia, including Sam Rainsy and Mu Sochua, cofounders of the under-regime Cambodia National Rescue Party.
A coalition of 50 human rights organizations warned on Sunday that the law would “destroy disastrously chilling effect on the freedom of speech of all Cambodian citizens.”
The group claimed that the abuse potential in the passage of this vaguely worded law, which targeted people based on their political views, speech, and activism, is “too high” a possibility.
Four journalists, including Al Jazeera photographer Mohammad Salama, are among 19 people killed in an Israeli attack on Nasser Medical Complex in southern Gaza, according to the enclave’s Ministry of Health.
The ministry said on Monday that the victims were killed on the fourth floor of the hospital in a double-tap strike – one missile hitting first, then another moments later as rescue crews arrived.
Those killed also included Hussam al-Masri, who worked as a photojournalist for the Reuters news agency, Mariam Abu Daqqa, who worked as a journalist with several media outlets, including The Independent Arabic and The Associated Press news agency, and Moaz Abu Taha, who worked for the NBC network, according to Gaza’s Government Media Office.
Reuters reported that their live video feed from the hospital, which was operated by cameraman al-Masri, suddenly shut down at the moment of the initial strike.
“The journalist colleagues were martyred when the Israeli occupation committed a horrific crime by bombing a group of journalists who were on a press coverage mission at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis Governorate and many martyrs fell victim to this crime”, Gaza’s media office said in a statement.
“We hold the Israeli occupation, the American administration, and the countries participating in the genocide crime such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and France fully responsible for committing these heinous brutal crimes”.
Salama married another Palestinian journalist, Hala Asfour, last year amidst the ongoing genocidal war.
Abu Daqqa, meanwhile, leaves behind a 12-year-old son, who was evacuated from Gaza earlier on in the war, according to AP editor Abby Sewell.
“She was a true hero, like all of our Palestinian colleagues in Gaza”, Sewell said in a post on X.
The journalists ‘ killings come barely two weeks after renowned Al Jazeera journalist Anas al-Sharif was killed along with four of his media colleagues in front of al-Shifa Hospital in Gaza City. Israel claimed it targeted Anas, who had become the voice of Gaza for his extensive reporting from the enclave – home to more than two million people.
The attack raises the death toll of Palestinian journalists killed in Gaza since October 7, 2023 to at least 274, according to an Al Jazeera tally.
In addition to the four journalists killed, Hatem Khaled, a photojournalist working for Reuters is also among those wounded, the agency confirmed. Khaled has extensively documented the war in Gaza for Reuters.
More journalists killed in Gaza than in any other major conflict
Al Jazeera’s Hind Khoudary said Israel has constantly targeted Palestinian journalists throughout the conflict.
“How many times are we going to continue reporting on the killing of our colleagues or the killing of other journalists working with Al Jazeera and other news outlets”? Khoudary asked.
“I’m one of the Palestinian journalists reporting from hospitals. We are in a two-year war where we have been deprived of electricity and internet, so Palestinian journalists are using these services at hospitals to continue reporting”, Khoudary said, reporting from Deir el-Balah in central Gaza.
Palestinian journalists are also using hospitals as a base to report on the deaths of Palestinians who have been injured, malnourished, and other victims, she continued.
No immediate comment was made on the hospital attack, according to the Israeli military and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s office.
During the course of the Gaza War, Mohamed ElMasry, a professor of media studies at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, claims that Israel has come to realize that it can “pretty much do whatever it wants” without having any negative effects.
According to him, “Israel has learned that it can pretty much do whatever it wants and get away with it” over the past 23 months when he mentioned attacks that targeted and killed paramedics, aid workers, and journalists.
“Israel’s army] only needs to make a statement, either denying it, refuting it, or blaming Hamas,” said Essry. The most recent attack on Nasser Hospital is expected to be addressed by them.
Rights organizations have unwaveringly condemned Israel’s use of Gaza as a media staging area. There, reporters are in greater danger than anywhere else in the world.
No conflict in modern history has resulted in more journalists being killed than the Gaza Strip’s genocide against Palestinians, according to Amnesty International.
Since the start of the war, Israel claims that fighters are operating from inside the hospitals without providing any evidence. Multiple hospitals have been hit or raided across the Strip. Israel’s claims have never been supported by proof.
According to Shincheonji Church of Jesus, a South Korea-based religious group, over 4,000 members of the church who recovered from COVID-19 are willing to donate plasma for developing a new treatment.
Mr. Man Hee Lee, founder of the Shincheonji Church, said that members of the church are advised to donate plasma voluntarily. “As Jesus sacrificed himself with his blood for life, we hope that the blood of people can bring positive effects on overcoming the current situation,” said Mr. Lee.
