Category World News

Global markets rarely reveal their vulnerabilities quietly. They do so when shipping lanes come under threat, energy prices surge, or supply chains fracture. Few regions illustrate this reality more starkly than the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which are now among the world’s most contested maritime corridors. What unfolds along these waters no longer remains local. It shapes economic security across the Arab world and far beyond.

Yet, amid growing attention to this strategic corridor, one factor remains persistently underestimated: Somalia.

For decades, Somalia was viewed primarily through the lens of conflict and fragility. That narrative no longer reflects today’s reality. The country is undergoing a consequential transition, moving away from prolonged instability, rebuilding state institutions, and re-emerging as a sovereign actor with growing regional relevance. Situated at the intersection of the Arab world, Africa, the Red Sea, and the Gulf of Aden, Somalia is not peripheral to regional stability; it is central to it.

Geography alone explains much of this significance. With the longest coastline in mainland Africa, Somalia lies adjacent to the Bab al-Mandeb passage connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the wider Indian Ocean. A substantial share of global maritime trade and energy shipments passes through this corridor. Disruptions along Somalia’s coast, therefore, have immediate implications for shipping reliability, energy markets, and food security — issues of direct concern to Gulf states and Arab economies.

For the Arab world, Somalia should be understood not as distant terrain but as a front-line partner in regional security. Stability along Somalia’s coastline helps contain threats before they reach the Arabian Peninsula, whether in the form of violent extremism, illicit trafficking networks, piracy, or the entrenchment of hostile external military presences along Africa’s eastern flank.

Somalia is not attempting to build stability from scratch. Despite persistent challenges, tangible progress has been made. Federal governance structures are functioning. National security forces are undergoing professionalisation. Public financial management has improved. Diplomatically, Somalia has reasserted itself within the Arab League, the African Union, and multilateral forums. These gains continue to be built on daily and reflect a clear commitment to sovereign statehood, territorial unity, and partnership rather than dependency. Somalia today seeks strategic alignment grounded in mutual interest, not charity.

Somalia’s relevance also extends beyond security. Its membership in the East African Community integrates the country into one of the world’s fastest-growing population and consumer regions. East Africa’s rapid demographic expansion, urbanisation, and economic integration position Somalia as a natural bridge between Gulf capital and African growth markets.

There is a clear opportunity for Somalia to emerge as a logistics and transshipment gateway linking the Gulf, the Red Sea, East Africa and the Indian Ocean. With targeted investments in ports, transport corridors, and maritime security, Somalia can become a critical node in regional supply chains supporting trade diversification, food security, and economic resilience across the Arab world.

At the heart of Somalia’s potential is its dynamic population. More than 70 percent of Somalis are aged below 30. This generation is increasingly urban, digitally connected, and entrepreneurial. Somali traders and business networks already operate across Southern and Eastern Africa, spanning logistics, finance, retail, and services. A large and dynamic diaspora across the Gulf, Europe, North America, and Africa further amplifies this reach through remittances, investment, and transnational expertise.

None of these momentums, however, can be sustained without security. A capable, nationally legitimate Somali security sector is the foundation for durable stability, investment confidence, and regional integration.

For Gulf states and the wider Arab world, supporting Somalia’s security sector is therefore not an act of altruism. It is a strategic investment in a reliable stabilising partner. Effective Somali security institutions contribute directly to safeguarding Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime corridors, countering transnational terrorism before it reaches Arab shores, protecting emerging logistics infrastructure, and denying external actors opportunities to exploit governance vacuums. Such support must prioritise institution-building, Somali ownership, and long-term sustainability, not short-term fixes or proxy competition.

The stakes are rising. The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are entering a period of heightened strategic contestation. Fragmentation along their African coastline poses a direct risk to Arab collective security. Recent developments underscore this urgency.

Israel’s unilateral recognition of the northern Somali region of Somaliland, pursued outside international legal frameworks and without Somali consent, is widely viewed as an attempt to secure a military foothold along these strategic waters, risking the introduction of the Arab-Israeli conflict into the Gulf’s security environment.

Even more troubling are emerging narratives advocating the forced displacement of Palestinians from Gaza, with proposals to relocate them to Somaliland against their will. Such ideas, whether formally advanced or not, represent grave violations of international law and human dignity. Exporting the consequences of occupation and war onto African soil would not resolve conflict; it would multiply it.

For the Arab world, this should serve as a wake-up call. Allowing external actors to fragment sovereign states or instrumentalise fragile regions for unresolved conflicts carries long-term consequences. Somalia’s unity and stability, therefore, align squarely with core Arab strategic interests and with longstanding Arab positions on sovereignty, justice and self-determination.

Somalia is ready to be part of the solution. With calibrated strategic support, particularly in security sector development and logistics infrastructure, Somalia can emerge as a cornerstone of Red Sea and Gulf of Aden stability, a gateway to East Africa, and a long-term partner for the Arab world.

The question is no longer whether Somalia matters in the regional and global Red Sea and Gulf of Aden discussions and plans. It is whether the region will act on that reality before others do.

The first round of Iran-US talks in Muscat produced no breakthrough. The next few weeks will determine whether they laid foundations or merely bought time before escalation.

When Iranian and American negotiators concluded several hours of talks in Muscat on February 6, publicly, neither side signalled any shift from its opening position. Iran insisted the discussions focus exclusively on the nuclear file. The United States arrived seeking a comprehensive framework that would also cover ballistic missiles, regional armed groups, and more broadly, issues Washington has raised publicly, including human rights concerns. Neither prevailed. Both agreed to meet again.

On the surface, this looks like a non-event. It was not.

The Muscat round was the first high-level diplomatic engagement between the two countries since the joint US-Israeli strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, an escalation that Iran later said killed more than 1,000 people and involved strikes on three nuclear sites. That the two sides returned to the same palace near Muscat’s airport where previous rounds were held in 2025, and agreed to return again is significant.

But continuation is not progress. The distance between what happened in Muscat and what a deal requires remains vast.

Diplomacy conducted under military escort

The most striking feature of the Muscat round was not what was said, but who sat in the room. The American delegation was led by Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, President Trump’s son-in-law. It also included, for the first time, Admiral Brad Cooper, the commander of US Central Command, in full dress uniform.

His presence at the negotiating table was not incidental. It was a signal. The USS Abraham Lincoln carrier strike group was operating in the Arabian Sea as the talks unfolded, and days earlier, US forces had shot down an Iranian drone that approached the carrier.

An Iranian diplomatic source told the Reuters news agency that Cooper’s presence “endangered” the talks. Another, quoted by Al-Araby TV, warned that “negotiations taking place under threat” could impose strategic costs rather than advance them. For Tehran, the message was unmistakable: This was diplomacy conducted in the shadow of force, not as an alternative to it.

Washington, for its part, sees this as leverage. President Trump, speaking on board Air Force One after the talks, described them as “very good” and said Iran wants a deal “very badly”, adding: “They know the consequences if they don’t. They don’t make a deal; the consequences are very steep.”

This is diplomacy framed as an ultimatum. It may create urgency. It is unlikely to create trust, and trust is what this process most desperately needs.

The structural problem

The US withdrew from the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, despite international verification that Iran was meeting its obligations. That decision shattered Iranian confidence in the durability of US commitments. Tehran’s subsequent incremental breaches of the agreement, steadily increasing enrichment levels from 2019 onwards, weakened its credibility, in turn.

This mutual distrust is not a negotiating obstacle that can be resolved with creative diplomacy alone. It is the defining condition under which any agreement must be built. The US has the capacity to impose enormous economic and military costs on Iran. But power does not automatically produce compliance. For commitments to hold, Iran must believe concessions will bring relief rather than new demands. That belief has been badly damaged.

Consider the sequence of events surrounding the Muscat round itself. Hours after the talks concluded, the US State Department announced new sanctions targeting 14 shadow fleet vessels involved in transporting Iranian petroleum, alongside penalties on 15 entities and two individuals. The Treasury Department framed the action as part of the administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign. Whether preplanned or timed for effect, the message was clear: Washington intends to negotiate and squeeze simultaneously.

For Tehran, which has consistently demanded that sanctions relief be the starting point for progress, this sequencing confirms precisely the pattern it fears. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi identified this dynamic explicitly, telling Iranian state television that “the mistrust that has developed is a serious challenge facing the negotiations.”

What actually happened in Muscat

Beneath the competing narratives, the outlines of the substantive discussion have begun to emerge. Iran reportedly rejected a US demand for “zero enrichment”, a maximalist position it was never going to accept in a first meeting. The two sides instead discussed the dilution of Iran’s existing uranium stockpile, a more technical and potentially more productive avenue.

Meanwhile, Al Jazeera reported that diplomats from Egypt, Turkiye and Qatar had separately offered Iran a framework proposal: Halt enrichment for three years, transfer highly enriched uranium out of the country, and pledge not to initiate the use of ballistic missiles. Russia had reportedly signalled willingness to receive the uranium. Tehran has signalled both the enrichment halt and uranium transfer would be nonstarters.

Perhaps the most important development was the least visible. According to Axios, Witkoff and Kushner met directly with Araghchi during the talks, breaking from the strictly indirect format that Iran had demanded for most of last year’s rounds of negotiations. Iran had previously insisted on communicating with the US only through Omani intermediaries. Crossing that barrier, even partially, suggests both sides recognise the limits of indirect talks once bargaining becomes technical.

Oman’s framing was arguably the most honest assessment of the day. Foreign Minister Badr al-Busaidi described the talks as aimed at establishing “appropriate conditions for the resumption of diplomatic and technical negotiations”.

What the next few weeks will decide

Trump said a second round of talks would take place soon. Both sides indicated to Axios that further meetings were expected within days. The compressed timeline is notable. During last year’s rounds, weeks separated each session. The pace suggests Washington believes the diplomatic window is narrowing, and Tehran is at least willing to test that claim.

Several tests will show whether urgency produces substance or merely speed.

First, the scope question. The fundamental dispute over what the talks are about remains unresolved. Iran won the first procedural battle: The venue moved from Turkiye to Oman, regional observers were excluded, and Araghchi claims only nuclear issues were discussed. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said before the talks that the agenda needed to include “all those issues”. If the second round begins with the same fight over scope, it will signal that even the basics remain unsettled.

Second, Iran’s enrichment posture. Before the June 2025 war, Iran had been enriching uranium to 60 percent purity, a short technical step from weapons-grade. Tehran has said enrichment stopped following the strikes. But Iran has also conditioned International Atomic Energy Agency inspections of the bombed sites on new inspection arrangements, raising concerns among non-proliferation experts. Conversely, reports of enrichment resumption or acceleration would likely end the diplomatic track.

Third, the military environment. The US naval build-up in the Arabian Sea is not decorative. The drone shootdown near the Abraham Lincoln and Iran’s attempted interception of a US-flagged vessel in the Strait of Hormuz in the days before the talks show how quickly signalling can slide into miscalculation. Whether the carrier group is reinforced, maintained or gradually drawn down in the coming weeks will reveal more about Washington’s assessment of diplomacy than any press statement.

Fourth, the sanctions rhythm. The same-day announcement of shadow fleet sanctions establishes a pattern. If Washington continues to layer new economic penalties between rounds of talks, Tehran will treat it as evidence that diplomacy is performance rather than process.

Fifth, backchannel activity. The most consequential diplomacy over the next few weeks may not occur in formal settings. Oman, Qatar, Egypt and Turkiye have been working behind the scenes to sustain dialogue. If those intermediary contacts remain active, space for de-escalation persists. If they fall silent, the margin for error narrows.

A managed deadlock is not a strategy

The most probable short-term outcome remains neither breakthrough nor war, but a managed deadlock in which both sides maintain maximal public positions while avoiding steps that would make future talks impossible. In practice, this is a pause sustained by caution rather than a settlement anchored in confidence.

For the broader region, the distinction matters urgently. Gulf states have no interest in becoming staging grounds for escalation. Public statements across the region have consistently emphasised de-escalation, restraint and conflict avoidance. But regional actors can facilitate, host and encourage; they cannot impose terms on either Washington or Tehran.

The Muscat talks did not fail. Neither did they succeed. They established that a channel exists, that both sides are willing to use it, and that direct contact between senior officials is possible.

But a channel is not a plan. The absence of war is not the presence of a deal. The period between Muscat and whatever comes next is a window in which miscalculation remains close to the surface, sustained only by the assumption that both sides are reading each other’s signals correctly.

The next round of talks will not produce an agreement. But it may show whether the two sides are building a floor beneath the standoff or simply postponing the moment when that floor gives way.

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