Category World News

On July 8, Indian Chief of Defence Staff Anil Chauhan delivered a pointed message at the Observer Research Foundation in New Delhi, raising alarms over a budding alignment of strategic interests between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

The general cautioned that such a trilateral convergence, if it gains traction, could have serious implications for India’s security and disrupt the regional balance of power.

His remarks came in the wake of a widely circulated photograph from Kunming, China, showing diplomats from the three nations meeting during the inaugural trilateral talks held alongside regional economic forums. While the meeting was officially billed as a diplomatic engagement, the image has sent ripples through India’s strategic community.

Bangladesh, clearly aware of the sensitivities involved, has moved swiftly to contain the narrative. Touhid Hossain, foreign affairs adviser to Dhaka’s interim government, publicly disavowed any intention of joining bloc-based or adversarial alliances. Dhaka reiterated that its foreign policy remains firmly nonaligned and anchored in sovereign autonomy.

Despite these assurances, New Delhi’s strategic calculus appears to be shifting. There is now a growing perception in New Delhi that, under the interim leadership of Muhammad Yunus, Bangladesh may be recalibrating its foreign policy, moving away from the overt closeness seen under former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina. Under Hasina, India and Bangladesh enjoyed unusually warm ties characterised by deep security cooperation, cross-border connectivity projects and shared regional objectives. Dhaka took strong action against anti-India insurgents, gave India access to transit routes through Bangladeshi territory and generally aligned itself with New Delhi’s strategic priorities.

Whether real or perceived, this shift is influencing how India reads the regional landscape.

Chauhan also drew attention to a broader, troubling pattern: External powers – chiefly China – are leveraging economic fragilities across the Indian Ocean region to deepen their influence. With countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan increasingly beholden to Chinese investment and aid, concerns are mounting that Beijing is systematically encircling India through soft-power entrenchment.

Bangladesh’s case, however, remains somewhat unique. Its economy, though under pressure, is relatively resilient, and Dhaka continues to emphasise pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy over ideological alignment. The Kunming meeting, while symbolically charged, does not yet represent a formal strategic realignment.

Still, the formation of a trilateral framework marks a significant development. Unlike previous bilateral engagements, this format introduces a new dimension of coordination that could evolve in unpredictable ways.

The echoes of history are hard to ignore. In the 1960s, China and Pakistan maintained a tight strategic axis that tacitly encompassed East Pakistan – what is now Bangladesh. That configuration unravelled in 1971 with Bangladesh’s independence.

Today, however, subtle signs suggest elements of that strategic triad may be resurfacing – this time in a more complex geopolitical theatre.

For Beijing, deepening ties with both Pakistan and Bangladesh serves its broader objective of consolidating influence in South Asia and the Indian Ocean region. For Islamabad, it provides a layer of diplomatic insulation and strategic leverage. For Dhaka, the relationship is more tactical – an attempt to hedge against regional volatility at a time when its once-stable ties with New Delhi appear increasingly uncertain.

Bangladesh’s cautious posture is also shaped by volatile domestic politics. Since the July protests and the installation of an interim administration, internal cohesion has frayed. Polarisation is resurging, and with national elections looming in early 2026, the government’s priority is stability, not strategy. Foreign policy in this climate is reactive – not transformative.

Dhaka understands the risks of leaning too far in any direction. Lingering historical resentments with Pakistan remain politically sensitive while an overreliance on China would strain crucial trade and diplomatic ties with the West, especially the United States, where concerns over democratic backsliding and human rights have sharpened.

In this context, any overt strategic alignment could invite unnecessary scrutiny and backlash.

The Kunming meeting, despite its symbolism, was primarily economic in focus – touching on trade, connectivity, infrastructure and cultural cooperation. However, when China and Pakistan floated the proposal to institutionalise trilateral cooperation through a joint working group, Bangladesh demurred. This was not indecision. It was a deliberate, calculated refusal.

Dhaka’s foreign policy has long been defined by “engagement without entanglement”. It maintains open channels with all major powers while avoiding the traps of bloc politics. This nonaligned posture is a core principle guiding its diplomacy. Bangladesh welcomes dialogue and economic cooperation, but it draws a firm line at military or strategic alignment.

For India, interpreting Bangladesh’s moves requires nuance. While Dhaka continues to broaden its international partnerships, it has not abandoned its critical role in India’s security calculus, particularly in the northeastern region. The challenge for New Delhi is not just to monitor emerging partnerships but to reinforce the value of its own.

Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, security cooperation between New Delhi and Dhaka under Hasina’s Awami League was pivotal in stabilising the border region. Bangladesh’s decisive crackdown on militant groups, coupled with close coordination with Indian intelligence and security agencies, played a crucial role in suppressing insurgent threats.

Today, with India’s ties to both China and Pakistan under severe strain, any perceived shift in Dhaka’s stance is scrutinised intensely in New Delhi. The fear that Beijing and Islamabad might exploit Bangladesh as a strategic lever to apply asymmetric pressure remains deeply ingrained in India’s security mindset.

Yet, Bangladesh’s explicit rejection of the proposed trilateral working group reveals a clear-eyed understanding of these sensitivities. It underscores Dhaka’s intent to steer clear of actions that could escalate regional tensions.

This evolving dynamic poses a dual challenge for India: It demands a recalibrated response that moves beyond reactive defensiveness. New Delhi must embrace a more sophisticated, forward-looking strategy – one that transcends old political loyalties and adapts to the shifting diplomatic contours of South Asia.

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Israel launched a series of air attacks on central Damascus, hitting a Ministry of Defence compound and areas near the presidential palace.

The attacks on Wednesday killed at least three people and wounded 34, according to Syria’s Ministry of Health, as reported by state media.

Israel also conducted attacks in southern Syria, where violent clashes between Druze groups, Bedouin tribes, and Syrian security forces have persisted for more than four days.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights reports that more than 250 people have died in Suwayda province during these confrontations.

Israel, which occupies the Syrian Golan Heights, claims its operations are intended to protect the Druze minority – whom it views as a potential ally – and to target pro-government forces allegedly attacking it.

Syria’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the Israeli attacks on Damascus and Suwayda as “part of a systematic Israeli policy to ignite tension and chaos and undermine security in Syria”, urging the international community to take “urgent action” against Israeli aggression.

The air attacks followed deadly clashes in Suwayda between Syrian government forces and local Druze fighters.

The conflict began with reciprocal kidnappings and attacks between Druze fighters and local Bedouin tribes. Government troops intervened to restore order but ended up clashing with Druze groups and reportedly targeted civilians in some instances.

The Druze, a minority with significant influence in both Syria and Israel, are regarded by Israel as loyal allies, with many serving in the Israeli military. A Tuesday ceasefire quickly collapsed, with fighting resuming the following day.

On Wednesday,  the Syrian government and Druze leader Sheikh Yousef Jarbou announced a new ceasefire in the city, and said the army had begun withdrawing from Suwayda.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa said on Thursday that protecting the country’s Druze citizens and their rights is a priority, as he announced that local leaders will take control of security in Suwayda in a bid to end the violence.

Suwayda’s Druze community appears divided. Leader Yasser Jarbou announced that a ceasefire had been negotiated with the Syrian government, while another leader, Hikmat al-Hijri, rejected any such agreement. Many Syrian Druze oppose Israeli intervention on their behalf.

The British government has secretly resettled thousands of Afghans in the United Kingdom for fear they might be targeted by the Taliban after their personal details were leaked, Defence Secretary John Healey revealed on Tuesday.

Details about the accidental data breach by a British soldier and the secret relocation programme for Afghans were made public after a rare court order known as a “superinjuction”, which barred the media from even disclosing its existence, was lifted on Tuesday.

Here is what we know about what happened and how the government responded:

Whose data was leaked and how did it happen?

A spreadsheet containing the personal information of about 18,700 Afghans and their relatives – a total of about 33,000 people – was accidentally forwarded to the wrong recipients by email in February 2022, Healey told lawmakers in the House of Commons.

These were people who had applied for relocation to the UK between August 2021 and January 7, 2022. That was the six-month period following the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan after the US and allied forces withdrew from the country. Most had worked as translators, assistants or in other capacities for the British military in Afghanistan.

They had applied for the UK’s Afghan Relocations and Assistance Policy (ARAP) scheme, which, like its predecessor, the Ex-Gratia Scheme (EGS), had been set up for Afghans who had worked for the British forces.

The EGS was originally established in 2013 following a long campaign by activists and media in support of people who had assisted the British military in Afghanistan and who were considered likely to face reprisals from the Taliban.

The British soldier at the centre of the leak, who had been tasked with verifying applications for relocation, is understood to have mistakenly believed the database contained the names of 150 applicants, when it actually contained personal information linked to some 18,714 people.

The soldier was under the command of General Sir Gwyn Jenkins, who was director of special forces at the time and now heads the British Navy. His name had also been suppressed by the court order until this week.

The UK’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) became aware of the leak when someone else posted parts of the data on Facebook on August 14, 2023. The Facebook post was first spotted by an activist who was assisting Afghans who had worked with UK forces.

The activist contacted the MoD, saying: “The Taliban may now have a 33,000-long kill list – essentially provided to them by the British government. If any of these families are murdered, the government will be liable,” The Guardian newspaper reported.

How did the government respond to the leak?

The MoD told Facebook to take down the post with the leaked information, citing security threats from the Taliban. It also warned some 1,800 ARAP applicants who had fled to Pakistan that they or their families could be in danger.

The UK government, led by former Conservative Prime Minister Rishi Sunak, then sought a court order barring any media disclosure of the data breach.

On September 1, 2023, a High Court judge in London issued a “superinjunction”, which not only prohibits the disclosure of any details but also forbids revealing that the order exists at all. That superinjunction was lifted on Tuesday following a campaign led by The Times newspaper in London.

In April 2024, the government created the Afghanistan Response Route (ARR) to support Afghans who were not eligible for ARAP but were considered at high risk of reprisals from the Taliban as a result of the data leak.

This scheme, which was kept secret, has now been closed, Healey told the House of Commons. However, he added that hundreds of invitations were issued to Afghans and their families under the scheme and these invitations “will be honoured”.

The government also launched the secret Operation Rubific to evacuate those Afghans deemed to be at risk directly to the UK.

How many Afghans have been relocated to the UK under the secret scheme?

As a direct result of the leak, the government says 900 people and about 3,000 relatives have already been flown to the UK under the secret relocation scheme and put up in hotels or military bases. In total, about 24,000 Afghans affected by the breach have either been brought to the UK already or will be in the near future, according to UK media reports.

Through broader resettlement schemes, 35,245 Afghans have so far been relocated to the UK, official data suggests.

Why is this information being disclosed now?

The court order barring the details about the leak from being disclosed was lifted at noon (11:00 GMT) on Tuesday.

Following several private hearings, a High Court judge ruled in May that the injunction should be lifted, citing, among other reasons, the inability of the public or parliament to scrutinise the government’s decisions.

British news outlet The Times reported it had spearheaded the two-year legal battle which resulted in the injunction being lifted.

That decision was, however, overturned by the Court of Appeal in July 2024, due to concerns about the potential risks to individuals whose information had been leaked.

Then came the “Rimmer review”.

Healey, a member of current Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s ruling Labour party, said he was briefed about the leak when it happened as he was serving as shadow defence secretary at the time. However, he added that other cabinet members were only informed about the leak when Starmer’s party was elected to power in the general election of July 2024.

“As Parliamentarians – and as Government Ministers – it has been deeply uncomfortable to be constrained in reporting to this House. And I am grateful today to be able to disclose the details to Parliament,” Healey said on Tuesday.

Healey said that at the beginning of this year, he commissioned former senior civil servant and former Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence Paul Rimmer to conduct an independent review.

Quoting the “Rimmer review” in Parliament on Tuesday, Healey said that four years since the Taliban’s takeover in Afghanistan, “there is little evidence of intent by the Taleban [sic] to conduct a campaign of retribution against former officials.”

He added that the information the Taliban inherited from the former Afghan government would have already allowed them to target individuals if they had wished. Therefore, Rimmer concluded it was “highly unlikely” that someone’s information being on the leaked spreadsheet would be a key piece of information enabling or prompting the Taliban to take action.

“However, Rimmer is clear – he stresses the uncertainty in any judgements … and he does not rule out any risk,” Healey said.

How safe are the people named in the leak now?

The Times reported that after the superinjunction had been lifted, a new temporary court order was issued, barring the media from publishing specific sensitive details about what exactly was in the database.

The Times said the government cited reasons of confidentiality and national security, arguing that the leaked list still poses a threat to the safety of the Afghans.

In a webpage published on Tuesday, the MoD states: “At present, there is no evidence to suggest that the spreadsheet has been seen or used by others who might seek to exploit the information; however, the UK Government cannot rule out that possibility.”

It now advises those who applied for the ARAP or EGS programmes before January 7, 2022, to exercise caution, avoid phone calls or messages from unknown numbers, limit their social media profiles and use a Virtual Private Network (VPN) where possible.

UK-based media outlets have reported that a law firm is suing the MoD on behalf of at least 1,000 Afghans affected by the data leak.

How much has the leak cost the UK government?

Healey said on Tuesday that it had already cost 400 million pounds ($540m) to bring an initial 900 Afghans and their 3,600 family members to the UK under the ARR.

However, this does not account for the expenditures by other government schemes to relocate Afghans to the UK. Healey estimated that the total cost of relocating Afghans to the UK was between 5.5 billion and 6 billion pounds ($7.4bn to $8bn).

Tensions are palpable in the West African nation of Togo as highly anticipated local government elections are being held following weeks of angry protests calling for leader Faure Gnassingbe to resign.

Although small, Togo commands weight as a developing maritime and transit hub in the region because of an important port in the seaside capital, Lome, which is perched on the edge of the Atlantic. The country serves as a gateway into inland Sahel nations and is also home to a major West African airline, meaning unrest there could reverberate across the region.

Voters heading out to cast their ballots on Thursday, July 17, are expected to elect leaders of the country’s 117 municipalities, amid a heavier-than-usual security presence and shuttered land borders.

At the same time, demonstrators have scheduled protests in the capital, Lome, to intentionally clash with the date of the vote, prompting fears of possible widespread violence.

Led largely by the country’s youth population, antigovernment demonstrations erupted in June after a controversial constitutional change. Protests have been met with brute force from Togolese security forces; at least seven people have died, local rights groups say. The protests are only the latest in the restive country, where more frequent demonstrations in recent years are pressuring the decades-long dynastic government.

Here’s what to know about the current political situation in Togo:

Why are Togolese protesting?

Large demonstrations have been held in Lome in recent years, with Togolese calling for Gnassingbe, who has led the country since 2005, to step down.

Between 2017 and 2018, thousands of protesters took to the streets in demonstrations tagged “Faure Must Go” and “Togo stands up”. The uprising rocked the nation of four million and resulted in violent crackdowns from security officials. The government thereafter banned public demonstrations for “security reasons”.

Although officially a democracy, Togo operates in practice as a militarised state, with the army heavily involved in politics. The capital is crawling with stern-faced, armed gendarmes who are often accused of arresting and torturing dissidents.

This year’s bout of protests was triggered after popular rapper and TikToker Tchala Essowe Narcisse, popularly known as Aamron, was arrested for publishing a video where he called for protests to mark the president’s June 6 birthday.

However, anger had been simmering over the high costs of living in the country, and particularly, over new constitutional reforms that opposition leaders and civil society organisations say could see Gnassingbe rule for life. Thursday’s municipal elections will be the first polls held under the new reforms.

First approved in April 2024 by a parliament dominated by the governing Union pour le Republic (UNIR) party, the constitutional amendment swapped the presidential system in the country for a parliamentary one.

Controversially, though, it also introduced a new all-powerful position: President of the Council of Ministers. The role essentially regains all the powers of a president and is without clear official limits. Opposition leaders argued at the time that it would allow Gnassingbe to appoint a dummy president and remain the de facto leader until at least 2030. They called it a “constitutional coup”.

On May 3 this year, Gnassingbe was sworn into the new executive role, as critics predicted. Politician Jean-Lucien Savi de Tove, 86, is now president, and is the oldest in Togo’s history.

In late June, thousands of demonstrators poured into the streets of Lome in anger, calling for Gnassingbe to step down from office after rapper Aamron’s arrest and alleged torture. Protesters set up barricades and hurled stones at security forces, who responded with force, firing tear gas canisters into the crowd, according to reporting by the Reuters news agency.

Le Front Citoyen Togo Debout, a coalition of 12 civil society and human rights groups, accused security officials of arbitrarily arresting civilians, beating them with batons and ropes, and stealing and destroying private property.

At least seven people were discovered dead in the aftermath of the protests, according to the coalition, including two minors. Their bodies were discovered days after the demonstrations in various lagoons and lakes around Lome.

Meanwhile, a Togolese government statement said the deaths were caused by drowning and cautioned residents living near water bodies to be extra careful in the current rainy season.

The ‘Don’t Touch My Constitution’ movement demanded an international investigation into the claims, while Togo’s Catholic Bishops said the levels of violence were “unacceptable and unjustified”.

Who is Faure Gnassingbe?

Just days after his father died in 2005, Faure Essozimna Gnassingbe was hurriedly installed as the country’s president by the army, extending decades of his family’s rule over Togo.

Despite outrage in the country, which led to widespread protests in which at least 500 people were killed, the younger Gnassingbe did not relinquish power and went on to organise and win elections that year, which many critics called a ruse.

His father, the late Gnassingbe Eyadema, seized power in a military coup and ruled the country with a tight fist for 38 years (1967-2005), making him the longest-serving African ruler at the time he died. His “rule of terror” was characterised by a one-party system and deadly repression of dissent, according to Amnesty International. The younger Gnassingbe, while having fostered multi-party rule and infrastructural development in the country, appears to be angling for his father’s record, critics say.

Combined, the father-son duo has commandeered Togo for 58 years. With 60 percent of the population under 35, most Togolese have never experienced life under a different political administration.

Gnassingbe has won every election since 2005. In 2019, in an attempt to circumvent demonstrations calling for his resignation, parliament ushered in constitutional amendments that, the government argued, automatically reset Gnassingbe’s terms. That allowed him to run for the 2020 and 2025 presidential elections.

At first glance, the latest reforms from 2024 appear to acquiesce to what some critics have been demanding: A weakened president elected by the parliament for a single six-year term, rather than an all-powerful leader.

However, what most did not see coming was that Gnassingbe would be appointed to a more powerful position.

Are protesters being targeted? And what is the M66 Movement?

As tensions simmer, demonstrators and civil society accuse Togolese officials of targeting protest leaders, many of whom are living in exile in neighbouring countries, as well as France and the United States.

Last week, the government issued international arrest warrants targeting those believed to be leading organisers, especially members of the M66 Citizens’ Movement – a political collective of bloggers and activists, named after Gnassingbe’s June 6 birthday date. Officials say the group is “inciting unrest and terrorism” in the country.

“The countries where these individuals reside are urged to cooperate,” Security Minister Calixte Madjoulba said at a news briefing. “Wherever they are, we will pursue them.”

M66 members called for renewed protests on July 16 and 17 in a bid to boycott the municipal elections, which form part of a wider push by the government to devolve power at the centre and attempt to improve local governance. Local elections were not held between 1986 and 2020, as the government kept postponing them. Instead, the central authorities designated special administrators who critics say served the government’s interests.

Some opposition leaders have also called for boycotts, although Jean-Pierre Fabre, leader of the main opposition National Alliance for Change, told reporters this week that taking part in the vote was necessary to show Togolese what’s possible.

“The elections will not change anything in this country and we know it very well,” Zaga Bambo, a France-based music artist who claims to be a member of the group, said in a Facebook post. Bambo also dismissed the arrest warrants, telling French media channel RFI that he was unfazed by it.

In his first speech since Israel attacked Damascus, Interim President Ahmed al-Sharaa accused Israel of trying to turn Syria into a ‘theatre of endless chaos’. He also emphasised that protecting Druze citizens is a top priority, after clashes between troops and Druze fighters in Suwayda.