On February 15, during the 38th summit of the African Union (AU) held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, African leaders elected Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, the foreign minister of Djibouti, as the new chairperson of the African Union Commission (AUC), the executive branch of the continental body. He prevailed over Raila Odinga, the former prime minister of Kenya, and Richard Randriamandrato, Madagascar’s former minister of foreign affairs.
Youssouf succeeds Moussa Faki Mahamat, the former leader of the AUC, who served two consecutive four-year terms as Djibouti’s foreign minister in 2005. In his official manifesto, he has committed to advancing governance and democracy, strengthening institutional capacity, and fostering peace and security, among other goals.
Youssouf will use his diplomatic acumen to address the conflict that is raging in Sudan and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) especially as he assumes office at a precarious time in Africa.
Youssouf appears determined to fight for peace and effect major positive developments in the upcoming continent. His success is less than certain, because African leaders are typically reluctant to give in to the AU and its affiliates.
In a report released in March 2022, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) discovered that only 7% of its decisions had been fully enforced as of July 2021, only 18% had been partially enforced, and a significant 75% had not been enforced at all.
Additionally, the report noted that several African nations have made it clear to the Executive Council that they will not abide by the Court’s decisions. Perhaps this explains why last year’s ACHPR report omitted these statistics.
The majority of African leaders oppose the implementation of stringent external oversight laws, which are crucial steps to preventing war and instability for their nations. In consequence, It is not at all certain what Youssouf might achieve in the following four years.
What the new AUC chair can hope to accomplish in the coming year may be influenced by his predecessor’s successes and failures, Moussa Faki Mahamat.
At a ceremony to mark the official start of his term on March 14, 2017, Mahamat was oozing with confidence. He had pledged to “make the Commission a tool capable of bringing the aspirations of our peoples into reality” and “to silence the guns and achieve an Africa free of conflicts by 2020.”
Eight years later, his administration’s performance has been marked by a combination of limited accomplishments and many unresolved challenges.
The Ethiopian government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a landmark peace treaty called the Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (COHA) on November 2, 2022 in Pretoria, South Africa, with the assistance of Mahamat. This accord brought an end to the devastating 2020-2022 Tigray war. Despite this crucial achievement, however, he was unable to “silence the guns” in the conflicts in Chad, Mali, Burkina Faso, Somalia and Mozambique – although it was not for lack of effort.
Mahamat addressed the illiberal actions of African leaders to the 37th Ordinary Session of the African Union on February 17, 2024, seemingly in an effort to justify his various failures.
He cited the ongoing conflicts on the continent, the resurgence of military coups in Central and West Africa, and the overwhelming unwillingness of some AU member states to hold elections that are viewed as credible. On the latter, he rightly said, “Instead of being joyful modes of peaceful transfer or maintenance of power, elections have become, through the extent of their irregularities, factors for deepening crises”.
At the same time, he emphasised that many African leaders have largely ignored the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the AU’s blueprint for conflict prevention, management, and resolution, and its counterpart, the African Governance Architecture (AGA). The AGA’s goals are to promote and defend human and human rights, advance democratic institutions and cultures, and promote good governance and the rule of law.
Mahamat also lamented the failure of institutional reforms within the Continental Union to address issues involving the AUC’s and chairperson’s authority. Although the Chairperson of the Commission is referred to in the texts as the organization’s “Chairman” and “Chairman” as the legal representative and “Chairman of the organization,” paradoxically, he lacks the room to act quickly on urgent matters.
Then, he criticized African leaders harshly, claiming that they have “the frantic tendency to make decisions without real political will to put them into action.” This has resulted in the woeful and unworkable scenario where, according to Mahamat, 93 percent of decisions made in 2021, 2022, and 2023 were not acted on.
He continued, pointing out that this deliberate defiance can be seen at the regional and state levels, where member states frequently disregard and carelessly disobey resolutions set by continental bodies. He alarmingly warned that the organization would not be able to effectively address the continent’s sociopolitical challenges without transformative changes.
Without a doubt, African leaders pose a significant challenge to the continent’s sociopolitical and economic advancement. They enjoy observing the AU develop into a consciously inferior entity that primarily serves their self-serving, dishonest goals.
It is therefore imperative that Youssouf, in his role as Mahamat’s successor, be granted ample independent authority and resources to enforce strict compliance with the organisation’s conventions, particularly with respect to APSA and AGA.
Without that, he may sadly be as powerless to resolve the continent’s most pressing problems as his predecessor.
To allow member states to voluntarily evaluate their governance practices, the AU established the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) in 2002. However, its effect has been minimal. Africa clearly requires a comprehensive regulatory framework for annual and impromptu national assessments given the ongoing conflicts and inadequate governance that permeate the continent each year.
Consider the situation in Sudan.
The AU ignored the president’s regime’s unlawful, autocratic, and profoundly inhumane actions for three decades, which gradually opened the door to the coup on April 11, 2019. The coup’s removal on October 25, 2021, and the current civil war subsequently led to another military takeover.
Similar failures were a result of the AU’s inaction and its inability to impose good governance in Mozambique.
The ruling Frelimo party’s profound inability to establish an inclusive democracy, ensure economic stability, and deliver fundamental services has made the gas-rich province of Cabo Delgado fertile ground for insurrection. More than 1.3 million people have been forced to flee the province as a result of an armed rebellion that started in October 2017, which damaged the healthcare system and created a critical humanitarian crisis. Watching these tragedies unfold was what the AU and its various bodies did.
Indeed, in both scenarios, the AU had the opportunity to implement decisive and timely governance interventions to advance peace, stability, and socioeconomic well-being. It didn’t, or, more accurately, it couldn’t.
Unfortunately, Addis Ababa has historically been stripped of the requisite authority to analyse and respond to bad leadership. Among the many examples are Zimbabwe and Sudan. To name a few examples, the AU has been unable to address the plight of political prisoners in Eritrea, democratic understrate in Tunisia, and years of brutal oppression of opposition leaders in Uganda.
In the upcoming four years, it is crucial that the new chair of the AUC avoid adopting a passive stance given the persistent disdain for essential AU protocols that causes unrest across the continent. His office must have the unwavering authority to hold African leaders accountable for their inaction and excesses.
In his new role, Youssouf can leave a lasting legacy of peace and socioeconomic transformation, but first he must convince the AU to begin acting in the best interests of its one billion main beneficiaries, Africa’s 1.5 billion people.
