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Thousands of people in southern Tunisia joined a rally demanding the closure of a state-run phosphate plant blamed for cancers, respiratory illnesses, and a mass poisoning that hospitalised more than 120 people.

When asked whether United States President Donald Trump would invoke the Insurrection Act, Vice President JD Vance said this week that Trump is “looking at all his options”.

The decision would allow Trump to deploy the US military domestically for law enforcement purposes without congressional authorisation and over the objections of state governors.

Vance’s October 12 comment on NBC’s Meet the Press was just one of many in recent months about Trump’s ambitions to send the National Guard to Democratic cities such as Portland and Chicago.

But the legal terms being tossed around – Insurrection Act, plenary authority, martial law, Posse Comitatus Act – have traditionally not been commonly used in US politics. These terms defy simple definitions after decades of interpretation by the courts.

We explain what they are:

What is the Insurrection Act?

This 1807 law allows the US president to deploy federal military personnel domestically to suppress rebellion and enforce civilian law.

Invoking the Insurrection Act temporarily suspends another US law that forbids federal troops from conducting civilian law enforcement. A president can invoke the law after determining that “unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion” against the federal government make it “impracticable to enforce” US law “by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings”, the law says. In those cases, the Insurrection Act would allow the president to direct federal troops to enforce US laws or stop a rebellion.

The law is broadly written and does not define terms such as “insurrection” or “rebellion”. The US Supreme Court ruled in 1827 that the president has exclusive power to decide whether a situation represents an acceptable reason to invoke the law.

Chris Edelson, an American University assistant professor of government, previously said the law provides “limited authority” for the president to use the military to respond to “genuine emergencies – a breakdown in regular operational law when things are really falling apart”.

The Insurrection Act has been formally invoked about 30 times in the US since 1808, including when southern governors refused to integrate schools in the 1950s and 60s and during the 1992 Los Angeles riots, after four white police officers were acquitted in the roadside beating of Rodney King, a Black man.

What is martial law?

People sometimes conflate martial law with the Insurrection Act. Martial law typically refers to imposing military law on civilians, while the Insurrection Act uses the military to impose civilian law. Martial law is more stringent and has fewer protections than civilian law, experts said.

The Supreme Court wrote in a 1946 ruling that the term martial law “carries no precise meaning” and that it was not defined in the Constitution or in an act of Congress. Legal experts say, because of this, it is not clear whether the US president has a legal path to declaring martial law in the way that it is commonly understood.

Still, it has been declared in the past. The US imposed martial law in Hawaii after the 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and President Abraham Lincoln declared martial law in certain parts of the country during the Civil War.

The Supreme Court held in 1866 that martial law could be imposed only if civilian courts were not functioning.

The court “more or less found that martial law could only be declared in an active war zone”, said Chris Mirasola, University of Houston Law Center assistant professor. “The circumstances within which presidents have invoked martial law and that the Supreme Court has understood martial law are incredibly narrow. It would require an active hostility on US territory that prevents civilian legal proceedings from occurring.”

Trump, who has shown a willingness to challenge constitutional precedent, has continued to muse about using military powers against civilians. Trump told top US military commanders on September 30 that the military could be used against the “enemy within” and suggested that some cities could be used as military “training grounds”.

What is plenary authority?

“Plenary authority” is defined by the Legal Information Institute at Cornell Law School as “power that is wide-ranging, broadly construed, and often limitless for all practical purposes”.

The term made headlines when White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller started to say that Trump has “plenary authority” to deploy National Guard troops to US cities in an October 6 CNN interview. Miller abruptly stopped talking, and CNN said the disruption was due to a technical glitch. But social media users said Miller froze because he mentioned plenary authority.

When the show returned, Miller finished his answer, saying he was “making the point that under federal law, Title 10 of the US Code, the president has the authority anytime he believes federal resources are insufficient to federalise the National Guard to carry out a mission necessary for public safety”.

Although the president has broad powers under the Constitution, like issuing pardons for federal crimes, he does not have limitless power. The US government is divided into three branches – legislative, executive and judicial – in order to have checks and balances.

Title 10 of the US Code outlines the role of the country’s armed forces and constrains what the military is allowed to do and what orders the president can lawfully issue.

It does not include terms like “plenary authority” or “plenary power”. Instead, it says when the president “is unable with the regular forces to execute the laws” and the US faces a foreign invasion, a rebellion, or danger of rebellion, the president “may call into Federal service members and units of the National Guard of any state”.

A judge in Oregon has twice blocked the Trump administration from deploying National Guard troops to Portland; a federal appeals court also blocked the administration from deploying the guard to Chicago, saying troops can remain federalised for now but cannot be deployed.

Trump officials say the guard is needed to protect Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officers and federal facilities. Trump previously cited section 12406 of Title 10 when he called for National Guard troops to be sent to Los Angeles during immigration protests in June. A federal judge ruled in September that the deployment violated the law. The administration is appealing.

What is the Posse Comitatus Act?

The Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878, generally prevents the use of the military as a domestic police force on US soil, with exceptions for the Insurrection Act.

The phrase “posse comitatus” refers to a group of people called upon by a county sheriff to maintain peace and suppress lawlessness. Think of Western movie depictions of posses of townspeople gathering to catch fugitives. “The Posse Comitatus Act is so named because one of the things it prohibits is using soldiers rather than civilians as a posse comitatus,” the Brennan Center for Justice, a nonprofit policy institute, wrote in 2021.

As the Posse Comitatus Act has been interpreted by the courts, civilian law enforcement officials cannot make “direct active use” of military personnel, including using federal military forces, over their citizens to “regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory authority,” according to the Congressional Research Service.

The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the National Guard when it is under state authority and the command of a governor; the law’s restrictions apply when the National Guard is federalised by the president. This means the National Guard generally cannot conduct arrests, searches or seizures unless there is an exception, such as the Insurrection Act.

The only National Guard exception is the District of Columbia’s, which is solely under federal control.

What is the National Guard?

The National Guard is a state-based military force with certain federal responsibilities. It often responds to domestic emergencies, such as natural disasters and civil unrest, and can support US military operations overseas.

More than 430,000 National Guard members serve in units in all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and the US territories of Guam, Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.

The National Guard typically operates as a part-time reserve force that can be mobilised for active duty by governors. The guard also helps train foreign allies in more than 100 countries under the State Partnership Program.

A president, in some cases, can federalise and take control of a state’s National Guard over the objection of governors for domestic missions and to serve in wars overseas, but it rarely happens without governors’ consent. When the National Guard is federalised, its troops are subject to the same restrictions as federal troops.

The National Guard has been federally mobilised in the US several times, including in response to the 2020 protests over the murder of George Floyd; the 1992 Los Angeles riots; and civil unrest following the 1968 assassination of Martin Luther King Jr.

The recent downward spiral in Afghanistan-Pakistan relations would have been hard to imagine when Pakistani military and civilian leaders welcomed the Taliban’s return to power in Kabul in August 2021.

A Taliban government, Islamabad believed, would be friendly to Pakistan and would become a bulwark against any security threats to the country. After all, Pakistan’s military and intelligence services had for more than two decades supported the Afghan Taliban movement.

Between 2001 and 2021, this meant a contradictory foreign policy. On the one hand, by supporting the United States’ military intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan recognised the US-backed governments that ruled the country. At the same time, Pakistan covertly tolerated – and even enabled – the resurgence of the Taliban inside Pakistani territory, which also included cohabitation with other Pakistani fighter groups.

Yet, that relationship has now collapsed as the Pakistani air force struck targets in Kabul for the first time this week.

An apparent disconnect in their mutual expectations and disrespect for each other’s capabilities make it harder for them to resurrect what they once had.

What is at stake for both countries?

The Pakistani security establishment, comprised of the army and the country’s powerful military intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is responsible for devising and driving the nation’s Afghan policy.

Historically, the army has also exercised significant power over the civilian administrations, even when Pakistan was not under military rule.

Pakistan has faced a surge of unprecedented attacks against its security forces since 2021, coinciding with the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan. More than 2,400 deaths were recorded for the first three quarters of 2025, towering over last year’s total figure of about 2,500 people killed in attacks across Pakistan.

Pakistan has blamed a majority of attacks on the Pakistan Taliban, known by the acronym TTP, whose leaders are now based in Afghanistan. TTP members hail largely from the tribal areas of Pakistan, along the Afghan border.

Pakistan had hoped that TTP leaders would leave Afghanistan once the Pakistan-friendly Taliban government was established in Kabul. Some TTP fighters reportedly did return home, but this did not translate into a decline in violence. The TTP demands a localised implementation of Islamic law and the reinstatement of the former semi-autonomous status of tribal areas bordering Afghanistan.

For Pakistan, confronting a deadly and persistent uprising at home has become a national security crisis. The country is, meanwhile, also reeling from several other intersecting crises: A stunted economy, geopolitical tensions with archrival India – marked by the recent conflict in May – as well as growing domestic political discontent, and natural disasters.

Taliban leaders in Afghanistan insist that the TTP is a domestic challenge for Pakistan to address. In 2022, shortly after forming an interim administration, the Taliban government mediated talks between TTP leaders and the Pakistani army in Kabul. After initial indications of progress, underpinned by a temporary ceasefire, the talks collapsed.

For the Taliban government, which is heavily sanctioned and isolated from international financial institutions, the realities of ruling a vastly underdeveloped and economically poor country are stark. Over four years since taking power, Russia is the only country that has formally recognised the Taliban administration, though a growing number of countries – China, India and Iran among them – have acknowledged the group as Afghanistan’s rulers and are hosting their diplomatic representatives.

Afghans are suffering from the near-collapse of the economy, and public sector institutions, such as health and education services, are on the brink of a complete breakdown. Faced with severe food shortages and humanitarian challenges, Afghans suffer as United Nations-led aid agencies face funding cuts. A prolonged conflict with Pakistan is likely to further deepen these challenges.

Can both sides return to their past friendship?

Both sides appear, at the moment, to be digging their heels in. Though they have agreed to temporary ceasefires, neither side wants to look weak by admitting it needs to back down.

Official Pakistani government statements now refer to the Taliban government – whose return to power in Kabul was once celebrated – as a “regime”, calling for a more “inclusive” administration in Afghanistan. They warn of continuing attacks within Afghan territories if the Taliban fail to act against the TTP.

To be sure, Pakistan possesses a substantially more powerful military, technologically advanced weaponry, and considerable geopolitical leverage against the Taliban government. There is also a renewed sense of self-confidence as Pakistan considers it successfully fought the recent war with India in May 2025, including by downing multiple Indian jets.

Since the 1980s, it has hosted millions of Afghan refugees, a generation of whom were educated and have built livelihoods in Pakistani cities. This, according to Pakistani leaders and some public opinion, should mean that Afghans must bear goodwill towards Pakistan. Forcing out Afghan refugees will be a key leverage Pakistan would want to use against the Taliban government.

Fundamentally, Pakistani leaders view their country as a serious and powerful entity with strong global alliances – one that any Afghan government, especially one led by a group supported by Pakistan, should respect and cooperate with.

The Taliban, on the other hand, view themselves as victorious, battle-hardened fighters who waged a long and successful war against foreign occupation by a global superpower. Hence, a potential conflict imposed by a neighbour would be a lesser mission.

Taliban spokesmen are pushing back against Pakistani officials’ recent narrative, underlining the significance of the ongoing information war on both sides. They have alleged, for instance, that Pakistan’s tribal border areas shelter ISIL (ISIL) fighters with tacit backing from elements of the Pakistani army.

Nonetheless, as a landlocked country, Afghanistan is heavily dependent on trade routes via Pakistan, which remain shut due to ongoing tensions, resulting in major losses for traders on both sides. The Taliban government lacks air defence systems, radars or modern weaponry to counter any further incursions by Pakistani drones and jets.

The path to de-escalation

The Pakistani army continues to frame its fight against TTP as part of the wider confrontation with India. It has alleged, without evidence, that the armed group is backed by New Delhi. Pakistan also expects the Taliban to disown and distance themselves from the TTP and instead align themselves with Islamabad.

However, the TTP and Taliban share long-term camaraderie, ideological compatibility and social bonds that go beyond stringent organisational peculiarities. For the Taliban, a conflict with the TTP could also risk creating space for minacious actors such as the ISIL affiliate in Khorasan Province (ISKP) armed group.

And while Pakistan is stronger militarily, the Taliban have their own tools that could hurt Islamabad.

What if the Taliban’s Kandahar-based supreme leader, Haibatullah Akhunzada, were to issue a fatwa for war against Pakistan’s security establishment? The TTP leadership had already pledged allegiance to Akhunzada in 2021. But the Taliban’s top leader is also held in high religious regard by a large segment of Pakistani religious school students and religious leaders, and a call against Islamabad from Akhunzada could lead to serious internal security challenges for Pakistan.

Islamist political groups in Pakistan would also not support an all-out war with the Taliban. Meanwhile, any sustained Pakistani attacks against Afghanistan will likely bolster domestic support for the incumbent Taliban administration, even when there is palpable resentment among Afghans against the Taliban.

To prevent further escalation and seek meaningful political dialogue, there is an urgent need for a trusted mediation actor capable of sustainable engagement. This role is best suited for Middle Eastern and Muslim nations trusted by both sides, such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

There is evidence that this is a fruitful pathway. Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi confirmed in a news conference in New Delhi last week that the Taliban ceased retaliatory attacks against Pakistan after Qatar and Saudi Arabia mediated.

But first, there needs to be a real desire for peace from the leaders in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Even as Afghan and Pakistani officials hurl warnings at each other, and their forces engage in repeated bouts of cross-border fire, both countries are acutely aware that war will cost them heavily.

However, this does not mean that relations will return to the erstwhile bilateral warmth anytime soon or that miscalculations cannot happen.

Geography and history bind Afghans and Pakistanis into interdependence, which needs to be capitalised upon.

Governments need to stop hoping in vain for the success of failed approaches that have been tried for decades. Afghan leaders must work at developing amicability with Pakistan. Pakistani leaders need to reciprocate by conceiving a wholesome foreign policy towards Afghanistan, which is not coloured by rivalry with India.

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