In recent months, a new baseline idea has taken hold in European and United States debates on Ukraine: “Article 5‑like” guarantees. In March, Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni was the first to suggest a mechanism inspired by Article 5 of the NATO Charter, which provides for collective action in the event of an attack on a member. US President Donald Trump’s team then promoted a US “Article 5‑type” guarantee outside NATO in August. In September, French President Emmanuel Macron capped this shift by gathering 26 European partners in Paris to pledge a post-war “reassurance force”.
These proposals may sound reassuring, but they should not. In a world where we face nightly drone raids, blurred lines at sea, and constant pressure on critical infrastructure, replicating NATO’s words without NATO’s machinery would leave Ukraine exposed and Europe no safer.
Russia’s activity inside NATO territory has moved from rare to routine. On September 10, two dozen Russian-made drones crossed into Polish airspace during a wider strike on Ukraine, NATO jets shot down those that posed a threat, and Poland activated Article 4 of the NATO Charter, which allows for consultations in the event of a threat.
In the following weeks, Denmark temporarily shut , down several airports after repeated drone sightings. Days later, French sailors boarded a tanker suspected of being part of a Russia-linked “shadow fleet” and of taking part in the drone disruptions.
Germany also reported coordinated drone flights over a refinery, a shipyard, a university hospital, and the Kiel Canal. Meanwhile, across the Baltic Sea, months of damage to undersea cables and energy links have deepened concern.
Each of these episodes is serious. Yet, none of them clearly crossed the legal threshold that would have triggered collective defence under Article 5.
That is the core problem with “NATO‑style” guarantees. Article 5 is powerful because it establishes that an attack on one is an attack on all, but it still needs a political process that begins with consultations and leaves each ally free to decide how to respond. It was written for visible aggression: Columns of troops on a border, ships firing across a line, fighter jets attacking territory.
Today’s reality is different. Drones launched from outside Ukrainian territory, one-night incursions over allied infrastructure, or cable cuts by vessels are meant to sit just under formal thresholds. A copy of Article 5 outside NATO’s integrated command, without , a , standing allied presence or pre-agreed rules for Ukraine, would be even slower and weaker than the original.
When mulling a security mechanism for Kyiv, allies need to recognise that it is no longer a security consumer, it is a security contributor. After Poland’s incident, allies began asking for Ukrainian counter-drone know-how. Ukrainian specialists have deployed to Denmark to share tactics for fusing sensors, jamming, and using low‑cost interceptors.
NATO leaders now say openly that Europe must learn how to defeat cheap drones without firing missiles that cost hundreds of thousands of euros. This is a notable shift: Ukraine is not just receiving protection, it is helping to build it.
Ukraine’s allies also need to remember what happened in 1994. Under the Budapest Memorandum, Kyiv gave up the world’s third‑largest nuclear arsenal in exchange for political “security assurances” from several countries, including Russia and the US. Those assurances were not legally binding.
In 2014, Russia seized Crimea and fuelled war in Donbas while denying its troops were there, using soldiers without insignia to keep the situation ambiguous. Even if Ukraine had been in NATO then, that ambiguity would have raised doubts about whether Article 5 applied. In 2022, Russia invaded openly.
Clearly, non-enforceable promises and debates over thresholds do not stop a determined aggressor. This is why we need guarantees that trigger action automatically, not statements that can be argued over in the moment.
What would work is a package that is tougher than Article 5 on the issues that matter against a sub‑threshold attacker: Time, automaticity, presence, intelligence, and production.
First, there needs to be automatic triggers. A legally ratified “if‑then” mechanism should activate within hours when clear markers are met: State‑origin drones or missiles entering Ukrainian airspace from outside, mass drone incursions into border regions, destructive cyberattacks or sabotage against defined critical infrastructure. The initial package would include both military steps and heavy sanctions. Consultations would adjust the response, not decide whether there will be one.
Second, there needs to be a joint aerial and maritime shield that treats Ukrainian skies and nearby seas as one operating picture. Allies need to keep persistent airborne radar and maritime patrol coverage, fuse sensors from low to high altitude, delegate rules for downing drones along agreed corridors, combine electronic warfare, directed‑energy and radio‑frequency tools, and low‑cost interceptors with classic surface‑to‑air missiles. The test is economic: Europe must make Russian drone raids expensive for Moscow, not for itself.
Third, there must be visible presence and ready logistics.  , Before a ceasefire is concluded, allies need to build forward logistics: ammunition, spare parts, and maintenance hubs in Poland and Romania with a standing air bridge into Ukraine. Following an agreed ceasefire, they can rotate multinational detachments,  , air defence crews, maritime patrol teams, and engineers , through Ukrainian ports and airfields. The aim would be not to establish permanent bases, but to ensure any renewed attack instantly draws in several capitals.
Fourth, there needs to be an intelligence compact. Allies need to move from ad hoc sharing to an institutional arrangement with Ukraine that integrates satellite, signals, open‑source, and battlefield sensors into common, near‑real‑time products. Fast attribution is central: The right to defend yourself relies on what you can prove, and deterrence relies on an adversary knowing you can prove it quickly.
Fifth, there needs to be a production deal. Multi‑year funding should anchor co‑production in Ukraine of drones, air‑defence components, and artillery rounds, alongside European and US plants making the high‑end systems Ukraine and Europe still lack. Allies should commit to buy Ukrainian systems at scale and tie guarantees to contracted output, not to communiques. Empty magazines make empty promises.
These measures would not copy the letter of Article 5. They would meet a different threat with tools that can counter it. Europe’s recent experience, in Poland’s skies, at German shipyards, at Danish airports, and in the Baltic Sea shows how an adversary can apply steady pressure without triggering classic definitions of “armed attack”.
If Ukraine receives only “NATO‑style” language, it will inherit those same gaps outside the alliance. If instead Ukraine and its partners lock in automatic responses, a shared air picture, visible presence, real‑time intelligence, and an industrial base that keeps pace, they will build something stronger: A guarantee that works in the world as it is, not the world at it was.
