Islamabad, Pakistan – As Pakistan sought to defend itself against Indian missiles and drones launched at its military bases and cities in early May, it relied on an unlikely combination of assets: Chinese missiles and air defence; Chinese and United States fighter jets; and US diplomacy.
The missiles, air defence and jets helped Pakistan thwart any devastating hits on its airbases and claim it had brought down multiple Indian fighter planes – an assertion that India has neither confirmed nor denied.
The diplomacy sealed a ceasefire that Pakistan has publicly welcomed and thanked the Donald Trump administration for.
Yet, as the US has in recent years increasingly picked India over Pakistan as its principal South Asian partner, Pakistan this week worked to reassure China that Beijing remained its most coveted ally.
Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister Ishaq Dar, who also serves as foreign minister, visited Beijing earlier this week, meeting his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi on May 20 in the first high-profile overseas visit by a Pakistani leader since the ceasefire.
According to a statement from the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the two sides discussed the fallout of the brief but intense conflict with India, the ceasefire, and Islamabad’s criticism of New Delhi’s actions.
During the meeting with Wang, Dar highlighted India’s “unilateral and illegal decision” to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), a six-decade water-sharing agreement. India halted the accord following the April 22 Pahalgam attack in Indian-administered Kashmir, which left 26 people dead. Delhi blamed the attack on Pakistan-based armed groups, an allegation Islamabad denies.
Wang, meanwhile, welcomed the ceasefire, describing it as serving the “fundamental and long-term interests of both sides [India and Pakistan]” while promoting regional peace.
Getting Wang on board was critical for Pakistan, say analysts.
‘Power struggle in South Asia’
With South Asia sitting on a tinderbox during the recent Pakistan-India standoff, a larger geopolitical contest loomed in the background.
Pakistan, once a key US ally, has shifted decisively into China’s orbit, relying on its northwestern neighbour heavily for economic and military support.
Meanwhile, India, long known for its non-alignment policy, has leaned closer to the US in recent years as part of a strategy to counter China’s rising influence.
Shahid Ali, an assistant professor of international relations at Lahore College for Women University, who specialises in Pakistan-China relations, said the timing and optics of Dar’s visit were significant.
“While Pakistan hoped to get China’s full diplomatic support for its conflict with India, especially regarding the suspension of the IWT, the visit also provided Dar a good opportunity to apprise China about US-led ceasefire dynamics, also reassuring them of Pakistan’s longstanding all-weather strategic partnership,” Ali told Al Jazeera.
Erum Ashraf, a UK-based scholar focused on Pakistan-China ties and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) – a $62bn mega project launched a decade ago – echoed this view.
She said the meeting allowed China to better understand what promises Pakistan may have made to the US and President Trump, who helped mediate the ceasefire.
“The Chinese must be concerned how Pakistan managed to gain President Trump’s support to talk of ceasefire and to even offer to resolve the matter of Kashmir between both countries. The Chinese worry how US influence in their back yard could impact their interest in the region,” she told Al Jazeera.
CPEC remains a cornerstone
Pakistan’s former ambassador to China, Masood Khalid, called Beijing a “logical” first stop for Islamabad’s efforts to use diplomacy to push its narrative about the crisis with India in the aftermath of the ceasefire.
He noted that beyond the recent India-Pakistan military confrontation, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor remained a key pillar of bilateral cooperation.
“The foreign minister may apprise the Chinese side of the security steps which Pakistan has taken for Chinese nationals’ protection,” Khalid told Al Jazeera.
Indeed, according to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wang prodded both countries to work together to create an “upgraded version of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor.”
CPEC, launched in 2015 under then-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, the elder brother of current Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif, has been hailed as a “game-changer” for Pakistan.
It is a key component of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a huge network of roads, bridges and ports spread across nearly 100 countries that Beijing hopes will recreate the ancient Silk Road trade routes linking Europe and Asia.
However, CPEC has faced repeated delays, especially in Balochistan, where its crown jewel, the Gwadar Port, is located.
Separatist groups in Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest but poorest province, have long waged an armed rebellion against the state and have repeatedly hit Chinese personnel and installations, accusing them of benefitting from the province’s vast natural resources.
According to Pakistani government figures, nearly 20,000 Chinese nationals live in the country. At least 20 have been killed since 2021 in various attacks in different parts of Pakistan.
While Pakistan’s Foreign Ministry did not mention it explicitly, the Chinese statement quoted Dar as saying his country would make every effort to “ensure the safety of Chinese personnel, projects and institutions in Pakistan”.
Muhammad Faisal, a South Asia security researcher at the University of Technology Sydney, said the safety of Chinese nationals remains Beijing’s “topmost concern”.
“Even as the crisis with India heightened, the presence of a large number of Chinese nationals in Pakistan, in some ways, compelled Beijing to seek swift crisis de-escalation,” he told Al Jazeera.
‘China’s high-wire act’
Between April 22, when the Pahalgam attack occurred, and May 7, when India struck targets inside Pakistani territory, a global diplomatic effort was quietly under way to de-escalate tensions between the two nuclear-armed nations.
During this period, the US initially showed little interest in direct involvement while China, initially, also was slow to get involved.
China, which has a historically tense relationship with Delhi that suffered further after their troops clashed in the Galwan Valley of Ladakh in 2020, eventually urged restraint from both sides.
However, many observers felt China’s position was seen as lacking neutrality due to its closeness with Pakistan.
Faisal said China is likely to maintain its current “high-wire act”, acknowledging Pakistan’s security concerns while continuing to call for calm on both sides.
He added that while the US was the lead mediator for the ceasefire, Beijing double-tapped Washington by calling both Islamabad and New Delhi to dial down tensions.
“A lesson Beijing learned is that its current restrained public posturing opened up diplomatic space to engage with interlocutors in both Islamabad and New Delhi, despite the fact that the latter views its role with scepticism,” he said.
Ashraf, the UK-based academic, said India did not view China as a “neutral umpire” in its disputes with Pakistan – even though New Delhi and Beijing have in recent months tried to reset their ties, pulling troops back from contested border points and ramping up diplomatic efforts to calm tensions.
“India and China have only recently achieved a breakthrough in their strained border relations, which perhaps helps to explain China’s initial ‘hands off’ behaviour with Pakistan after Pahalgam,” she said.
But ultimately, she said, China needs to “balance a tightrope”: It doesn’t want to “upset relations with India”, but it also needs to help Pakistan enough that it doesn’t “collapse in the face of India’s attacks”.
