Donald Trump, the president of the United States, quickly declared victory after directly attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities. After the “bombing campaign wiped out Iran’s ability to produce nuclear weapons,” his administration claimed that “the world is far safer.”
However, much thought has been given to the extent to which Iran’s nuclear program was actually rerouted in the wake of the strikes. Craters reveal little about what lived deep beneath layers of concrete, according to Rafael Grossi, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Because the site was too deep underground, the Trump administration acknowledged that at least one site had been spared bunker bombings. Iran’s centrifuges and its stockpile of uranium with a 60% enriched content are still undetermined.
The Iranian nuclear program’s damage is still unknown, but the non-proliferation regime that kept it open for years has been in disarray.
This obscene military move may have the opposite effect of reducing nuclear proliferation, increasing the nuclear threat it sought to contain, making the Middle East and the rest of the world a much safer place.
A thoroughly investigated nuclear program
Iran’s nuclear program had remained largely peaceful prior to this month’s attack.
It was supported by the US Atoms for Peace initiative in the 1950s. It expanded to include a number of nuclear facilities over the course of the following decades.
The Tehran Research Reactor, an installation built with US assistance in 1967 and used for the country’s main isotope production, the Natanz nuclear facility, the country’s main enrichment site, the Fordow underground plant near Qom, and the Bushehr nuclear plant, the only one still operating in Iran, are just a few examples.
Iran is working on the Darkhovin and Sirik power plant projects, but those are still in their early stages.
The IAEA has meticulously monitored the Iranian nuclear program for decades. In 1968, the nation ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), legally committing itself to abandoning nuclear activity and putting all nuclear materials under IAEA’s protections.
In 1974, Iran ratified a comprehensive safeguards agreement, which established 18 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside of those facilities (LOFs). These included radioisotope-using research reactors, conversion and fuel-making facilities, laboratories, and hospital facilities.
The IAEA occasionally used more intrusive verification techniques and pressured Iran to sign the Additional Protocol, an agreement for expanded inspections, especially after previously secret sites were exposed in 2002. From 2003 to 2006, the nation voluntarily did this.
Iran and the United States, the United Kingdom, China, Russia, France, and Germany all signed the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015. In exchange for sanctions relief, it agreed to reduce its stockpile of uranium by 97 percent and abide by strict uranium enrichment caps.
Iran’s program was given even greater access than it had before, and IAEA was able to install cameras and remote sensors at nuclear sites, enabling real-time monitoring. Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, three of the three recent nuclear facilities that the US recently attacked, were covered by this expanded access, which included all the main sites of Iran’s nuclear program. While it remained in force, the JCPOA proved to be extremely effective.
Putting a stop to nuclear diplomacy
Trump vowed to leave the JCPOA in 2018, saying that Iran would receive “too much in exchange for too little” under its terms during his first term as president. The US reimposed sanctions and launched a “maximum pressure” campaign to stifle Iran’s economy in response to repeated pleas from European allies to keep the agreement.
Trump’s withdrawal had immediate effects. Iran began reducing its compliance with the agreement as a result of the deal’s benefits being lost. Tehran announced in 2020 that it would no longer be subject to any operational restrictions in the nuclear deal after Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was killed by a Trump-ordered air strike.
Unsurprisingly, Trump’s actions significantly exacerbated any fresh negotiating efforts with Iran. Under the second Trump administration, US officials attempted to rekindle diplomatic relations with Iran, holding several indirect exchanges.
Iranian leaders demanded assurances that a new agreement would not be hampered by unilateral sanctions or changes, and Washington responded with little flexibility by making even more stringent demands.
What was proposed was a less favorable deal than the JCPOA, and it was from a nation whose promises had been unreliable, from Iran’s point of view.
The US-Israeli attacks nearly ended negotiations efforts. Iran ordered its negotiators home within hours of the attacks and resumed a new round of negotiations with the US in Oman.
Iran’s parliament began drafting legislation to end the NPT in the days following the bombing. A withdrawal could undermine the foundational agreement between the world’s arms control if Iran accepts it.
The NPT has restricted the use of nuclear weapons to a select few states for 50 years. Iran’s withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, which it did four years later, would be the most significant violation of the NPT.
Iran would no longer be subject to any restrictions or inspections, leaving the rest of the world unaware of its activities. Other regional powers would likely follow suit if Iran’s opaque nuclear program ended decades of restraint.
It’s not easy to leave the NPT. It demands the transfer or ongoing safeguarding of all imported nuclear technology, as well as three months’ notice, a public justification, and continued liability for past violations. If a potential quitter still believes there is any value in remaining at the table, the treaty depositories and the UN Security Council could use these tactics to pressure them back.
Iran’s parliament passed legislation to end all cooperation with the IAEA, despite the fact that it has not yet declared that it is leaving the NPT. This indicates blatantly that Iran’s commitment to multilateral diplomacy is unlikely to last.
The only option left is diplomacy, which is still in use today.
The US effectively told every non-nuclear state that cooperation buys little safety by bombing facilities under active IAEA safeguards.
A country that allowed inspectors to inspect its sites and continued to do so under a negotiated agreement faced military force as a result of the strikes. If states decide that implementing the NPT and permitting inspections won’t adequately defend them from attack or coercion, they may choose to develop a nuclear deterrent as their only reliable security guarantee. After North Korea made it clear that it had a nuclear weapon, the US is not considering attacking its nuclear facilities.
Whatever temporary setback this poorly thought-out display of force was intended to achieve now runs the risk of a strategic collapse of the non-proliferation regime and regional stability.
The Middle East and the rest of the world are still in the US’s reach to stop a nuclear arms race. It must redouble its diplomatic efforts in order to do that and confront the growing distrust it has caused head-on.
Negotiating a deal must be made, but American diplomacy must revert to realism in order to do so. The maximalist demand for “zero enrichment” should be abandoned in Washington. According to experts in arms control, insisting that Iran has no enrichment capability is unrealistic and unnecessary. Iran’s bombing-pathway can be effectively blocked by a tightly controlled enrichment program combined with rigorous monitoring, according to the JCPOA. In exchange for security guarantees and sanctions relief, the US needs to formally declare its willingness to accept a similar arrangement.
Tehran, for its part, has indicated that it will return its stockpile of highly enriched uranium and cap enrichment levels if given a fair offer, despite its opposition to completely renuating to its original enrichment rights.
In the end, diplomatic communication and ongoing international cooperation are still the best means of reducing risks of nuclear proliferation, as opposed to risky unilateral actions. A serious strategic error was made during the strikes. A similarly dramatic recommitment to the hard work of diplomacy will be required to repair the damage.
