What does the report into Israeli military failures on October 7 say?

The army’s “complete failure” was acknowledged by an Israeli military inquiry into the string of errors that occurred before and during the Hamas-led attack on October 7, 2023.

Groups of Hamas-led fighters stormed Gaza and attacked Israeli communities and a border music festival in what investigators claim was a highly coordinated attack that required years of planning.

During the attack, 139 people were killed, and 250 were taken prisoner.

The report details the army’s inability to coordinate a response, as well as a history of falsehoods about the risk posed by Hamas and a refusal to accept warning signs of an attack.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition have repeatedly thwarted inquiries into the political failings, despite the report’s numerous details of the Israeli army’s failures on October 7, 2023.

How was Hamas under-estimated by Israel’s army?

According to the report, senior officers have underestimated Hamas’ capabilities and intentions, a “fundamental misunderstanding” that the army has had for decades.

According to investigators, military planners assumed Hamas posed no significant threat to Israel and that it was uninterested in waging a major war.

Additionally, according to the planners, Hamas’s tunnel networks had significantly declined, with Israel’s high-tech separation barrier effectively preventing any cross-border threats.

Israeli authorities insisted that Hamas fighters were merely concerned with maintaining peace in Gaza and that they would launch rocket attacks against Israel rather than launch a massive ground invasion.

Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas, was also misled, assuming he was “not interested in a wider war.”

On February 20, 2025, four Israeli prisoners who were held by Hamas fighters are being held in Khan Younis, southern Gaza.

What warnings did Israel ignore prior to the attack?

According to the report, the Israeli military either ignored or misinterpreted several warning signs that an attack was on the horizon in the hours leading up to the attack.

Numerous female spotters raised unusual activity along the border before the attack and alerted their commanders the evening before the attack. Additionally, officers reported the widespread activation of Israeli SIM cards believed to be held by Hamas fighters as well as suspicious movements during the deployment of rockets by Hamas.

Instead, the commanders cited what they termed “reassuring signs” as proof that Hamas was merely conducting a military exercise.

How was the Israeli intelligence’s interpretation of events flawed?

The report claims that Hamas was already considering the incursion in October of 2023 in 2016.

However, Israel’s intelligence community criticized these reports as “unrealistic,” claiming that Hamas was dissuaded by Israel’s decision to stage an uprising in Gaza in May 2021, when 232 people were killed there.

Since then, Hamas has come to the attention of the Israeli army as having made the decision to launch its assault in April 2022. It was 85% ready by that September, and it had chosen October 7 as the date in May 2023.

What operational failures did Israel experience on that day?

Many.

According to investigators, the army was unprepared for the attack, and troops were deployed significantly behind schedule, allowing Palestinian fighters to advance without any apparent resistance.

One survivor later told the Israeli chief of staff that the last Palestinian fighter had left well before the first Israeli soldier had entered in one kibbutz, Nir Oz, which the army is accused of leaving.

Planners wildly underestimate the size of the attack, according to research on fighter numbers, which were also off the mark.

Later, it was discovered that 5,600 fighters, supported by a barrage of about 4, 000 rockets and 57 drones, had crossed the border in three waves.

In consequence, Israel’s Gaza Division, which had a little over 700 soldiers in it, was overrun and remained “defeated” for hours while coordinating their response.

The Gaza Division’s operations started at around 12:00 PM [10:00 GMT] when reinforcements started to arrive.

The Israeli air force struggled to distinguish between Hamas fighters and Israeli civilians, according to the report. The military acknowledged that some Israelis had been killed by friendly fire, despite the report’s insistence on specifics.

Instead of defending the lives of the under attack civilians and soldiers, investigators discovered that numerous aircraft were flying toward senior Hamas commanders’ homes in Gaza at the same time as the attack.

balls of fire and smoke rising above Gaza City during an Israeli strik — During an Israeli attack on October 27, 2023, according to Yousef Hassouna/AFP, balls of fire and smoke erupted above Gaza City.

The Hannibal Directive was it ordered by commanders?

Yes, many civilians died as a result, according to several Israeli newspapers.

The Israeli daily Haaretz reported that during the attack, the Israeli military was ordered to use the “Hannibal Directive,” which mandates that it use every force to stop Israeli combatants from being taken captive and even kill anyone who lives there.

In response, Israeli forces received orders on October 7 to stop Hamas from taking captives and returning to Gaza “at all costs,” which included killing civilian non-combatants.

Some pilots flying over the battlefield reportedly refused to follow the directive and occasionally hesitated to fire entirely out of concern for hitting civilians.

However, subsequent investigations have revealed that the Hannibal Directive caused the deaths of numerous civilians.

One of the victims, Efrat Katz, was shot as Hamas fighters transported her to Gaza.

An Israeli tank fired two shells into a house in Kibbutz Be’eri, which is said to have housed more than a dozen captives, including twins, 12-year-old. Two of the captives lived.