Tactics, transfers and turmoil – inside the fall of Amorim

Ruben Amorim may have a recurring image during his 14-month spell at Manchester United, which shows him cowering in the dugout at Grimsby.

It came during an August trip to the seaside for a Carabao Cup match that went horribly wrong for United – an embarrassing 12-11 defeat on penalties the first time in the club’s history they had been beaten by a team in the fourth tier.

Amorim’s comments after the game sounded like he was about to admit the job was too much for him, but he later admitted that emotions had gotten in the way of him and that he had become a victim of foolish behavior in public.

He wasn’t going to stop, though. Once Amorim is on a set course, he will never change, as with many other personalities. It is something that would contribute to his downfall.

One insider said in private that Amorim was only good at what he was really good at when he spoke to the media. A damning assessment, but harsh too.

Amorim’s last game was a 1-1 draw with Leeds, which places them among the top six teams in the Premier League while being sandwiched by sensational comments made to journalists.

His first interaction with the media on Friday included a thinly disguised admission there were splits behind the scenes. He launched his final broadside in his final response, which included the words “would not quit” after the game.

That, effectively, meant United had to either back Amorim or sack him.

They were always likely to choose the second option because his tactics were still in play and the hierarchy was already distinctly unimpressed by his brutal dismissal of academy players and his criticism of senior squad members.

Amorim’s appointment was viewed as a progressive move – the club bringing in someone who would work in a modern structure and develop as he went along.

However, he had used a particular style of play and 3-4-3 formation at Sporting with the 40-year-old.

The more Amorim was asked about it, the more he doubled down on his belief that to change would undermine him in the eyes of his players, and make them think he was not committed to his own messaging.

He admitted in October that he had to tell his players to ignore external voices repeatedly claiming the system had to be eliminated despite being certain of his methods and once suggesting even the Pope couldn’t persuade him to change.

“Is the media going to dictate what I’m going to do”? he told the media. “It cannot be. That cannot be maintained.

” But my players, I guarantee you, they are listening to you and they are putting that inside because we are not winning games.

Because I play more games than you guys combined, they have to believe in me.

This was all brought into sharp focus on 30 December when – four days after eventually reverting to a back four for the first time in the 1-0 win over Newcastle – he immediately went back to a three-man defence against Wolves.

It required a shift to left-wingback from Patrick Dorgu’s right-handed attacking position, which he had already been so effective on December 26.

By that point, United had already tried to persuade long-term target Antoine Semenyo to join them from Bournemouth by telling him he would play on the left wing.

Given that the club had already invested more than £200 million in attacking players, that was a clear indication that it saw the future as something different from 3-4-3.

It is no surprise, therefore, the formation against Wolves and subsequent result – a 1-1 draw against a side that had collected just two points all season and led to the team being booed off – was viewed extremely negatively internally at the club.

Afterward, technical director Jason Wilcox spoke privately to Amorim, promoting greater tactical flexibility.

United continued with their back three at Leeds.

Amorim’s relationship with his bosses suffered a significant backward step, and his continued criticism only made things worse.

Amorim wanted to be left alone to do his job, free from the unwanted influence of Wilcox.

United believed that what Amorim saw as interference was normal feedback, which had been repeatedly resisted.

The situation had become untenable. United are sixth overall, in line with pre-season expectations, but many people think their squad could produce much better results with a few minor tactical adjustments.

During United’s summer tour of the United States, players expressed genuine enthusiasm for the season that lay ahead, both publicly and privately.

Amorim had a few quirks, but most coaches do.

It was strange to see Amorim watch the sprints and rondos on a different pitch, sometimes 50 yards away and far from his coaching staff, when United first opened their doors for the first 15 minutes of training the day before the European games.

He was far more involved – whistle in hand – when the sessions began, though he wasn’t keen to let the media into those.

Given the amount of downtime permitted, United’s post-season trip to Malaysia was a fully open session, but the entire expedition was not conducted on fully professional lines.

Once United arrived at their training base in Chicago in July, access was limited. Amorim’s openness to the media did not match his training and candor.

He was meticulous in his preparation, though.

After laying off a pass, he was shown on video explaining to midfielder Kobbie Mainoo exactly how many strides he needed to take and how to widen his body to create the best passing angles.

In the summer, he had two players taking up the same positions in training, then ran through different scenarios to ensure they moved into the right area of the pitch.

Given that people were given positions and a hierarchy was set up, it makes sense, even if it may seem odd and have appeared to be so had anyone witnessed it.

The theory and practice is good. However, actual matches have their events.

We tend not to find out about discussions that have taken place around the appointment of a manager until long after the event.

However, this time is known.

We know because five months after United hired Dan Ashworth as a “best in class” sporting director in July 2024, he left after his suggestions for potential replacements for Erik ten Hag were deemed to not be imaginative enough.

Instead, Berrada conned Amorim from Sporting, telling the Portuguese that it was “now or never” when he inquired about a possible delay in his appointment from November until the end of the season.

At the time, in addition to Berrada, United had Wilcox as technical director, Christopher Vivell as an interim director of recruitment and Ratcliffe’s right-hand man Sir Dave Brailsford as a football club director.

The first three members of United’s hiring team continue to play a significant role, while Vivell has been made permanent and Wilcox has more responsibilities. Brailsford has backed away, though, and is concentrating on his wider role as Ineos ‘ head of sport.

The spotlight is on them just as much as Amorim as they are on them, surviving another failed managerial appointment.

They knew he was wedded to a certain formation, which he was not willing to change no matter how much external criticism he received.

Under Amorim, United have plumbed depths that should not be possible the way football’s finances are arranged these days.

The fourth-richest club in the world, ranked by Deloitte’s 2025 rankings, has struggled to compete with well-run smaller rivals like Brentford, Bournemouth, and Brighton, finishing last season behind West Ham and tied with Wolves in points.

Amorim went into the summer promising this season would be better. It has been, in some ways, accurate to compare a United manager to a 15th-place finish.

The spotlight, though, cannot just be on the coach.

United was aware of their situation. Does Ratcliffe’s “best in class” apply to Berrada? Or Wilcox, who was only allowed to work at Southampton for 15 months before accepting the position with United?

In going for Amorim and delivering their ‘ now or never ‘ ultimatum, United’s hierarchy must have known the squad being inherited did not fit the coach’s style. They supported him for more than $ 200 million over the summer, as well as ratified his decision to leave Marcus Rashford, Jadon Sancho, Antony, and Alejandro Garnacho.

Maybe there was unease at Amorim’s method of dismissing Garnacho, which effectively reduced his value in a market the player himself cut to one by sticking to his desire to join Chelsea.

Where they drew a line was Emiliano Martinez.

The World Cup-winning goalkeeper for Aston Villa was sought after by Amorim. United’s powerbrokers refused to sanction that, preferring to invest in the youth of Senne Lammens – on a much lower salary. According to data analysis, Lammens has the potential to one of Europe’s best goalkeepers at some point, and United officials say they are happy with their choice.

Instead, United prioritised their hefty investment towards the forward positions with a view to greater return on investment.

However, some people still question the wisdom of selling McTominay and then spending much more on Manuel Ugarte, a player who didn’t contribute to Casemiro’s Europa League debut.

Recruitment is a collective failing – and predates Amorim by a long way. United are no longer the same as they were after the unsuccessful pursuit of Semenyo.

Amorim is yesterday’s man now, just as David Moyes, Louis van Gaal, Jose Mourinho, Ole Gunnar Solskjaer, Ralf Rangnick and Ten Hag were before him.