Analysis: Russia, Iran strengthen alliance after Syria setback

A long-awaited cooperation agreement between Iran and Russia has been finalized, strengthening ties between the two nations as they both deal with mounting geopolitical pressure.

The 20-year agreement, signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian on Friday, strengthens military and defense cooperation and includes a provision that neither nation would allow its territory to be used for any offense that would threaten another country’s safety or aid any attack on either nation.

Such a deal has been discussed for years, but recent events have made it necessary.

For Russia, the war in Ukraine has strained its geopolitical standing, while Iran, in addition to Moscow, has been grappling with Western sanctions and the fallout from Israel’s attacks on and weakening of several of its allies in the region, as well as the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in early December.

In the wake of both countries losing a key ally to al-Assad, Syria arguably has given the world a major boost to the strengthening of ties, thereby sapping their position in the Middle East.

After being caught off guard by the opposition advance, both Moscow and Tehran eventually agreed to let go of al-Assad. However, they now appear to be working on enhancing their bilateral relationship.

Pezeshkian’s official visit to Moscow led to the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement.

The North-South Transport Corridor, a project Moscow has championed to facilitate trade between Asia and Russia, is a key component of the agreement, which builds on Russian-Iranian cooperation in Ukraine and efforts to evade Western sanctions.

This route, designed to bypass geopolitical choke points like the Suez Canal and the Baltics, favours a land corridor through Iran, Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea.

Syria as a catalyst

Moscow and Tehran had their own distinct strategic partnerships with Damascus prior to the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011.

Russia’s partnership was anchored to the naval base in Tartous, established in 1971 to project power across the Mediterranean, and the Khmeimim airbase, built in 2015 initially to provide air support to al-Assad against the Syrian opposition. Over time, the airbase has played a pivotal role in Moscow’s operations in Africa.

Iran, meanwhile, deepened its relations during the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, driven by an understanding that both Tehran and Damascus opposed Western interference in the region. Syria became an important conduit to the Lebanese Shia group Hezbollah, part of Iran’s “Shia crescent” and “axis of resistance”.

As the war wore on, both Russia and Iran’s strategic interests came into play in Syria, particularly in 2015, when both actively fought to prevent the opposition from winning.

Russia’s military intervention in 2015 stabilised al-Assad’s regime, aided by Iranian-aligned militias that played a decisive role in turning the tide of the conflict.

“Relations between Russia and Iran have since expanded”, Kirill Semenov, a non-resident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council, told Al Jazeera. “After 2020, events in Syria had only a minor impact on Russian-Iranian relations, which have developed in many new directions”.

Tehran and Moscow are attempting to avoid Western sanctions through alternative banking arrangements and energy deals, as well as military cooperation and a growing economy. Iran serves as a crucial transit point for Russia’s North-South Transport Corridor, providing an important trade route to Asia.

Since the Russia-Ukraine conflict, when Russia is using Iranian-provided drones in response to its shared goals to combat the perceived global hegemony of the United States, ties have grown even more. Iran sees Russia as a partner in its expansion of the East, while the two nations are looking for alternatives to the US-led global order.

Russia was already a member of, so it is possible that Iran will join the BRICS group of emerging economies in 2023 as part of this effort. As Iran looks to become a multipolar economic bloc and join it, the BRICS offer a platform for cooperation.

Russian-Iranian cooperation is anchored in the United States’ and the collective West’s expansionist plans, according to Semenov.

Iran and Russia have grown closer as a result of this common enemy strategy, according to visiting fellow at the German Institute for International Security Affairs Hamidreza Azizi.

According to Azizi, “The two parties have taken steps to improve their relationship toward some sort of strategic partnership, particularly in areas like military and security cooperation and, more recently, economic cooperation,” aimed at avoiding sanctions and adapting to the negative effects of economic pressures from the West.

Limits to a Russian-Iranian partnership

Contrary to the agreement Russia signed with North Korea last year, which does not include a mutual defense clause or form the basis for a formal alliance.

That perhaps indicates a suspension of the Iran-Russian relationship that has already been demonstrated in Syria.

Tehran and Moscow frequently found it difficult to find a common ground or to be unwilling to face the difficult task of rebuilding the nation.

For example, in 2017, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Rogozin made it clear his country would be the only one to rebuild Syria’s energy industry. One Iranian parliamentarian warned that Iran was being “sacrificed,” keeping Iran at bay by al-Assad and Moscow, who were eager to reap the rewards of Syria’s reconstruction.

Moscow may adopt a more diplomatic posture as the new Syrian administration becomes a source of conflict between Russia and Iran.

As part of a potential comprehensive package that includes Syria and Ukraine, Azizi noted that the impact of al-Assad’s fall on both Russia and Iran will depend on a number of factors, including “whether or not there has been any behind-the-scenes agreement or understanding between Russia on one side and [the US, Turkiye, and]the former] Syrian rebels on the other.”

“For example, if Russia can maintain its military bases in Syria, albeit in a more reduced capacity, and if there is an agreement to end the war in Ukraine after]US President-elect] Donald Trump takes office, Russia may actually feel less need for Iranian support on various fronts in both Syria and Ukraine”, Azizi added, although he added that he believed any fundamental changes in Iran-Russia relations were unlikely given the “increasing depth of cooperation” in the past few years.

Divergence is also possible in other areas, particularly regarding the nuclear weapons controversy that the West has claimed Iran is trying to resolve. After Israel hit its allies, particularly Hezbollah in Lebanon, some Iranian factions have now publicly called for that to change. The Iranian defense doctrine explicitly opposes the use of nuclear weapons.

Russia has historically participated in Iran’s nuclear program, including helping to build the Bushehr nuclear power plant, but progress continued to stalk throughout the 2000s and 2010s, making some Iranians accuse Russia of being an unreliable partner. Due to the sanctions that Western nations placed on Tehran between 2010 and 2016, Moscow also delayed the launch of the S-300 missile defense system.

“Russia doesn’t want Iran to be equipped with nuclear weapons …]that] would change the balance of power in the Middle East against Russia’s interests. Iran’s continued sanctions and opposition to the US and Europe’s nuclear program are the best options for Russia, according to Armin Montazeri, editor of Hammihan Daily in Tehran.

Russia “would likely ask for concessions from the US regarding the Ukraine issue” if it cooperated in containing Iran, Montazeri continued.

Middle Eastern directions in new directions

As Syria has shown, geopolitical dynamics can always change depending on local circumstances, and relations between Iran and Russia may become strained because there are no strong ideological ties beyond an anti-US strategy.

In Turkiye’s cooperation with Iran and Russia, one can see how alliances are evolving.

In December 2024, as the Assad regime crumbled, the Turkish, Iranian, and Russian foreign ministers convened on the sidelines of the Doha Forum in Qatar.

The Astana process, a diplomatic initiative aimed at resolving the Syrian conflict, saw the participation of Turkiye and Russia as guarantors on the regime’s side.

Even though the three powers supported different sides, Astana gave them a chance to collaborate on achieving security objectives in Syria. But for most of the process, it was Turkiye that was in the weaker position, considering what was seen as al-Assad’s de facto victory in the war.

That has now changed, and it is Turkiye’s longstanding support for the former opposition that places it in a position of power vis-a-vis Iran and Russia, and a conduit for influence on Damascus.

They will have to adjust to this brand-new reality, according to Omer Ozkizilcik, Istanbul’s Omran Center for Strategic Studies director.

“Iran, while clearly disadvantaged, will have to adjust to the new reality and establish some form of relationship with Syria’s new government”, said Ozkizilcik, referring to the almost carte blanche the Assad regime gave Iran to operate within Syrian territory.

Russia’s intention is to maintain its bases in Syria, but it is doing so partially by flying to Libya, where it has a close relationship with the eastern government based in Benghazi, and by flying to its al-Khadim base on several occasions.

Iran, on the other hand, has seemingly retreated to Iraq in a bid to consolidate its position. According to reports, it has reportedly urged its allies in Iraq to stop firing rockets and drones at Israel, which may have resulted in US-Israeli attacks on their positions.

In this context, Iran is likely to shore up its influence in Iraq, “the last pillars of Iran’s axis of resistance”, said Montazeri.

Tehran, which rely on the country for economic support in the face of sanctions, is now benefited by Iraq’s importance as a financial resource and defensive buffer.

Iran has a history of adapting to shifting geopolitical dynamics, according to Seyed Emamian, co-founder of the Governance and Policy think tank in Tehran. It will be able to maintain its relationship with Russia in the face of change.

Regardless of any agreements signed between Russia and the US following Trump’s inauguration, Iran’s leadership does not anticipate that Putin will significantly alter his approach.

“Putin is well aware of the anti-Russian stance embedded in the US and European establishments”, Emamian said.

Source: Aljazeera