In June 2025, the United States had just struck Iranian nuclear sites, but rather than signal that the bombings were the opening salvo of a war between the US and Iran, President Donald Trump was quick to try to draw a line under the attack.
“Now is the time for peace,” was Trump’s message at the time.
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Fast forward to the present day, and Trump is threatening an even bigger attack, and backing up the threat with a large-scale movement of US military assets, including an aircraft carrier, towards Iranian waters.
Trump says that these threats are his way of convincing the Iranians to agree to a deal – reported to include demands to effectively end Iran’s nuclear programme, limit its ballistic missile programme, and stop support for allies across the Middle East.
This is the Trump school of foreign policy: heavy on threats, and willingness to carry out calibrated and – at least initially – confined military action, designed to avoid US military entrenchment. At the same time, Trump says that he is not necessarily a supporter of regime change, but leaves the door open for it.
Trump actively cultivates an image that may – in a more disparaging way – be called the “madman theory” of foreign policy. Said to have originally been coined by former US President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s, the idea is for the enemy to question just how far you are willing to go, even if it seems irrational.
The US assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 was one of the major examples of Trump acting this way during his first term. The unexpected killing of a senior state official of another country risked direct war and went against the opinions of many foreign policy experts. And yet Trump saw it as an act of deterrence and strength, and felt vindicated once it became clear the Iranians would not respond in kind.
In his second term, Trump has doubled down on this style of foreign policy, most notably in the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. It now serves to give added heft to his current threats towards Iran.
The tactic serves two separate instincts within Trump and those around him – a desire to appear to be different from the neoconservatives who took the US into the 2003 war and subsequent disastrous occupation of Iraq, while simultaneously weakening any force in the region deemed to be a threat to the US or its chief Middle Eastern ally, Israel.
In essence, Trump wants to use the threat of force – and the occasional attack – to get short-term “wins” that make US enemies weaker, while steering clear of any protracted engagements.
Can Trump be successful?
How long that can work for depends on the size of the goal. When limited concessions are acceptable to both the US and the adversary, Trump’s threats can potentially lead to results in his favour.
The US president’s current threat to “no longer help” Iraq if the pro-Iranian politician Nouri al-Maliki becomes prime minister is a case in point.
Trump may be imposing his will on Iraq, but it is a threat backed not by war, but by potential economic consequences, therefore reducing the sense that Iraqi sovereignty is under attack. It also leaves the door open to other politicians the US deems acceptable to be prime minister, including the man currently in the job, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Al-Sudani is within the same wider Shia political alliance as al-Maliki, but is considered not to be as close to Iran and does not have the latter’s baggage. Keeping al-Sudani in power instead of al-Maliki, if that does indeed happen, is a relatively easy deal to make in return for avoiding any US economic wrath – and allows Trump to secure another “win”.
In Syria, US policy appears to be more focused on gradual withdrawal, because Trump feels like he has a partner in the group that he can work with in President Ahmed al-Sharaa. US policy in Syria is fixated on two goals: ensuring that ISIL (ISIS) does not strengthen, and guaranteeing no threat towards Israel from Syria.
At the same time, Trump has no qualms in abandoning the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, a US ally now deemed surplus to requirements.
Instead, Gulf powers, led by Saudi Arabia, have said that they can vouch for the Syrian government and al-Sharaa, and for Trump, this is a way to largely wash his hands of at least one problem in a region he has long maintained is prone to endless wars.
Increasing complications
In Lebanon and Gaza, Trump has attempted to use the threat of military force to achieve two goals: an end to all-out war and for anti-US and anti-Israel forces to agree to disarm.
Trump’s policy goals in Lebanon and Gaza are less maximalist than in Iran, but achieving them will be more complex than the relatively moderate concessions demanded of Iraq.
In both Lebanon and Gaza, the US has stepped in after devastating Israeli wars and positioned itself as a peacemaker, despite backing Israel in both of the conflicts.
And yet peace is conditional on armed groups – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza – disarming completely. During the gradual negotiations in both instances, the US has presented itself as a restraining force on Israel, preventing a return to all-out war, but allowed Israel to carry out regular small-scale attacks that serve as reminders of what Israel and the US could carry out if their demands are not met.
But full disarmament is a bitter pill to swallow for both Hezbollah and Hamas.
In Syria, Hezbollah and its supporters would see this as accepting defeat in the fight against the US and Israel – a catastrophic blow for an organisation that sees itself as a resistance movement to those two powers.
Trump’s “Board of Peace“, the body established to oversee the administration of Gaza, is more palatable to Hamas to a point, but similarly, the full disarmament being demanded of the group will take away one of the central elements of its self-identity, even as Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land continues with no end in sight.
It is therefore likely that both Hezbollah and Hamas believe that agreeing to the demand to fully disarm is an existential matter, opening the door to a future breakdown of negotiations.
Long-term consequences
Iran’s past experience with Trump and perception of its own existential threat may test the limits of Trump’s approach to foreign policy.
Trump insists that he wants a deal, but the Iranian government is signalling that it simply does not believe him, based on what it believes to be his duplicitous previous attacks during negotiations, and his willingness to abduct foreign leaders as a means of projecting US power.
The Iranians appear to see few off-ramps, and based on their experience in the past year, now regard concessions as merely inviting further pressure.
The Islamic Republic – or at least elements within it – sees that its own survival is at stake. So now, for the US and Trump, it is the other side that may have nothing to lose. In these circumstances, can the “madman” foreign policy approach work?
