Archive January 30, 2026

In June 2025, the United States had just struck Iranian nuclear sites, but rather than signal that the bombings were the opening salvo of a war between the US and Iran, President Donald Trump was quick to try to draw a line under the attack.

“Now is the time for peace,” was Trump’s message at the time.

Fast forward to the present day, and Trump is threatening an even bigger attack, and backing up the threat with a large-scale movement of US military assets, including an aircraft carrier, towards Iranian waters.

Trump says that these threats are his way of convincing the Iranians to agree to a deal – reported to include demands to effectively end Iran’s nuclear programme, limit its ballistic missile programme, and stop support for allies across the Middle East.

This is the Trump school of foreign policy: heavy on threats, and willingness to carry out calibrated and – at least initially – confined military action, designed to avoid US military entrenchment. At the same time, Trump says that he is not necessarily a supporter of regime change, but leaves the door open for it.

Trump actively cultivates an image that may – in a more disparaging way – be called the “madman theory” of foreign policy. Said to have originally been coined by former US President Richard Nixon in the late 1960s, the idea is for the enemy to question just how far you are willing to go, even if it seems irrational.

The US assassination of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani in 2020 was one of the major examples of Trump acting this way during his first term. The unexpected killing of a senior state official of another country risked direct war and went against the opinions of many foreign policy experts. And yet Trump saw it as an act of deterrence and strength, and felt vindicated once it became clear the Iranians would not respond in kind.

In his second term, Trump has doubled down on this style of foreign policy, most notably in the abduction of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. It now serves to give added heft to his current threats towards Iran.

The tactic serves two separate instincts within Trump and those around him – a desire to appear to be different from the neoconservatives who took the US into the 2003 war and subsequent disastrous occupation of Iraq, while simultaneously weakening any force in the region deemed to be a threat to the US or its chief Middle Eastern ally, Israel.

In essence, Trump wants to use the threat of force – and the occasional attack – to get short-term “wins” that make US enemies weaker, while steering clear of any protracted engagements.

Can Trump be successful?

How long that can work for depends on the size of the goal. When limited concessions are acceptable to both the US and the adversary, Trump’s threats can potentially lead to results in his favour.

The US president’s current threat to “no longer help” Iraq if the pro-Iranian politician Nouri al-Maliki becomes prime minister is a case in point.

Trump may be imposing his will on Iraq, but it is a threat backed not by war, but by potential economic consequences, therefore reducing the sense that Iraqi sovereignty is under attack. It also leaves the door open to other politicians the US deems acceptable to be prime minister, including the man currently in the job, Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.

Al-Sudani is within the same wider Shia political alliance as al-Maliki, but is considered not to be as close to Iran and does not have the latter’s baggage. Keeping al-Sudani in power instead of al-Maliki, if that does indeed happen, is a relatively easy deal to make in return for avoiding any US economic wrath – and allows Trump to secure another “win”.

In Syria, US policy appears to be more focused on gradual withdrawal, because Trump feels like he has a partner in the group that he can work with in President Ahmed al-Sharaa. US policy in Syria is fixated on two goals: ensuring that ISIL (ISIS) does not strengthen, and guaranteeing no threat towards Israel from Syria.

At the same time, Trump has no qualms in abandoning the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, a US ally now deemed surplus to requirements.

Instead, Gulf powers, led by Saudi Arabia, have said that they can vouch for the Syrian government and al-Sharaa, and for Trump, this is a way to largely wash his hands of at least one problem in a region he has long maintained is prone to endless wars.

Increasing complications

In Lebanon and Gaza, Trump has attempted to use the threat of military force to achieve two goals: an end to all-out war and for anti-US and anti-Israel forces to agree to disarm.

Trump’s policy goals in Lebanon and Gaza are less maximalist than in Iran, but achieving them will be more complex than the relatively moderate concessions demanded of Iraq.

In both Lebanon and Gaza, the US has stepped in after devastating Israeli wars and positioned itself as a peacemaker, despite backing Israel in both of the conflicts.

And yet peace is conditional on armed groups – Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza – disarming completely. During the gradual negotiations in both instances, the US has presented itself as a restraining force on Israel, preventing a return to all-out war, but allowed Israel to carry out regular small-scale attacks that serve as reminders of what Israel and the US could carry out if their demands are not met.

But full disarmament is a bitter pill to swallow for both Hezbollah and Hamas.

In Syria, Hezbollah and its supporters would see this as accepting defeat in the fight against the US and Israel – a catastrophic blow for an organisation that sees itself as a resistance movement to those two powers.

Trump’s “Board of Peace“, the body established to oversee the administration of Gaza, is more palatable to Hamas to a point, but similarly, the full disarmament being demanded of the group will take away one of the central elements of its self-identity, even as Israel’s occupation of Palestinian land continues with no end in sight.

It is therefore likely that both Hezbollah and Hamas believe that agreeing to the demand to fully disarm is an existential matter, opening the door to a future breakdown of negotiations.

Long-term consequences

Iran’s past experience with Trump and perception of its own existential threat may test the limits of Trump’s approach to foreign policy.

Trump insists that he wants a deal, but the Iranian government is signalling that it simply does not believe him, based on what it believes to be his duplicitous previous attacks during negotiations, and his willingness to abduct foreign leaders as a means of projecting US power.

The Iranians appear to see few off-ramps, and based on their experience in the past year, now regard concessions as merely inviting further pressure.

The Islamic Republic – or at least elements within it – sees that its own survival is at stake. So now, for the US and Trump, it is the other side that may have nothing to lose. In these circumstances, can the “madman” foreign policy approach work?

After several years of suspension, political parties in Burkina Faso have been formally dissolved by the military government, which has also seized all their assets in a move analysts say is a major blow for democracy in the West African nation.

In a decree issued on Thursday, the government, led by Captain Ibrahim Traore, scrapped all laws which established and regulated political parties, accusing them of failing to comply with guidelines.

The troubled West African nation is struggling with violence from armed groups linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda. It is one of a growing number of West and Central African nations to have undergone coups in recent years.

Traore seized power in September 2022, eight months after an earlier military coup had already overthrown the democratically elected President Roch Marc Kabore.

Despite strong criticism by rights groups and opposition politicians of his authoritarian approach, 37-year-old Traore has successfully built up an online cult-like following among pan-Africanists, with many likening him to the late Burkinabe revolutionary leader, Thomas Sankara.

Traore’s anti-colonial and anti-imperial pronouncements are often shown in high-definition, AI-generated videos that have gained him widespread admiration across the internet.

But the decision to ban political parties does not sit well for democracy, Dakar-based analyst Beverly Ochieng of the Control Risks intelligence firm, told Al Jazeera.

“The military government will [remain] highly influential, especially after a recent decree appointing Traore in a supervisory capacity in the judiciary,” Ochieng said, referring to a December 2023 constitutional change which placed courts directly under government control.

Going forward, “there will be very limited division of powers or autonomy across the civic and political space,” Ochieng said, adding that the military government will likely keep extending its stay in power.

Why have political parties been banned?

The Burkinabe government claims the existing political parties were not following the codes which established them.

In a televised statement following a Council of Ministers meeting on Thursday, when the new decree was approved, Interior Minister Emile Zerbo said the decision was part of a broader effort to “rebuild the state” after alleged widespread abuses and dysfunction in the country’s multiparty system.

A government review, he said, had found that the multiplication of political parties had fuelled divisions and weakened social cohesion in the country.

“The government believes that the proliferation of political parties has led to excesses, fostering division among citizens and weakening the social fabric,” Zerbo said.

He did not give details of the political parties’ alleged excesses.

How did political parties operate in the past?

Before the 2022 coup, which brought the current military leadership to power, Burkina Faso had more than 100 registered political parties, with 15 represented in parliament after the 2020 general elections.

The largest was the ruling People’s Movement for Progress (MPP), which had 56 of 127 seats in parliament. It was followed by the Congress for Democracy and Progress, with 20 seats, and the New Era for Democracy with 13 seats.

But the civilian government faced months of protests as thousands took to the streets to demonstrate against growing insecurity from armed groups in large parts of the country.

In 2022, Traore took power, promising to put an end to violence by armed groups. He also promised the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) bloc that his government would hold elections by 2024.

But political parties were banned from holding rallies after the 2022 coup and, a month before the 2024 deadline, Traore’s government postponed elections to 2029 after holding a national conference, which was boycotted by several political parties.

Burkina Faso, along with Mali and Niger, withdrew from ECOWAS to form the Alliance of Sahel States, a new economic and military alliance in January last year. They also withdrew from the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In July 2025, Traore’s government dissolved the Independent National Electoral Commission, saying the agency was too expensive.

Has insecurity worsened under Traore?

Landlocked Burkina Faso is currently grappling with several armed groups which have seized control of land in the country’s north, south and west, amounting to about 60 percent of the country, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS).

The most active groups are the al-Qaeda-backed Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP), which also operate in neighbouring Mali and Niger.

The groups want to rule over territory according to strict Islamic laws and are opposed to secularism.

By December 2024, all three Alliance of Sahel States countries had cut ties with former colonial power France and instead turned to Russian fighters for security support after accusing Paris of overly meddling in their countries.

Between them, they expelled more than 5,000 French soldiers who had previously provided support in the fight against armed groups. A smaller contingent of about 2,000 Russian security personnel is now stationed across the three countries.

But violence in Burkina Faso and the larger Sahel region has worsened.

Fatalities have tripled in the three years since Traore took power to reach 17,775 – mostly civilians – by last May, compared with the three years prior, when combined recorded deaths were 6,630, the ACSS recorded.

In September, Human Rights Watch accused JNIM and ISSP of massacring civilians in northern Djibo, Gorom Gorom and other towns, and of causing the displacement of tens of thousands since 2016.

HRW has also similarly accused the Burkinabe military and an allied militia group, Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland, of atrocities against civilians suspected of cooperating with armed groups. In attacks on northern Nondin and Soro villages in early 2024, the military killed 223 civilians, including 56 babies and children, HRW said in an April 2024 report.

Mali and Niger have similarly recorded attacks by the armed groups. Malian capital Bamako has been sealed off from fuel supplies by JNIM fighters for months.

On Wednesday night, the Nigerien military held off heavy attacks on the airport in the capital city, Niamey. No armed group has yet claimed responsibility.

Is the civic space shrinking in Burkina Faso?

Since it took power, the government in Ouagadougou has been accused by rights groups of cracking down on dissent and restricting press and civic freedoms.

All political activities were first suspended immediately after the coup.

In April 2024, the government also took aim at the media, ordering internet service providers to suspend access to the websites and other digital platforms of the BBC, Voice of America and HRW.

Meanwhile, authorities have forced dozens of government critics into military service and sent them to fight against armed groups. Several prominent journalists and judges have been arrested after speaking out against increasingly restrictive rules on press and judiciary freedom.

Abdoul Gafarou Nacro, a deputy prosecutor at the country’s High Court, was one of at least five senior members of the judiciary to be forcibly conscripted and sent to fight armed groups in August 2024 after speaking out against the military government. Nacro’s whereabouts are currently unknown.

In April 2025, three abducted journalists resurfaced in a social media video 10 days after they went missing, in one example. All three – Guezouma Sanogo, Boukari Ouoba, and Luc Pagbelguem – were wearing military fatigues in an apparent forced conscription. They have all since been released.